Satish Chandra Mittal, J. - (1.) FACTS giving rise to this revision petition are that Major Singh and three other sons of Niranjan Singh filed the suit for permanent injunction against their father Niranjan Singh restraining him from alienating the suit -properties on the grounds that the same belonged to the Hindu undivided family and that the intended alienations were not for legal necessity. Before the filing of the suit, Niranjan Singh had entered into two agreements dated 20th December, 1980, for sale of two parcels of land with Respondents Nos. 2 to 7. Upon acquiring knowledge of the institution of the present suit, the said respondents applied under Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, for impleading them as defends. After giving due notice to the plaintiff -petitioners, the trial (sic) allowed the application. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have (sic) this petition.
(2.) SO far as maintainability of this petition under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is concerned, law is well -settled in favour of petitioners. However, learned counsel for the contesting respondents Nos. 2 to 7 contended that the petitioners are required to (satisfy the requirements of section 115 of the Code. For appreciating the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties in this regard, rule 10(2) of Order 1 of the Code may be reproduced : - - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. The latter part of rule 10(2) envisages two parties : (1) the person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant and (2) whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. It goes to the credit of Mr. Jagjit Singh, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, that he conceded that the respondents did not fall is the first category. Now the question is, whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the respondents satisfied the ingredients of Order 1, rule 10(2) as regards the second category. Their learned counsel pointed out that admittedly the present suit was filed after Niranjan Singh had entered into the two agreements with the respondents. A perusal of the averments made in the plaint leaves no room for doubt that indirectly these two agreements are under attack. Cautiously, the petitioners did not make specific reference to them in their plaint, but the fact remains that they did aver therein that Niranjan Singh was negotiating to alienate the suit lands. It is further contended by Mr. Jagjit Singh that Niranjan Singh, notwithstanding his declaration in the agreements that he was the sole owner of the lands, is not likely to contest the suit; as such, it would be virtually an ex parte decree against the respondents. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents would not be bound by such a decree, if they are not made parties to the suit, cannot be the decision factor for not giving them the benefit of the provisions of Order (sic) rule 10(2). Doubtless, it is well -settled that a plaintiff is dominus litus but it is no gainsaying that the provision of rule 10(2) lay down exceptions thereto and if a case brought within its pale, the opposition by the plaintiff too would not defeat the claim of a party for being impleaded. Lastly, Mr. Jagjit Singh contended that the respondents will not in any way alter the character of the suit and that their defense would be confined to the two material issues : whether the suit property, including the lands mentioned in the two agreements dates 20th December 1980, belongs to undivided Hindu family and (2) whether there is legal necessity to alienate the same by Niranjan Singh.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the parties cited a number of rulings before me, but I do not want to burden this judgment by discussing all of them, inasmuch as those cases were decided upon their own facts. All the same, as the learned counsel for the petitioners laid stress on Banarsi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal : (1968) 70 P.L.R. 451: A.I.R. 1969 P&H. 57 decided by Sarkaria, J (as his Lordship then was), the facts thereof may be analysed, Banarsi Dass instituted a suit for specific performance of contract of sale against Smt. Chameli During the pendency of the suit, Panna Lal and Banwari Lal instituted another suit against Smt. Chameli for a permanent injunction restraining her from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over a chabutra 4 -1/2 square feet in area. Banarsi Dass applied under Order 1, rule 10 for being impleaded as a party on the ground that chabutra was a part of the property which was the subject -matter of his suit. Upon a consideration of the other relevant facts, the learned Judge came to the that if Banarsi Dass were to be added as a defendant, it would amount to introduction of a new cause of action. The Court would then have to enquire into the circumstances under which Smt Chameli agreed with Banarsi Dass, an enquiry with which Panna Lal and Banwari had nothing to do. Thus, they would be dragged into a different controversy between Banarsi Dass and Smt. Chameli Obviously, this ruling is distinguishable on facts.;