AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH,J. - (1.) (ORAL)Petitioner has approached this Court, praying for quashing of the order dated 31.7.2007 (Annexure P -4) passed by the Superintendent of Police, District Rohtak, dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that he has been convicted by the Special Judge, Rohtak, for offences under Sections 420, 161 IPC as also under Sections 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, "the Corruption Act"). Challenge is also posed to the order dated 27.9.2007 (Annexure P -6) passed by the Inspector General of Police, Rohtak Range, Rohtak, vide which the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed. In addition to this, the petitioner has also challenged order dated 26.3.2008 (Annexure P -7) passed by the Director General of Police, Haryana, Panchkula, vide which the revision preferred by the petitioner stands dismissed. It is the contention of counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable on 4.8.1975. Thereafter, he was promoted as Head Constable. An FIR No.182 dated 21.5.1988, under Sections 420, 171, 161 IPC and Sections 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Corruption Act was registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Rohtak. In the trial which took place, the petitioner was convicted by the Special Judge, Rohtak, vide judgement dated 5.6.1989 and sentenced on 7.6.1989 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. The petitioner preferred an appeal i.e. Criminal Appeal No.294 -SB of 1989 before this Court, where, vide order dated 31.3.2003 (Annexure P -3), this Court upheld the conviction of the petitioner. However, keeping in view the prolonged agony of trial, which the petitioner had to face, he has been released on probation for a period of three years on furnishing requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. As per the counsel, on conviction of the petitioner by the Special Judge, Rohtak, he was dismissed from service by the Superintendent of Police vide order dated 31.7.2007 (Annexure P -4). The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Inspector General of Police and the revision against the said order was dismissed by the Director General of Police, without taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner would be entitled to grant of pensionary benefits. The conduct of the petitioner has also not been taken into consideration in the commission of offences for which he has been convicted. His submission, thus, is that the impugned orders cannot sustain. Counsel for the petitioner further contends that the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct, which is attributed to him as he is stated to have demanded Rs.20/ - only and, therefore, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement or any other punishment would have been sufficient in the case of the petitioner. He, thus, contends that the impugned orders call for interference by this Court. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents, contends that the petitioner has been rightly dismissed from service by the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, by invoking the powers conferred under Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India and Rules 16.2(2) read with 16.2(4)(ix)(b) of Punjab Police Rules as the petitioner has been convicted by the trial Court as also by the Appellate Court. While passing the said order, the Punishing Authority has taken into consideration that he, instead of discharging his duties honestly being a member of the Disciplined Force, had himself indulged in a crime, involving moral turpitude, which has tarnished the image of the Department and it is not in the interest of public at large as also the Department that the petitioner should be allowed to continue in service. He further contends that after a regular trial, the petitioner has been found to be indulged in corruption and is convicted for various offences and, thus, he could not have been retained in service nor could a lesser punishment be imposed on him. Assertion, thus, is made for dismissal of the writ petition. I have considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the records of the case. The admitted position in the present case is that the petitioner has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, to be precise under Sections 420 and 161 IPC as also under Sections 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Corruption Act. The trial Court did impose the punishment of three years rigorous imprisonment, which has been converted by the Appellate Court to probation. However, that would not in itself amount to exoneration of the petitioner from the misconduct, which had been committed by him as the same directly relates to his duties, responsibilities and functions as a Head Constable. The assertion of counsel for the petitioner that the respondents have not taken into consideration the conduct of the petitioner cannot be accepted in the light of the observations, which have been made by the Punishing Authority in its order dated 31.7.2007. The Appellate Authority as also the revisional authority have rightly rejected the appeal and revision respectively of the petitioner. The exercise of powers under Article 311(2) (a) of the Constitution of India and Rules 16.2(2) read with Rule 16.2(4)(ix) (b) of Punjab Police Rules, awarding punishment of dismissal from service is fully justified and in accordance with law. In an earlier occasion when this Court had an opportunity to deal with such a situation i.e. in Civil Writ Petition 22169 of 2012 (Ram Niwas Vs. State of Haryana and others), decided on 7.11.2012, this Court has held as under: - "As per Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all -India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Under Article 311 (2), no such public servant as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he was informed of the charges held against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of these charges. But there are certain exceptions also carved out with regard