- (1.) This order shall dispose of CWP Nos. 3305, 4360 & 7931 of 1993, involving common questions of facts and law. However, to dictate orders, facts have been taken from CWP No. 3305 of 1993 titled The Food Corporation of India Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.
(2.) Challenge in the present writ petition is to the order of assessment made by the respondent on 18.12.1992 whereby an amount of Rs. 12,78,355/- was held to be due from the petitioner-establishment on account of Provident Fund Contributions (both shares), Admn. Charges, Family Pension Contributions (both shares), Deposit Linked Insurance Contribution and Insurance Admn. Charge for the period from December, 1980 to January, 1988.
(3.) Counsel for the parties are in agreement that in similar circumstances, the Letters Patent Bench has remanded the matter to the said authority, for determining the amount under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Funds & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 and take a decision in the matter afresh since the Commissioner did not consider the relevant evidence before determining the amount payable by the Corporation. Relevant portion of the order passed in LPA No. 184 of 2012 titled Food Corporation of India Vs. Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal & others decided on 15.11.2012, reads as under: After considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the law laid down by the aforesaid two judgments, and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that while determining the amount under Section 7A of the Act, the Commissioner has not followed the proper procedure and passed the impugned order in an arbitrary manner on the basis of the best judgment assessment and ordered for recovery of the amount from the appellant-Corporation without any justification. The liability to pay the contribution to the provident fund pertaining to the workers engaged by the contractors can only be fastened on the appellant-Corporation after determining the said liability in the hand of the contractors. For determining the same, it would be necessary for summoning the contractors and examining them for the purpose of getting material for making effective determination. Only the contractors are in a position to supply the list of workers engaged by them for the purpose of the work which was entrusted by the appellant-Corporation, but in the present case no such material was collected. In our opinion, by simply issuing the summons only would not serve the purpose, but the authorities under the Act are bound to force them to appear in exercise of the power conferred in sub-section (2) of Section 7A of the Act as the authorities concerned had to collect material for the purpose of discharging their statutory duties and responsibilities imposed under the law. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Food Corporation of India Versus Provident Fund Commissioner and others has clearly observed that the Commissioner while conducting enquiry under Section 7A has been given the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure for trying a suit. The power given under Section 7A to the Commissioner is to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen. The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect entire evidence before coming to proper conclusion. That is the legal duty of the Commissioner. In the present case, the Commissioner while performing his statutory duty did not collect the relevant evidence before determining the amount payable under the Act by the appellant-Corporation. The learned Single Judge has not looked into this aspect of the matter and passed the judgment on the wrong fact that the appellant-Corporation did not supply the list of the contractors. Accordingly, we are of the view that it would be proper if the matter is remanded to the Commissioner to pass the fresh order by summoning those contractors and determine the amount payable after providing full opportunity to all the concerned parties. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the order dated 29.04.1993 (Annexure P2) passed by the Commissioner and the impugned order dated 14.09.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Commissioner to determine the amount afresh, after providing due opportunity to all the parties and after hearing the matter in accordance with law, expeditiously, as early as possible, preferably within a period of two months.;