Hemant Gupta, J. - (1.) CHALLENGE in the present petition is to an order dated 6.11.2013 (Annexure P. 5) passed by the District Magistrate, under Section 14 of the Securitization & Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
(2.) IT is pointed out that originally one Sadhu Singh Mangat was the owner of the premises known as Aman House measuring 384 Sq. yards. The same was leased out to the petitioner vide lease deed dated 15.8.1992. After the death of said Sadhu Singh, his son Jagjit Singh Mangat, respondent No. 3 continued receiving the rent. It is further pointed out that said Jagjit Singh Mangat raised a loan of Rs. 3 crores from respondent No. 2 -Allahabad Bank, by mortgaging the property in question. In default of payment of the aforesaid loan, respondent No. 2 initiated proceedings under the Act. Thereafter, on an application filed by respondent No. 2 under Section 14 of the Act, the District Magistrate passed the order on 6.11.2013. The said order is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner has an alternative remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal against the order passed by the District Magistrate in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev Vs. State of Maharashtra, : (2011) 2 SCC 782, the Court held that against an action taken under Section 14, the remedy lies to move an application to the Tribunal. The Court observed: - 22. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT. 23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person.
(3.) EARLIER in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, : (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court held that the expression "any person" in Section 17 would include borrowers, guarantors or any other person. It observed as under: - "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression "any person" used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.";