- (1.) AN industrial plot measuring 15 acres was resumed by the Estate Officer, HUDA, Gurgaon vide order dated February 23, 1982. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed on May 31, 1982. A suit challenging these orders having been dismissed and the appeal having met the same fate, the appellant has come in this second appeal to this Court. A few facts may be noticed.
(2.) ON April 6, 1976, the appellant, which is a Limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act applied for an industrial plot to the Haryana Urban Development Authority, Gurgaon (hereinafter referred to as the 'huda' ). This application is on record as Ex. DA. Vide order dated August 26,1976 (Ex. P. 2), the plot was allotted to the appellant. Its possession was handed over to the appellant on September 15, 1976. The terms and conditions of allotment were later on conveyed vide a letter dated September 15, 1976. Vide letter dated June 8, 1976 (Ex. P. 6.), the Estate Officer HUDA, Gurgaon informed the appellant that the boundaries of the plot had been altered. Thereafter vide letter dated July 2, 1980, (a copy of which is Ex. DW1/2), the appellant sought the permission of the respondent-Authority for the transfer of the plot to M/s Digamber Paper Mills (now Respondent No. 3 ). While this matter was pending, on November 12, 1980, a notice Ex. D. 6 was issued by the Estate Officer informing the appellant that it had committed a breach of the conditions of sale as the construction on the plot had not been completed by September, 1978. Consequently, the appellant was "called upon to show cause within a period of thirty days as to why an order of resumption of the site and/or building and forfeiture of whole or any part of the money, if any paid in respect thereof, should not be made. " The petitioner submitted its reply vide letter dated December 20,1980 (Ex. P. 9 ). It was inter-alia stated that "there is no clause in your allotment latter No. 3025 dated 26. 8. 1976 vide which we were required to complete the construction by 9/78 as stated in your notice under reply. " Accordingly, it was prayed that the notice should be withdrawn. Certain correspondence ensued. It is not necessary to make any reference thereto. On May 15, 1981 another notice (a copy of which is on record at p. 309) was issued to the appellant calling upon it to show cause as to why the plot be not resumed on account of the non-payment of the money due. This was followed by a notice dated June 19,1981, under Section 17 (3) of the Act. The next day, on June 20,1981, the plot was ordered to be resumed and the amount of Rs. 1. 75 lacs which had already been paid by the appellant was ordered to be forfeited. On appeal, the Chief Administrator, HUDA, passed an order dated October 26, 1981 (P. 8) setting aside the order of resumption. This was followed by a letter dated Nov. 26, 1981, a copy of which is on record at p. 313, by which the appellant was called upon to appear before the Estate Officer for personal hearing in regard to the notice dated November 12,1980 (Ex. D. 6 ). The appellant actually appeared and submitted an application dated December 17,1981 requesting for the grant of "about two months time for submission of plans. . . " This request was accepted by the Estate Officer, respondent No. 2, and the following order was passed: "mr. Kapur appeared before me and assured that he will get the plan approved within two months and start the construction soon thereafter. He has also shown quotation for machinery etc. He is given two months time to submit the plan etc. and start the construction. Sd/-22. 12. "
(3.) ON the same day, the appellant deposited an amount of Rs. 1. 00 lac towards the cost of the plot. This was followed by another deposit of Rs. 1. 25 lacs in full and final settlement of the cost of the plot on February 17, 1982 (Ex. P. 8 ). Then, less than a week thereafter, on February 23,1982, the Estate Officer passed the order resuming the plot. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Chief Administrator, HUDA vide order dated May 31,1982. This led to the filing of a suit on June 7,1982, out of which the present second appeal has arisen.;