SUKHDEV SINGH KANG, J. - (1.) DIDAR Singh and his four brothers filed an application under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act ('the Act' for short) for eviction of Hari Mittal, and Faqir Chand, their tenants.
(2.) SMT . Veena Kumari claiming herself to be the wife of above-said Hari Mittal filed an application under rule 10 of the Order 1, Civil Procedure Code, read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, for impleading her as a respondent to the eviction application on the ground that Hari Mittal, her husband, had deserted her and his whereabouts were not known for the last 4-1/2 years and she had been running a studio in the premises in dispute for the said period, through her servant Faquir Chand. She was a necessary party and should be impleaded and such as her presence before the Court was necessary for the just and proper decision of the case. This application was resisted by the landlords. The Rent Controller allowed the application. He held that the applicant claimed herself to be the deserted wife of Hari Mittal and as such she had a direct interest, in the property and in case ejectment application was allowed, the applicant was likely to suffer consequences of the ejectment order. The Rent Controller had also to decide as to whether the tenancy was heritable in view of the allegation that Hari Mittal was not heard of since long. Aggrieved by this order, the landlord-petitioners have filed this revision petition under sub-section (5) of the section 15 of the Act. Shri Vijay Dogra, the learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously argued that the case of the petitioners before the Rent Controller was that Hari Mittal was their tenant and one of the grounds for eviction pleaded was that Hari Mittal has sub-let the shop in dispute to Faquir Chand, respondent No. 2. Petitioner's case was not that Smt. Veena Kumari was a tenant. He further argued that the case of Veena Kumari was that she had been deserted by her husband for the last 4-1/2 years and the latter had not been heard of since then. It is not her case that her husband had died or he is presumed to have died having not been heard for the last more than 7 years. The wife cannot, in the life time of her husband, claim to be the legal representative of her husband. She was not a necessary party and her presence was not necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all points in the proceedings. In support of his contention he has cited before me Banarsi Dass Durga Prasad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal and others, AIR 1969 Punjab and Haryana 57 and a Division Bench decision of this in Arjan Singh and others v. Kartar Singh and others, AIR 1975 Punjab and Haryana 184.
(3.) ON the other hand, Mr. Raghbir Singh Ahluwalia, the learned counsel for the respondent (applicant-wife) has contended that the applicant is running a studio through Faquir Chand. She was vitally interested in the proceedings for ejectment because the result thereof shall affect her legal rights. Even if she was not a necessary party, the points in controversy could not be effectually and completely adjudicated upon in her absence. The application has been filed against Hari Mittal. There is no allegation that Hari Mittal has not been heard of for more than 7 years. The case of the applicant at the highest can be that she is the deserted wife of the tenant. In that capacity she can have no right to represent her husband. So she cannot be termed to be either a necessary party or even a proper party. In Banarsi Dass's case (supra) it was observed by Sarkaria J. (as his Lordship then was) :- "Under sub-para (2) of Order 1 Rule 10, a person may be added as a party to a suit in two cases only i.e., when he ought to have been joined and is not so joined, when he is a necessary party, or, when without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. There is no jurisdiction to add a party in any other case merely because that would save a third person the expense and botheration of the separate suit for seeking adjudication of a collateral matter, which was not directly and substantively in issue in the suit into which he seeks intrusion. A person may not be added as a defendant merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment." ;