Bal Raj Tuli, J. - (1.) THE Appellant was selected by the Punjab Public Service Commission for the post of Secretary, District Board, Ferozepur, in 1961, and was appointed as Secretary by that Board on March 21, 1381, with the approval of the Punjab Government. He was confirmed by resolution No. 11 dated February 2, 1963, passed by the District Board with effect from the date of his appointment. By a resolution of the District Board passed at its special emergent meeting held on November 7, 1964, the Appellant was suspended pending enquiry into charges which were to be communicated to him. Subsequently, in a meeting of the District Board held on November 26, 1964, a resolution was passed for the discharge of the Appellant from. service by giving him one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice under Rule 1(1) in part V -A of the District Board Rules, 1926, and condition No. 4 of the terms of his appointment. Another resolution was passed in the same meeting not to proceed with the enquiry into the various charges against the Appellant in view of the decision to discharge him from service. The order of discharge was served on the Appellant on February 10, 1965, when he received it through registered post. The Appellant then submitted a representation to the Punjab Government on April 7, 1965, to which he received a reply dated May 5, 1965, informing that he should approach the Commissioner of the Division. On June 7, 1965, the Appellant again approached the Punjab Government for its interference under Section 50 of the District Boards Act, 1883, as a special casein view of the circumstances leading to his suspension and subsequent discharge from service but without success. Having thus received no redress from the Punjab Government, the Appellant filed a suit on December 14, 1967, praying for a declaration to the effect that the order terminating his services, vide District Board Resolution No. 2 dated November 26, 1964, being in reality one of dismissal/removal from service was illegal, void, ultra vires, arbitrary, unjust, mala fide and against the provisions of the Constitution of India and the rules governing the service of the Appellant and contrary to the canons of justice and equity and that the Appellant still continued to be in the service of the District Board, Ferozepur (now Zila Parihad, Ferozepur), a Secretary, entitled to all the emoluments and benefits admissible to him. This suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on January 9, 1969. Against that decree, the Zila Parishad, Ferozepur, filed an appeal before the District Judge, Ferozepur, which was dismissed on December 22, 1969, by the III Additional District Judge, Ferozepur. Against that decree, R.S.A. 186 of 1970, was filed in this Court which was accepted by the learned Single Judge on September 18, 1970, and the suit of the Appellant was dismissed. After obtaining the leave of the learned Single Judge, the Appellant filed L.P.A. 78 of 1971 which was heard by my Lord the Chief Justice and myself on September 15, 1972, and in view of certain judgments, which were brought to our notice, we decided to refer the following question of law to a Full Bench for decision: Whether the termination of services of a permanent District Board employee by giving him one month's notice in terms of the conditions of his appointment is bad in law and cannot be made? Consequently, this Bench has been constituted to decide that reference.
(2.) DURING the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the parties suggested that the question of law should be reframed so as to include Rule 1 in part V - -A of the District Board Rules, 1926, along with the conditions of the Appellant's appointment, as the impugned order was passed under both the provisions. We have, accordingly, reframed the question of law as under: Whether the termination of services of a permanent District Board employee by giving him one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof in terms of the conditions of his appointment and/or Rule 1 in part V - -A of the District Board Rules. 1926, is bad in law and cannot be made? It has thus to be determined whether the Appellant, a permanent Secretary of the District Board, Ferozepur, could be discharged from service by giving him one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice under Rule 1(1) in Part V - -A of the District Board Rules, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), or Clause 4 of his letter of appointment containing the conditions of his service or both. Shri Jagan Nath Kaushal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, has vehemently stressed that the Appellant was appointed to a statutory post and after entry into service, he acquired a status and was governed by the Punjab Civil Services Rules and condition 4 in the letter of appointment ceased to have any 1 operation after he was confirmed. Support is sought for this submission from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of Indian and Anr. : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1889: It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office, the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servants is more one of status than of contract. The hallmark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The emoluments of the Government servant and his terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Government under Article 310. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In my view, the Appellant, not being a Government servant, cannot rely upon these observations. The post of the Secretary of a District Board was neither statutory nor was the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution available to him as he was not a civil servant under the Central Government or the State Government.
(3.) SECTION 27 of the District Boards Act, 1883 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), provided for the employment of officers and servants by the District Board as may be necessary and proper for the efficient execution of its duties and of the duties of the local boards acting under it. The appointment of a Secretary had, however, to be made by the Board with the approval of the State Government, if it decided to appoint a Secretary. There was no section in the Act making it obligatory or mandatory for the District Board to appoint a Secretary like Section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, wherein a mandatory provision for the appointment of a Secretary has been made in the following words: 38 (1). Every committee shall, from time to time, at a special meeting, appoint, subject to the approval of the State Government, one of its members or any other person to be its secretary, and may, at a like meeting, suspend, remove dismiss or otherwise punish any person so appointed. Such a provision is also to be found in Section 98(2) of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila parishads Act, 1961, as under: 98 (2) There shall be a Secretary of the Zila Parishad, who shall be appointed by the Government on receipt of a proposal from the Zila Parishad. Sub -section (3) of Section 88 ibid provides: 88(3) The Secretary shall exercise and perform such powers and functions as may be prescribed and shall be entitled to take part in the meetings of the Zila Parishad or of any standing committee thereof, but shall not be entitled to vote or move any resolution. The Punjab Government has also made special rules called 'The Punjab Zila Parishads (Powers and Functions of Secretaries) Rules, 1962, prescribing the powers and duties of the Secretary of a Zila Parishad. The Rules, however, do not make any provision for the appointment of a Secretary to the Board. In view of the different provisions with regard to Secretary in the three Acts, discussed above, the post of Secretary of a Municipal Committee or a Jila Parishad can be said to be a statutory post but not the post of a Secretary of the District Board. A District Board was, therefore, not under any statutory obligation to appoint a person to be its Secretary. It was for the District Board to determine whether a Secretary should be appointed or not. It may be noticed here that District Boards were abolished and replaced by Zila Parishads some time after the discharge of the Appellant from service and his case is to be decided in the light of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.;