Shamsher Bahadur, J. - (1.) THE petitioner Harnam Singh has challenged in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the transference of house No. B.V/405 situated in Ludhiana by the Settlement authorities who are respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in favour of the State respondent, Som Raj.
(2.) IT is not disputed that three rooms out of four in property No. B.V/405 in Ludhiana City was allotted in the first instance to the petitioner. The fourth room was allotted to the fifth respondent Smt. Budhwanti, who is the mother of Som Raj the sixth respondent. The order of allotment which was passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer on 6th April, 1959 refers to Som Raj as "another co -allottee whose claim is likely to be rejected under Rule 65." The evacuee property of house No. B.Y/405 was thus allotted to the petitioner and the fifth respondent. Som Raj, however, filed an appeal to the settlement Officer who by his order of the 28th June, 1961, directed (sic) transfer of the whole house in his favour on the ground that the suit of Rs. 2,645/ - representing compensation payable to him was nearest to the value of the property which was assessed at Rs. 3,708/ -, the compensation payable to the petitioner being Rs. 2,195 -50. The fifth respondent to whom one room has been allotted has not a verified claim. Rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act says that "if more persons than one holding verified claims are in occupation of any acquired evacuee property which is an allot table property, the property shall be offered to the person whose compensation was the nearest to the value of the property." It may be mentioned that the rule was subsequently amended to give preference to the person whose gross compensation was the highest. Under the Explanation, this rule is applicable also "where some of the persons in occupation of any acquired evacuee property which is an allot table property hold verified claims and some do not hold such claims. The Settlement Officer hearing the appeal took the view that Som Raj being a co -occupant with his mother was entitled to the allotment on the ground that his compensation was the nearest to the assessed value of the property. The present petitioner being aggrieved from this order preferred a petition for revision which was dismissed by Shri Sapra on 29th September, 1961. Thereafter a representation was made under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and this was also dismissed. The petitioner has now invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The first point taken by Mr. Nayar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the sixth respondent was not entitled to the allotment under Rule 30 as he was not an original allottee. It has to be borne in mind that the entitlement under Rule 30 is based not on original allotment but on occupation of the acquired evacuee property. It may be that the mother of the sixth respondent was an actual allottee but it has not been controverted that he was in occupation of it or the sixth respondent might have been living with his mother for aught one can say. The view taken by the Settlement Commissioner in appeal cannot be said to be unreasonable and indeed finds support from a Division Bench of this Court (S.B. Capoor and Pandit JJ.) in Atma Singh v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and others, I.L.R. (1963) 2 P&H. 685. In this case, Ajit Singh claimed the property under Rule 30 although his son Mohinder Singh was an actual allottee. Ajit Singh was considered to be as much an occupant of the property as his son Mohinder Singh. On a parity of reasoning it must be concluded that the sixth respondent who is the son of the allottee is entitled to the allotment under Rule 30. Mr. Nayar has invited my attention to two unreported judgments of this Court. The first one is by Dulat J. in Kunj Lal v. Union of India C.W. No. 83 of 1960, decided on 24th January, 1961. What came for consideration in this case was whether a member of a joint Hindu family in occupation of a portion of the building as an allottee could entitle the entire joint Hindu family to claim preference under Rule 30. The Chief Settlement Commissioner took the view that actual allottee alone should be considered to be in occupation and Dulat J., while saying that the other view is also possible said that the view taken by the Department could not be said to be palpably wrong. From these observations, the proposition in support of the petitioner's contention cannot possibly be deduced. The view of the Chief Settlement Commissioner not having (sic) found to be unreasonable, the Court did not interfere and there (sic)rdly any support for the proposition that a person in occupation, through not an allottee, is not entitled to the transference of the property under Rule 30. The other judgment is by Grover J. in which observations of Dulat J. have been accepted. This is Tirath Dass etc. v. The Union of India etc. C.W. No. 1112 at 1961, Civil Writ No. 1112 of 1961 decided on 9th March, 1962. In my opinion, the Bench authority of this Court in Atma Singh's case 1 is more to the point and must be followed.
(3.) THE second submission of the learned counsel relates to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority to deal with an appeal which was barred by time. Under section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, an appeal has to be filed to the Settlement Commissioner within thirty days from the date of the order. Under the proviso, however, the Settlement Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days. Now it is not clear from the record when the appeal was actually filed. We have only the date of decision which is 28th June, 1961. As against the assertion of the petitioner there is an affidavit by the respondents that the appeal before the Settlement Commissioner was filed in time. The point was never raised before the Settlement Commissioner who heard the appeal nor was it taken before the revisional authority which dismissed the revision of the petitioner on 29th November, 1961. Thus there is no material to substantiate the allegation that the appeal was filed beyond thirty days. Even assuming that it was barred by time, it is not clear whether the Settlement Commissioner did not extend the period of limitation as he could have done under the proviso to Rule 22. This contention must, therefore, be repelled.;