Rajendra Nath Mittal, J. - (1.) THIS is a letters patent appeal against the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated 1st May, 1980
(2.) BRIEFLY , the facts are that the properties bearing Nos. C -1277, C -1278 and C -1279, situated in Karnal, were transferred to Parma Nand as one unit by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner vide his order dated 31st January, 1959. A sale deed was also executed in his favour on 31st July, 1959. Property No. C -1278 is a Chaubara on property No C -1277 which is a shop. Property No. C -1277 was earlier allotted to Roshan Lal, a non -claimant. An appeal was filed by Roshan Lal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the properties did not constitute one unit and were not allottable as their value was more than Rs. 10,000/ -. The appeal was rejected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. A revision petition under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was also dismissed. He came up in writ petition to the High Court which was accepted and the authorities were directed to re -decide the matter after determining whether all the three properties constituted one property or two properties. After the order of remand, the Regional Settlement Commissioner, vide his order dated 22nd July, 1968, held that the properties constituted two units. Parma Nand filed an appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner who affirmed the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner vide his order dated 14th November, 1969. Consequently, he ordered the transfer of the property No. C -1279 to Parma Nand. However, Roshan Lal was not held entitled to property No C -1277 and it was ordered to be sold.
(3.) BOTH the parties went up in revision under Section 33 of the Act to the Central Government, Parma Nand died during the pendency of the revision petition Mr. Damodar Dass, who was enjoying the powers of the Central Government, vide his order dated 27th July, 1970 (Annexure "C" to the writ petition), held that the properties constituted one unit and consequently he upheld the sale in favour of Parma Nand. 3. Roshan Lal challenged the order of Mr. Damodar Dass under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court. The learned Single Judge same to the conclusion that the properties bearing Nos. -C -1277 and C -1279 constituted different units and that the Rehabilitation Authorities could not amalgamate the properties and treat them as one for the purpose of transferring them to any claimant. Consequently, the order of Mr. Damodar Dass was quashed and that of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated I4th November, 1969, restored. 6. Mr. Sarin has vehemently argued that the question whether the properties Nos. C -1277 and C -1279 constituted one unit or not is a question of fact and this Court could not interfere with the finding of Mr. Damodar Dass in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. We have duly considered the argument and find force in it. Mr. Damodar Dass, on considering the evidence, came to the conclusion that the properties constituted one unit. The finding given by him is one of fact. It is a well settled that the High Court while issuing the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the finding of fact reached by a Tribunal on appreciation of the evidence except in certain circumstances The circumstances, are that the finding is based on inadmissible evidence or it is not supported by any evidence or the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence. In the above observations, we get support from Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishanan and Ors. : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477, Swaran Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 232, and Natha Singh and Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Ors. : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1053. The following observations in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) may be read with advantage: ...the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The above case was followed in Swaran Singh's case (supra). It was observed therein that the findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be. Similar view was expressed in Natha Singh's case (supra).;