R.S. Narula, J. - (1.) THIS is an alleged sub -tenant's petition under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act) for revision of the order of Shri M.L. Singla, Rent Controller, Fazilka, dated March 24, 1973, permitting the landlord -Respondent to produce evidence, "in rubuttal" after the, conclusion of the evidence of the tenant and the sub -tenant in spite of the fact that the burden of proof of all the issues framed in the application for ejectment is on the landlord -Respondent and the onus probandi of no issue is on either the tenant or the subtenant.
(2.) MR . Nand Lal Dhingra, learned Counsel for the landlord, has raised two preliminary objections to the maintainability of this petition. His first objection is that the jurisdiction of this Court under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 of the Act is confined to interference with the final orders passed under the Act, and it is not permissible to this Court to test or rectify the propriety or legality of an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller in the course of the proceedings under the Act. In support of this objection counsel has relied on an unreported judgment of I.D. Dua, J., in Ruldu Ram and three Ors. v. Shri Sarup Chand C.R. No. 528 of 1963 decided on 13th January, 1964. Ruldu Ram and three others had filed that petition against the order of the Agnate Authority regrinding the case to the Rent Controller for diffident a particular issue. The objection raised in this Court to the maintainability of that revision petition was that the appeal of the other side had not yet been finally disposed of, that a revision petition under Section 15(5) would be competent against the final appellate order, that in the course of the hearing of such a revision petition fee order of remand could also be challenged if the Petitioners (in that case) so wanted and that the High Court should not interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority in the course of the hearing of the appeal. While dealing with that objection, Dua, J., held that Section 15(5) though widely worded and though (Creating no bar to revisions against interlocutory orders, should normally be confined to final orders. The learned Judge did not, in my opinion, even impliedly hold that petitions for revision Under Section 15(5) of the Act against interlocutory orders are either not authorised by that provision or the same were barred by any law. On the other hand the learned Judge made it clear that Section 15(5) does not create any bar to the maintainability of petitions for revision against interlocutory orders. It was only by way of caution that it was observed that normally such revision petitions should be filed against only final orders. The learned Judge did not refuse to hear fee petition because of want of jurisdiction in this Court to do so, but held feat since the exercise of revisional power was discretionary in this Court, fee Judge was disinclined to express any opinion on fee impugned order at feat stage leaving it open to fee aggrieved party to urge fee same matter if it became necessary for him to come to this Court against the final order in which all fee interlocutory orders would be open to revision and consideration. Dua, J.'s judgment in the case of Ruldu Ram and others (supra) is, therefore, no authority for fee proposition that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15(5), of the Act is confined to final orders passed under fee Act and does not extend to non -appealable interlocutory orders passed by fee Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority. Mr. Dhingra has also referred to the penultimate paragraph of my judgment in Chaman Lal Narang v. Ashwani Kumar and Ors. C.R. No. 683 of 1973 decided on 16th January, 1974, wherein I have referred to the observations of Dua, J., in the case of Ruldu Ram and Ors. I do not think that my observations in that judgment can in any manner advance or support the Respondent's objection. I also attach some significance to the expression "proceedings taken" used in Sub -section (5) of Section 15 in addition to the earlier alternative of "order passed". The fact that a petition for revision has been provided not only .against "any order passed", but also against "any proceeding taken" shows that the scope of the provision is certainly not confined to a final order. There is, therefore, no merit in the first preliminary objection of Mr. Dhingra and I have no hesitation at all in repelling the same. At the same time I must observe that howsoever wide the power of the High Court under Sub -section (5) of Section 15 may be, it is all the same necessary that it should be exercised sparingly and only in a fit case where the order is either not legal or not proper in the circumstances of the case. The second objection of Mr. Dhingra is that the order of the trial Court is appeal able and therefore, no petition for revision of the same is competent unless the Petitioner first exhausts his remedy by way of appeal. In support of this proposition Mr. Dhingra has invited my attention to the judgment of A.N. Grover, J. in L. Mulkh Raj v. The Municipal Committee Dharamsala C.R. No. 440 of 1957 decided on 21st November, 1958. That petition had been filed in this Court against the order of the Rent Controller in a proceeding for fixation of fair rent wherein he had held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to that litigation, and had, therefore, dismissed the petition, but at the same time he had also assessed the fair rent of the premises. The tenant came to this Court without first preferring any appeal against the order of Rent Controller to the Appellate Authority under Clause (b) of Sub -section (1) of Section 15 of the Act. The appeal had not been filed because it had become barred by time. Grover, J. before whom the revision petition came up for hearing accepted the preliminary objection raised before him on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Dharamsala, to the effect that a Court of revision should not interfere with an order if an alternative remedy by way of appeal against that order was available. In the course of the order, the learned Judge observed that this Court has very wide powers of revision under Section 15, but it would be neither expedient nor proper to interfere unless a cogent reason is given for not preferring an appeal in order to Have the decision of the Appellate Authority as provided by Section 15. The decision of this Court in L. Mulkh Raj's case C.R. No. 440 of 1957 decided on 21st November, 1958, (supra) does not appear to support the Respondent's objection at. all. The order of the Rent Controller in that case was not an interlocutory one, but a final one. It was admittedly an appealable order and therefore, this Court expressed the view that the order should not be interfered with in revision. It was neither contended nor held that the petition for revision did not lie under Section 15(5) of the Act. Despite the view taken about the non -advisability and inexpediency of entertaining the revision petition, Grover, J. still went into the controversy and held that there was no ground to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller even on merits in view of an earlier binding Division Bench judgment of this Court on the point which was sought to be agitated before him. In the instant case, the order passed by the Rent Controller did not dispose of the petition for eviction. It was admittedly an interlocutory order. No appeal against that order lies to the Appellate Authority under Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub -section (1) of Section 15 of the Act. It was held by this Court Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Gursharan Singh v. Madan Lal, 1968 P.L.R. 955, that an order of a Rent Controller refusing to stay proceedings under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable as it is not under Sections 4, 10, 12 or 13 of the Act, and that the revision petition to this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act against such an order was competent. An order passed by the Rent Controller impleading a party was held to be not appealable under Section 15 in Janki Dass v. Hazara Singh C.R. No. 371 of 1957 decided on 30th July, 1958, by Gosain, J. Similarly in Ved Parkash Kapur v. Harish Chander Rastogi and Anr., 1967 P.L.R. (Del) 165, an order refusing to implead a stranger as a party was held to be not appealable as it did not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. An order allowing the substitution of legal representatives was held to be not appealable in Niadra v. Nanneh, 1960 P.L.R. 451.
(3.) AN appeal is creation of a statute and there is no inherent power in an Appellate Authority to entertain ah appeal which is not expressly provided by law.;