G.S.CHAHAL,J - (1.) DALIP Singh and other seek quashing of the impugned order dated 9th March, 1993 passed by the additional Sessions Judge, Patiala Annexure P. 1, dismissing the revision petition-filed by the Petitioners on the preliminary question of maintainability.
(2.) THE petitioners were charged for offence. under Sections 325/323/379, 429/148/149 of the Indian Penal Code by Shri G. K. Rai, Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Samana, vide order dated 29th September, 1992. Against this order the petitioners preferred a revision petition before the court of Sessions which was entrusted to Shri H. P. Handa, Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala. The learned Additional Sessions judge formed the opinion that the order framing of charge was interlocutory order and as such no revision petition was competent in view of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 397, Sub-section (2) of the Code reads as follows: "397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision :- (1) xxx xxx (2) The powers of revision conferred by Sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The expression interlocutory order has not been defined in the Code but the same has been subject matter of legal interpretation in various authorities. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1978)1 SCR 222, the following observations were made by their Lordships of the Apex Court: "It seems to us that the term interlocutory order in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been-used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases. passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under S 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which effect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." In V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., AIR 1980 Supreme Court 962, Their Lordships after considering the observations of that Court in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, (1978)1 SCR 749, made the following observations: "7. Reading the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid case as a whole we are unable to agree with the argument of Mr. Mridul that this Court in any way disapproved the test of a final order or interlocutory order accepted by the Federal Court in the case of S. Kuppuswami Rai v. The, King, 1947 FCR 180. This Court took care to explain that in a situation with which the Judges were dealing in that particular case, it would hot be proper to treat the order framing charges as an interlocutory order pure and simple. Even though the order may be intermediate it could not be said to be final so as to bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 (3) of the Code. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the exposition of the law by the learned Judges who decided the said case. We will deal with a broader and a wider aspect of the matter in a later part of our judgment when we deal with the scope and ambit of the Act. We might reiterate here even at risk of repetition that the term interlocutory order used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in Section 397 (3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final .
(3.) THESE two authorities make things absolutely clear that order framing a charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate as a quasi-final order and as such the revision is incompetent and section 397(2) of the Code will not operate as a bar The learned Additional Sessions Judge has misread the judgment of V.C. Shukla's case (supra) which related to the charge framed under the special Act and in view of the provisions of the said Act order framing of charge was held to be interlocutory. 1. hereby, accept this petition, quash order Annexure P. 1 dated 9th March, 1993, and direct the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, to restore the revision petition to its original number and to proceed in accordance with law.;