Prem Chand Pandit, J. - (1.) THE dispute in this case relates to a building situated in Amritsar which belongs to Mohan Lal his four sons and his wife. It was mortgaged with possession by these owners in March 1949 with Firm Hira Lal Brothers of Amritsar, hereafter called the firm, for Rs. 15,000/ -. Subsequent to this mortgage, it appears that this building was acquired under the Punjab Town improvement Act, 1922, (hereinafter called the Act'). In consequence thereof, notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were issued It is not quite clear on the present record as to when the said a (sic) were published. But even according to the statement made by the Learned Counsel for the sons of Mohan Lal on December 19, 1970 the claims were put in before the land Acquisition Collector by the firm on May 22, 1967. In January 1970, the mortgagors brought a suit for possession of this property by redemption against the firm. It was the allegation of the plaintiffs, that the firm had already received more than Rs. 40,000/ - and consequently, nothing was due from them. During the pendency of this suit, the firm on February 20, 1970, made an application under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') for staying the said suit on the ground that the matter in dispute was already pending before the Lard Acquisition Collector. This application was accepted by the learned trial Judge and against that decision the plaintiffs here in revision. This petition was, in the first instance, placed before Harbans Singh, C.J., who, on August 11, 1972, observed that the point involved was an important one and likely to arise in a number of cases and, therefore, it would be better if the same was decided by larger Bench. That is how the matter has been placed before us.
(2.) IT is the common case of the parties that the provisions of section 10 of the Code do not apply to the present case. It is, however, the contention of the respondent -firm that the suit could be stayed under the inherent powers of the Court mentioned in section 151 of the Code. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners however, contests this proposition and says that if a party is unable to bring his case within the four corners of section 10 of the Code, then the suit cannot be stayed under the inherent powers of the Court stated in section 151. No authority taking that view has been cited before us Reliance was, however placed by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners on a Supreme Court decision in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Raj Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal : A.I.R. 1962 SC 527. But all that was stated there was that the provisions of section 10 of the Code were clear, definite and mandatory. A court in which a subsequent suit had been filed, was prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit in certain specified circumstances. When there was a special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers under section 151 was not justified. The provisions of section 10 did not become in applicable on a Court holding that the previously instituted suit was vexatious suit or had been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract. This authority has no where limited the inherent powers of the Court. If a person can prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the said powers should be exercised in his favour and a particular suit be stayed, that can be done under section 151 of the Code. As held by Dua J. in Smt. Janak Rani v. Chanan Singh, 1963 Cur. L.J. P&H. 131, Section 151 undoubtedly confers inherent powers on the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to preventable of the process of the Court. The Court is not helpless when circumstances, not covered by the express provisions of the Code, call for an order to promote the ends of justice, for no precise rules can be made by human agency which will exactly cover all conceivable and infinitely varying circumstances likely to arise in future. But the inherent power will be invoked only in rare cases, when clearly the ends of justice demand it. Applying these principles to this case, it will be seen that the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector started much before the institution of the suit in 1970. The points of controversy in the present suit arise for determination in the Land Acquisition proceedings as well. There is no quarrel with that proposition. It is also conceded by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners that the ultimate decision in the land acquisition case will act as res judicata between the parties so far as the matters involved in the present suit are concurred. Those proceedings had admittedly, been instituted earlier than the present suit. So, we allow them to go on and it is just possible that they might have even ended by now, because the Learned Counsel the parties are not able to assist us in this behalf. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, we are of the view that the trial Judge has acted correctly in exercising his discretion in passing the order of stay under the provisions of section 151 of the Code. That being so, this petition fails and is dismissed, but with no order as, to costs. ;