- (1.) THE Patiala and East Punjab States Union published a notification dated April 14, 1954, in the Patiala arid East Punjab States Union Government Gazette dated April 25, 1954, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of I894, (here in after called the Act) which had been extended to that State by the Patiala end East Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act, 1953, wherein it was stated that the land mentioned in the notification was likely to be required to be taken by Government at public expense for a public purpose, namely, for construction of roads in notified area No. 1 and that any person interested, who had any objection to the acquisition of any land, should file his objection within 30 days of the publication of the notification before the Collector, Patiala district. A notification under Section 6 of the said Act was published on March 29, 1955, which was later on superseded by notification dated September 30, 1955. Under these notifications, the land of Shri Bhagwan Singh Grewal was acquired. The Collector made his award under Section 9 of the said Act on March 14, 1956, and on the next day, that is, March 15, 1956, he received the amount of compensation without making any protest vide receipt Exhibit R. W. 1/a of that date. On April 24, 1966, Shri Bhagwan Singh Grewal made an application lor reference under Section 18 of the Act which was forwarded by the Collector to the Court of the District Judge on April 30, 1956. A notice of that reference was issued to the State of Pepsu through the Collector, Patiala, who filed his reply dated August 11, 1996. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:-1. Is the application for reference made within time?
(2.) HAS the petitioner accepted the compensation amount without any protest and hence this reference is not competent?
(3.) HAS the petitioner not been awarded adequate compensation and, if so, what it should be? 2. The case was then adjourned to September 13, 1956, for the evidence of the claimant. Since Bhagwan Singh did not produce any evidence on that date, the District Judge, Patiala, dismissed the reference for non-prosecution. Against that order, an appeal (F. A. O. 13 of 1957) was filed in this Court which was accepted by R. P. Khosla, J. , on April 27, 1959, and the case was remitted back to the District, Judge for decision in accordance with law after allowing the parties an opportunity to lead necessary evidence in support of their respective contentions. From the order of R. P. Khosla, J. , it appears that Bhagwan Singh died on or about January 15, 1957, and his widow Smt. Harcharan Kaur got herself impleaded as his legal representative. In the meantime, the merger of the States of Pepsu and Punjab took place with effect from November 1, 1956, and the State of Punjab defended the case thereafter. The learned District Judge recorded the evi- dence of the parties and accepted the reference by order dated October 20, 1959, by deciding all the issues in favour of the claimant and enhanced the amount of compensation. Against that decree, the State of Punjaib filed this appeal which came up" for hearing before my learned brethren (Sandhawalia and Suri, JJ.) when the learned counsel for the appellant stated that he did not press the point of limitation and the only objection, pressed was that the reference before the District Judge was not legally competent as the application under Section 18 of the Act had been made by a person who had accepted the award by receiving payment of the compensation without protest. In view of the conflict of authorities, my learned brethren felt that the following question of law should be decided by a larger Bench:- "can the Court, after a reference has been made to it by the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dismiss or decline the reference on the ground that the applicant was a person who had accepted the Collector's award by receiving, without protest, the compensation amount determined by the Collector?" and directed that the records of the case should be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench. This is how this case has come up before this Bench for decision. 3. There were two reported judgments of Mahajan, J. , dealing with this point which were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The first judgment in point of time is Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1970 Cur LJ 66, wherein the compensation was accepted by the claimant in accordance with the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector and later on he made an application under Section 18 of the Act for reference to the District Judge. His case was referred to the District Judge by the Collector in spite of the provisions of Section 31 (2), second proviso, of the Act and the question was raised before the District Judge whether the referenca was valid. That reference was heard by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ferozepur, who had been empowered to hear and decide such references. Before him two points were raised, namely, that the application before the Collector was barred toy time and the petitioner had received the payment of compensation without protest and, therefore, the application was not maintainable. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge held that the plea of limitation could not be raised in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. The State of Pepsu, ILR (1958) 1 Punj 854 = (AIR 1958 Punj 490 ). He, however, held that the petitioner was not entitled to any enhancement in compensation because he had received the payment of compensation in accordance with the award without protest. The application of the claimant was thus dismissed. Against that decree, R. F. A. No. 311 of 1960 = (reported in 1970 Curr LJ 68) (Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab) was filed in this Court which was dismissed by Mahajan, J. , with the following observations:- "the short contention advanced by the learned Advocate-General is that there is no merit in this appeal because the claimant accepted the compensation after the award without protest; and if he does so, he has no right to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act in view of the provisions of Section 31 (2), Second Proviso; and, in any event, if a reference is made, it is open to the Court not to Rive him relief in view of his having accepted the compensation without protest--in other words, having accepted the award as a good award. Reference is also made to Section 20, Clause (b) of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the contention of the learned Advocate-General is sound and must prevail. The learned Advocate-General does not contend that the reference before the District Judge was without jurisdiction and could not toe entertained. He admits that there was a valid reference to the District Judge. But it is another matter, if a person is precluded by the Statute from contesting the award; and the reason for that is that under Section 31 (2), Second Proviso read with Section 20 (b), there is a clear indication that a person, who accents the award without protest, cannot question it. Moreover, there is no estoppel against a statute. There is no provision regarding limitation in Section 31. This is a matter which was solely within the jurisdiction of the Collector while determining the question, whether a reference should or should not be made. But there is a positive bar to a reference if the amount has been accepted without protest, under Section 31 (2), Second Proviso; and in any event, even if a reference is made in ignorance of that provision, as it appears from the present case, Section 20 (b) clearly gives jurisdiction to the Court to non-suit the claimant if he has accepted the award without protest, that is, he has accepted the amount awarded without protest. I see no escape from this conclusion. The view, I have taken of the matter, finds support from the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Suresh Chandra Roy v. The Land Acquisition Collector, Chinsurah, AIR 1964 Cal 263. ";