S.P.GOYAL, J. - (1.) ARUN Kumar respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner and other respondent from dispossessing him forcibly for the building in dispute where he was stated to be carrying on his business. He claimed himself to be in possession as a tenant and entitled to continue as such till evicted in accordance with the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act). Along with the suit he filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code for ad interim injunction to the same effect which was declined by the trial Court. However, on appeal the learned Additional District Judge reversed the order of the trial Court and granted ad interim injunction restraining the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 to 4 from dispossessing the plaintiff from the shop in dispute till the disposal of the suit. Aggrieved thereby Madan Mohan defendant has come up in this revision.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the correctness of the impugned order primarily on the ground that the prayer made in the plaint as well as in the application was that the defendants be restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff except in due course of law but the order passed goes much beyond the said prayer. It was further contended that the petitioner was held entitled to the restoration of the possession of the property in dispute by the order of the learned Sessions Judge passed in proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code (for short, called the Code) and as such he was not dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly but was enforcing the lawful order passed in his favour. However, none of the contention raised has any merit. The order passed under section 145 of the Code is always a tentative order subject to the decision of the civil Court on the question of title and the right to possession of the parties concerned. No doubt the plaint is not happily drafted but its sum and substance is that the plaintiff has claimed himself to be a tenant and entitled to retain possession of the property in dispute till he is elected therefrom in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is well-established that in a suit for injunction the plaintiff is not required to specifically claim a declaration of his title to the property or the right to remain in its possession. Such a relief is always deemed to be included in the prayer for a permanent injunction. The suit, therefore, in substance is to establish the right of the plaintiff to continue in possession as a tenant which necessarily means that he is not liable to be evicted therefrom in pursuance of the order of a criminal Court under section 145 of the Code. The first ground urged, therefore, has no merit.
(3.) AS regards the second contention that the petitioner cannot be said to be causing any injury by enforcing a lawful order and as such no temporary injunction can be granted under Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, it would suffice to mention that after the enforcement of the 1976 Amendment Act it has been provided under Order 39 rule 1(c) that an injunction can be granted to restrain the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The earlier view expressed by certain High Court that when the defendant is seeking to dispossess the plaintiff from the property in dispute in pursuance of an order passed by some authority in accordance with law no temporary injunction can be granted as the act of the defendant does not amount to causing of an injury to the plaintiff within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, no more holds the field in view of the introduction of the said clause in Rule 1 of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code.;