- (1.) This petition is directed against the order of the Addl. District Judge, Amritsar dated 8th June, 1992, whereby he.allowed the appeal of the plaintiff- respondent against the order of the trial court declining relief of temporary order of injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2.) Mrs. Ajit Kaur, respondent-plaintiff, was appointed a Vocational Guide by the petitioner University for a fixed period of one year, i.e, from 23rd May, 1991 to 22nd May, 1992. Although it was given out that the post was likely to continue, yet despite this understanding, the post was abolished on the expiry of the fixed term allegedly on account of the mala fide of Dr. Kehar Singh, petitioner No.2. The petitioner thereafter filed CWP No. 5577 of 1992 in this Court challenging this action of the respondent-University but the said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on a statement made by the petition's counsel that his client wished to approach the Vice Chancellor for redress. The respondent, however, filed a suit instead praying for a declaration to the effect that as she had put in more than 240 days in service she had attained the status of a regular employee and as such her services could could not be terminated and in addition thereto claimed that as the action of the respondent- University in abolishing the post of Vocational Guide was mala fide, the action could not be sustained. The petitioner also sought a temporary injunction praying that the University be restrained from abolishing the post in question meaning thereby that she be allowed to continue on the post of Vocational Guide in the department. This application was disallowed by the trial court holding that as the appointment of the respondent was for a fixed period, it had come to an end by the efflux of time and that on the abolition of the post she had no right to continue in service and as such there was no balance of convenience in her favour and no question of her suffering irreparable loss or injury. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the respondent filed an appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Amritsar, who, vide the impugned order, allowed the same and issued the following directions:- "In view of the above discussion and in conclusion I allow this appeal, set aside the order under appeal and grant the plaintiff temporary injunction prayed for by her. The same shall subsist during the pendency of the suit. However, she shall not draw the salary against the post which shall be paid to her only if she succeeds in the suit. During he pendency of the suit, the post shall not be transferred to Music Department and shall be retained where it was ant the plaintiff allowed to work against the post." The appellate court found that the allegations of mala fides of Dr. Kehar Singh leading to the abolition of the post were not proved but on going into the merits of the case held that as it was not clear as to under what circumstances the post had been abolished, a prima facie case had been made out. It was also held that the application under Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, was maintainable even though the petitioner was claiming the benefit of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellate court also found that as the writ petition filed in this Court had been dismissed as withdrawn, the civil suit was maintainable.
(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The first argument of the petitioner's counsel is that as the respondent had been appointed for a fixed term, from 23rd May, 1991 to 22nd May, 1992, her term of appointment came to an end on that date and even accepting for a moment that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable to her case, Section 2(oo)(bb) thereof would come into operation and in case the services of the workman came to an end in terms of the order of appointment, the said action could not be termed as Retrenchment. There is merit in the stand of the learned counsel. Admittedly, the respondent was allowed appointment for a fixed tenure and as such the non-renewal of the contract on the expiry of the term of appointment would not constitute Retrenchment so as to bring her case within the ambit of the protection provided by the Industrial Disputes Act to those who complete 240 days service in a year.;