- (1.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an award of the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak who on a reference made under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) held that the workman respondent was entitled to re-in-statement with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from the date on which he raised the industrial dispute.
(2.) SHRI Jai Prakash Maan-respondent (for short the workman) was appointed as Clerk by the petitioner-Bank on March 1, 1980 and his services were dispensed with on September 20, 1980. He worked for a total period of about 185 days only. After about ten years from the date of his discharge, he raised an industrial dispute on February 15, 1990 by sending a demand notice under Section 2 (a) of the Act calling upon the management to take him back in service with full back wages from the date when his services were terminated. On receipt of this demand notice, the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Panipat held conciliation proceedings and summoned the management who filed a detailed written reply raising a number of objections. It was, inter-alia, pleaded by the management that the workman had not completed 240 days in service and that the industrial dispute was being raised after a period of about 10 years. The conciliation proceedings proved abortive and the Conciliation Officer sent his failure report to the State Government, who on a consideration of all the facts, including the failure report, by a letter dated September 15, 1990 declined to refer the dispute for adjudication on the ground that the same had been raised after a period of 10 years from the date of termination of service and that the workman had given no reason for this in ordinate delay. It appears that the workman represented to the State Government in December, 1990 against its action in refusing to refer the dispute. This representation too was rejected and the decision of the State Government was communicated to the workman as per letter dated February 20, 1991, a copy of which was forwarded to the management of the Bank as well. Thereafter, the Govt. of Haryana formed an opinion that a dispute existed between the management of the Bank and the workman regarding termination of his service and referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak: "whether the termination of services of Shri Jai Parkash Maan is justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?;" On receipt of the aforesaid reference, the Labour Court after recording the evidence of the parties and hearing their representatives found that the management after terminating the services of the workman had appointed several persons as Clerks. It was also held that the posts of Clerks had been advertised and the workman too had applied for the same but was not appointed even though he had been interviewed along with other candidates. It was also found that the Managing Director of the Bank who terminated the services of the workman had no authority to do so and for this reason as well the termination was illegal. The Management, according to the Labour Court, also did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 25 (H) of the Act in as much as the workman was not re-employed when appointment had been offered to others. Consequently, the reference was answered in favour of the workman holding that he was entitled to re-instatement with continuity in service with full back wages only from the date of demand notice. It is this award of the Labour Court that has been impugned in the present petition.
(3.) THE first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner-bank is that the reference made by the State Government in January, 1992 was illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. It was submitted that the earlier claim to a reference having been declined by the Government in September, 1990 after conciliation proceedings were held, the Government could not refer the same dispute without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was also urged that the reference made by the State Government was liable to be struck down on the ground of delay as well. I find merit in both these contentions.;