I.S. Tiwana, J. - (1.) (Oral) - The petitioner who was dismissed from service as Inspector, Quality Marking Centre, Nakodar, by the Director of Industries Punjab, on account of his conviction by a Court under section 324, Indian Penal Code, impugns the order of the Government dated 27th Oct., 1977 (Annexure P 1) whereby setting aside the order of his dismissal on appeal, the Appellate Authority held that "the period of arrest and conviction may be deemed to have been treated as the period under suspension in accordance with the provisions of rule 4 (2) (b) of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1970. As regards the remaining period of his absence, i. e., 11-11-1976 till he joins his duties, it may be treated as leave of the kind due, under rules." According to his learned counsel, this part of order annexure P 1 is violative of rule 7.3(2) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume I, Part I, inasmuch as the petitioner having been fully exonerated of the charge levelled against him, the said punishment could not be inflicted upon him. This submission of the learned counsel, however, does not impress me at all. The remaining part of order annexure P 1 which reads as follows:- "The appeal filed by Shri Gurdev Singh, Inspector Quality Marking Centre, Nakodar, against the orders of the Director of Industries Punjab, issued vide his Endst. No. E/97/381/34739 - A, dated 9-11-1976, dismissing and debarring him from future Government service has been considered by Government and it has been established that the Director of Industries did not go into the facts of the case which should have been gone into quite independently of the factum of conviction by the Court. The orders of the Director of Industries are, therefore, set aside and Shri Gurdev Singh is reinstated with immediate effect." does not anywhere say that the misconduct which had been alleged against the petitioner was not found to have been established. All that this order says is that the punishing authority, i.e., the Director of Industries should have gone into the facts of the case independently of the order of his conviction by the Court. In other words, all that this order means is that the petitioner should not have been dismissed from service merely on account of his conviction by the Court. This view of the Appellate Authority is completely in consonance with the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in Om Parkash Vs. The Director, Postal Services (Posts & Telegraphs Department), AIR 1963 Pb. & Hry. 1 (F.B.) . The matter, however, does not rest here. To me, it appears that the petitioner is entitled to succeed for the non-fulfilment of the requirements of sub-rule (4) of the said rule wherein it is laid down that in cases other than those covered by sub-rule (2), the Government employee is to be paid such amount of pay and allowances as may be ordered by the competent authority after giving notice to the Government employee of the quantum of the proposed payment and after considering representation, if any, submitted by him within the specified time. This rule makes it incumbent on the competent authority to give a notice to the employee concerned before dis-entitling him to any part of the pay and allowances payable to him for the period of his suspension. It is the conceded case here that no such notice as envisaged by sub-rule (4) was ever served upon the petitioner before the passing of the impugned order annexure P1. I am, thus, of the opinion that for this violation of sub-rule (4), order annexure PI to the extent it is impugned cannot be sustained. For this view of mine I also seek support from Gurmukh Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1980 (3) SLR 9 .
(2.) I, therefore, set aside the last part of the impugned order which has been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. I, however, disentitle the petitioner to the costs of this litigation. Order accordingly.;