Prem Chand Pandit, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition by Rajinder Singh, Sarpanch, under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 2nd June, 1962, passed by the Director of Panchayats, Punjab, Respondent No. 1.
(2.) THE Petitioner was duly elected Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Barapind, in district Jullundur. Besides him, there were eight other panches of this Gram Panchayat. On 12th April, 1962 the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Jullundur, Respondent No. 3, served a notice, annexure A, requiring him to show cause within a week as to why he should not be suspended under Section 102(1) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the basis of certain charges, which were mentioned in that notice. He sent his explanation, annexure B, which was considered by Respondent No. 1, who passed the impugned order, annexure C, on 2nd June, 1962 under Section 102(1) of the Act and suspended the Petitioner from the membership of the Panchayat and debarred him from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayat during the period of his suspension. It was stated in this order that: During the course of an enquiry it has transpired that Shri Rajinder Singh Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Barapind, tehsil Phillaur, district Jullundur, is alleged to have abused his powers as under: (1) that he issued a notice to Shri Didar Singh for removal of roof over a street which was not warranted and beyond his power; (2) that he decided the said case oh 18th June, 1961, against Shri Didar Singh without giving him proper opportunity for defence; (3) that he did not stay the proceedings in spite of the stay orders from the competent court; (4) that he manipulated and refused to give copies of the orders of the Panchayat; and (5) he abused and threatened Shrimati Banti, Lady Panch of his Panchayat, in a Panchayat meeting. His continuance in the office of Sarpanch is, therefore, considered undesirable in the interests of the public. Against this, the present writ petition was filed. It came up before me in the first instance and the learned Counsel for the Petitioner raised the following four grounds: (1) that, under the law, a notice by Respondent No. 1 was necessary to be given to the Petitioner before he could be suspended. In the present case, the notice, annexure A, had been issued by Respondent No. 3, which he was not authorised to do and, consequently, all subsequent proceedings taken as a result of that notice were illegal; (2) that out of the charges mentioned in the order, annexure C, the first three were irrelevant for the purposes of Section 102 of the Act and the fourth one was nonexistent; (3) that out of all the charges even if one them was bad in law, the whole order suspension was illegal; and (4) that the impugned order was mala fide. In support of ground No. (1), learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a Single Bench decision of Dua, J., in Civil Writ No. 1642 of 1960 (Bijay Singh and Anr. v. Punjab State) decided on 10th November, 1961, in which it was held that such a notice was necessary before a Panch could be suspended by the Director under Section 102(1) of the Act. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate -General had placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Civil Writ No. 1595 of 1960 (Sodagar Singh v. State of Punjab) decided by Dulat, J., and myself on 19th April, 1962, in which, while interpreting the provisions of Section 123 of the Pepsu Panchayat Raj Act (Act No. 8 of 2008 Bk.), we held that while acting under that section, the Director merely performed an administrative function and there was no obligation on him to act in a judicial or quasi -judicial manner and he could, therefore, disqualify any person, who had been removed under Sub -section (1) of this section for re -election for such period not exceeding five years. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner had submitted that the two provisions were not similar, firstly, because in Punjab Act No. 4 of 1953, the pendency of an enquiry against the Panch was necessary before the Director could suspend him, which was not the case in the Pepsu Act. Secondly, under the Pepsu Act, the Director was authorised both to remove and suspend any member, if in his opinion he had abused his position or had continuously failed to perform the duties imposed by or under that Act or any rule made thereunder or his continuance was undesirable in the interest of the public, whereas under the Punjab Act he could merely suspend and the power of removal was given to the Government and that also after such an enquiry as it might deem fit and on the grounds which were mentioned in Sub -section (2) of Section 102. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, since the pendency of the enquiry against the Panch was a pre -requisite to the order of suspension, therefore, the principles of natural justice applied and notice had to be given to the Petitioner to explain his position before passing the order of suspension. He, therefore, contended that, under the Act, this notice had to be given by the Director himself, because under Section 95(2) of the Act, the Director could not delegate any of his powers specified in Section 102 of the Act. In the present case, the notice issued by Respondent No. 3 was, consequently, of no effect. Since ground No. 1 raised an important question of law as to whether under Section 102 of the Act any notice was necessary to be given to the Panch and, if so, by whom, before the Director could suspend him for any of the reasons for which he could be removed by the Government under Sub -section (2) of that section and it might affect a large number of cases, I directed that the papers be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for necessary action as provided for in proviso (b) to Clause (1) of Chapter 111 -B of the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders, Volume V. That is how the matter has come before us.
(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the Petitioner has raised the following three contentions before us: (1) that a notice by the Director himself was necessary before passing the order of suspension against his client. Since in the present case, the notice had been given by the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Jullundur, the order of suspension passed by the Director was bad in law; (2) that even if one of the grounds on which the order of suspension was based was irrelevant for the purposes of Section 102 of the Act, the whole order of suspension was illegal. In the present case, out of the grounds mentioned in the order of suspension, the first three were irrelevant and the fourth one was non -existent; and (3) that the order of suspension was mala fide.;