- (1.) THIS revision petition is directed against the orders of the Courts below whereby an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act filed by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation has been dismissed.
(2.) AJAY Kumar Jain, respondent-plaintiff was allotted an industrial plot in the Industrial Estate Murthal, Tehsil and District Sonepat. This plot was resumed on account of non-construction, by order dated December 24, 1982. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the order of resumption as also the order dated February 7, 1983 declining his prayer for withdrawing the order of resumption, were null and void. It was pleaded that all the instalments stood paid and the order of the resumption was passed at the back of the plaintiff without affording him an opportunity of being heard. On notice of the suit having been issued to the defendants now petitioners, an application was moved by the latters, under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act praying that proceedings in the suit be stayed as the matter in dispute was covered by an arbitration clause appearing in the agreement. Learned trial Court dismissed the said application by order dated January 13, 1989, primarily on the ground that "records of the present case reveals that the applicants/defendants has neither filed any affidavit along with application for stay of suit nor did he mention in his application about his readiness and willingness which is a pre-condition for stay of suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. " The defendants being not satisfied with the order of the trial Court, filed an appeal which was disposed of by the learned District Judge by order dated May 21, 1990. Learned District Judge though apparently did not agree with the reasoning of the trial Court, yet dismissed the appeal on a different ground. According to the learned District Judge, right to arbitration flows from the agreement which on petitioner's own showing appears to be debatable proposition. It was ultimately concluded by the learned Judge that the agreement did not show as to whether it was entered into between the parties after passing of resolution dated February 5, 1983 whereby K. K. Sharma had been authorised to sign on behalf of the petitioner-Corporation. It was specifically noticed that the order resuming the plot was passed on December 24, 1982 and, therefore, the authorisation in favour of K. K. Sharma was of no consequence and it was not shown that K. K. Sharma had been authorised to sign the agreement before that date. Not only this, it was also noticed that first line of the agreement mentions the date of execution of the agreement as "27th day of September, 1975" whereas the last line of the agreement shows that it was signed on 10th January, 1980 at Bhiwani and attested by the then Sub Divisional Magistrate there. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that allotment in favour of the respondent was made under an agreement which was duly signed by the parties and, therefore, the Courts below erred in not staying the proceedings of the suit and referring the matter to the arbitrator. Learned counsel in support of his submission urged that there was an agenda item 20 passed in the 73rd meeting of the Board of Directors where powers to enter into an agreement were sub-delegated to the Deputy Secretary. He brought to my notice the said agenda item 20 which may be noticed as under: "in the interest of expediency and smooth working, the Deputy Secretary has been sub-delegated the power to sign all agreements connected with allotment/sale of plots and the consequent deeds of conveyance in favour of the respective allottees of the plots in the Industrial Estates being developed by the Corporation after seeking previous orders of the Managing Director in each case. The Board may kindly see for information. " From the above resolution, learned counsel for the petitioners sought to argue that K. K. Sharma was the Deputy Secretary at the relevant time and therefore was competent to sign the agreement on behalf of the petitioner-Corporation. I have considered the submission of the counsel and find no merit therein. In the first instance it is not shown that this agenda item was approved by the Board of Directors. It is also not shown as to on which date the 73rd meeting of the Board of Directors took place. The agenda item as reproduced above further shows that this was for the information of the Board. Once that is so, it cannot be concluded that K. K. Sharma was fully competent to execute the agreement on behalf of the Corporation. The agenda item clearly further demonstrates that K. K. Sharma will sign agreements on behalf of the Corporation after seeking previous orders of the Managing Director in each case. It is nowhere shown or even suggested that K. K. Sharma before signing the agreement, allegedly executed between the parties had sought previous orders from the Managing Director for doing so. Once that is so, it cannot be said that K. K. Sharma was competent to sign on behalf of the Corporation. Moreover, delegation of powers, as argued by the learned counsel for the parties, is not in favour of the Secretary but in favour of the Deputy Secretary. It is again not shown that at the relevant time, K. K. Sharma was the Deputy Secretary of the Corporation. K. K. Sharma has not signed the agreement as Deputy Secretary of the Corporation. The date of agreement as noticed by the learned District Judge, to begin with, on September 27, 1975 whereas K. K. Sharma has admittedly signed it on a much latter date i. e. January 10, 1980 at Bhiwani, the alleged agreement having been attested by the then Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In the Circumstances, I have no reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned District Judge.
(3.) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs. The trial Court is directed to decide the matter in accordance with law.;