to the application of this clause and the first exception is where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. This proviso would be applicable to the case in hand as the petitioner stands convicted for an offence under the Corruption Act and, therefore, has been dismissed from service. This clause makes an officer, who stands convicted on a criminal charge, liable to be dismissed without any further proceedings under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. However, the charge in the criminal case must relates to a misconduct of such magnitude as would have deserved the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The punishing authority must consider, in view of the conviction, as to what penalty should be imposed on a delinquent employee. For applying this proviso, it is not necessary for the Government to wait until the dismissal of the appeal or revision presented against the conviction. However, if conviction is subsequently set aside, the order of dismissal ceases to have effect and the employee is entitled to be reinstated. Government is not estopped from applying this proviso merely because an enquiry had already been held. Reference in support of this can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Counsel has asserted that against the order of conviction, he has preferred an appeal before this Court, in which the sentence imposed upon the petitioner stands suspended and the petitioner has been released on bail by this Court which would entitle him to be reinstated in service. This argument of the petitioner cannot be accepted in the light of the authoritative judgment of the Supreme Court in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Administration), Madras (supra) where this very issue was considered in detail and it was held that merely because the sentence has been suspended or the convict has been released on bail by the Appellate Court does not render clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution inoperative rather action must be taken under this provision just after conviction without waiting for conclusion of appeal/revision or other remedies. Reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. V.K. Bhaskar, 1997(11) SCC 383 can also be made where again it has been held that challenge to the order of dismissal on the ground that appeal against conviction is pending in the High Court and the sentence is suspended cannot be a ground for an employee to be reinstated in service. A Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar Sikka vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, Panchkula and others, 2006 (1) SCT 186 has held that once a Government servant is convicted on a criminal charge of corruption, his dismissal from service is an automatic consequence of convict. It is not desirable to retain such person any more in service merely because an appeal has been preferred in which sentence has been suspended and the convict has been released on bail. Thus, there is no merit in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the setting aside of the order of dismissal of the petitioner or keeping it in abeyance till the decision of the appeal preferred by him. The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order is in violation of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules. This contention of the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted in the light of the fact that the petitioner has been convicted for an offence, which has been found to be proved against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, for which he has been convicted and sentenced. The application of the Rule, as is apparent, is restricted to cases where the punishment is for a minor offence. For a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the same cannot be treated as a minor offence which would entail application of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules. Further, in the light of the mandate of the Constitution, which is provided under Article 311 (2) and which would cover the claim of the petitioner, the said Rule would not be of much help to the petitioner. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the length of service of the petitioner has not been taken into consideration prior to imposing the punishment and his claim for pension has not been taken into account, also cannot be accepted in the light of the alleged mis -conduct of the petitioner, which has not only been proved in the departmental enquiry held against him but the criminal trial against him rather a lenient view has been taken by the punishing authority while imposing the punishment of stoppage of five increments with permanent effect vide order dated 22.02.2010 (Annexure P -2). Instead, in cases where allegations of corruption are found to have been committed by the police officials in performing their duties and allegations are proved in the departmental enquiry, no punishment less than dismissal should be imposed. Finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same stands dismissed." It would not be out of place to mention here that L.P.A. No.386 of 2013 as preferred against this order has also been dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 14.3.2013 and, thus, the said order has attained finality. Faced with this situation, counsel for the petitioner submits that there are certain dues, which are payable by the Department for the service rendered by the petitioner prior to his dismissal. If that be so, let a representation in this regard be submitted by the petitioner to the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, within a period of four weeks from today, which, if submitted, shall be considered and decided by passing a speaking order within a further period of four weeks. In case the said representation is accepted, the consequential benefits be released to the petitioner within a period of four weeks thereafter. However, in view of the above discussion, the writ petition stands dismissed. March 03, 2014 ( AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ) khurmi JUDGE;