D.K. Mahajan, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal is directed against the concurrent decisions of the Courts below decreeing the plaintiff's suit for pre -emption. Bhagat Singh sold the vacant site in dispute by three sale deeds for Rs. 99/ - each. One sale -deed was executed in favour of Bachan Singh and the other two in favour of his wife Smt. Bhagwan Kaur. Darbara Singh real brother of Bhagat Singh filed the present suit to pre -empt the three sales. It may be mentioned that the sales were made on 30th March, 1959 and 31st March, 1959, and the suit was filed on 13th July, 1960. The defendant -vendees raised the plea of limitation besides other pleas. It is only the plea of limitation which has been agitated in this second appeal. The courts below have found that the possession of the land was transferred in October, 1959, and therefore the suit for pre -emption filed on 13th July, 1960 was within time. In this connection reference has been made to Article 10 of the Limitation Act and also section 30 of the Punjab Pre -emption Act whichever provision applies the terminus -a -quo is the same. The only difference between Article 10 of the Limitation Act and section 30 of the Punjab Pre -emption Act is that in the case of sale of agricultural land, the attestation of the mutation following the sale furnishes the terminus -a -quo whereas, in the case of registered sale deeds the date of registration furnishes the terminus -a -quo. Otherwise in the case of property which is capable of physical possession in the case where Article 10 of the Limitation Act applies possession of the whole of the property and in case where section 30 of the Punjab Pre -emption Act applies possession of part of the property is enough to start the period of Limitation running for a suit for pre -emption. In the present case the plaintiff's allegation was that he came to know of the transfer of possession from the vendor to the vendees in October 1959 while in the witness -box he shifted his stand and gave three different dates for the transfer of possession. The present site is situate in a village and therefore the period of limitation would be governed by section 30 of the Punjab Pre -emption Act, and if it can be shown by the plaintiff that possession of any part of property sold was transferred to the vendees, the limitation will start running from that date. No physical act of taking possession in this case has been proved and stress has only been laid on the recital in the sale deeds that possession has been transferred and that the vendees started tethering their cattle on the site in dispute. The evidence led in this case at best may disclose that the pre -emptor had knowledge of the sale deeds but that would not cause the limitation to run because section 30 of the Pre -emption Act provides terminus -a -quo in such a situation (1) from the date of the attestation of the mutation and (2) on the date the vendees took physical possession of any part of that property. Knowledge of the sale is not one of the points from which limitation will start running. Therefore the plaintiff's suit would be within time if it were filed within one year of the date of attestation of the mutation or from the date when the transfer of possession took place. If any of these two facts came into existence within one year of the suit for pre -emption, the suit will not be barred by time. The Courts below have accepted the plaintiffs contention that the tethering of cattle in October 1959 amounted to transfer of possession and in that view of the matter held the suit to be within time.
(2.) MR . Sohan Lal Gupta who appears for the vendees contends that evidence in regard to the tethering of cattle is conflicting and so is the statement of plaintiff. These considerations relate to appreciation of evidence and cannot be made the subject matter of a second appeal. The conclusion by a court of fact on a question of fact to be determined in a case is final in second appeal so far as this Court is concerned. It cannot be said in the present case that that conclusion is based on no evidence, though it may be said that the evidence is wholly not satisfactory, but then, there is the evidence, on which the conclusion can be rested. There is another aspect of the matter. The evidence discloses that the case of possession alleged does not amount to transference of possession and therefore the vendees did not enter into physical possession of any part of the property sold till they started building latrines, khurlies which act of possession was later than the date of suit; and, in this situation it must follow that the suit would not be barred by time. The matter when it is looked at from either point of view, leads to the conclusion that no fault can be found with the view taken by the Courts below. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed, but I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.;