A.N.Grover, J. - (1.) In order to decide the points arising in this appeal, the facts may be stated.
(2.) A shop bearing No. 3755 in the main bazar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, belonged to Chaman Rafiq Begum. On 1st October 1947 she obtained a decree for eviction against Pearey Lal and Cheda Mal, her tenants. Janki Parshad, the son of Pearey Lal, being said to be a sub-tenant. On 19th April 1949 the property of the Begum was declared evacuee property. Janki Parshad son of Pearey Lal made payments to the Custodian of rent obtaining receipts in his name. Before 1956 the shop in question was restored to the Begum. On 4th January 1956 she made an application for execution of the decree for eviction dated 1st October 1947. On 12th January 1956 she sold this property along with some other properly to Krishan Sarup by means of a deed of sale, Exhibit D. H. 2. She also assigned the benefit of the decree to the vendee, On 24th March 1956 the execution application filed on 4th January 1956 by the Begum was dismissed as unsatisfied. On 9th May 1957 an execution application was filed by Krishan Sarup who is respondent No. 1 in the present appeal. The only substantial objection that was raised related to the bar of limitation. The objection petition was dismissed on 9th April 1958. The appeal was also dismissed on 27th October 1958. Then the present appeal was filed in this Court.
(3.) The main question is one of limitation. One of the other subsidiary questions that has been raised is that a new tenancy had come into existence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the Administration of Evacuee property Act, 1950 (to be referred to as the Act) in favour of Janki Parshad and, therefore, the decree sought to be executed was no longer capable of execution. This objection was not raised in the objection petition, nor was it put into issue, although certain evidenced was led in connection with it. The trial Court decided it against the objectors but in the grounds of appeal before the lower appellate Court, no ground was directed against that part of the order of the trial Court, nor has any such ground been raised in the present memorandum of appeal before me. I, therefore, decline to allow this question to be raised at the stage of second appeal.;