Shamsher Bahadur, J. - (1.) THE question which arises for determination in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relates to the competence of the appropriate Government under the Land Acquisition Act to altar the object of the acquisition from one public purpose to the other.
(2.) LAND belonging jointly to the Petitioners, Budhi and five others, measuring 53 acres 6 kanals and 3) marls in village Majesar of Ballabgarh teshil in Gurgoan district was acquired in pursuance of notification of the Punjab Government of 2nd September,: 1960 (Annexure A) under Sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act for "setting up a factory to manufacture) electric motors'.' As the land was required urgently action for acquisition was taken under Section 17(2)(c) of the Act Under which land required 'for a public purpose which in the opinion, of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance" can be entered upon and taken possession of by the Collector thereafter to "vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". From the endorsement made In the notification appears that the land was acquired for the Indian Electric Tool Corporation, Post Office Box No. 3025 New Delhi -5, to whom its copy was sent for information. The notification was followed by the usual declaration under the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and under Section 7 the Sub -Divisional Officer Palwal was directed to take over the acquisition of the said land. This notification was also made on the same day and it was further mentioned that the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers under Section 17(2)(c) of the said Act was pleased to direct that the Sub -Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer Palwal shall proceed to take possession of the land herein specified in accordance therewith. A copy of this notice also was forwarded to the Indian Electric Tool Corporation, New Delhi, for information. According to the assertions made in the petition, the land so acquired was not transferred to the company for whose benefit the notification purports to be. By another notification of 3rd of October, 1962 (Annexure C) an area of land measuring 20 acres 1 kanal and 19 marlas out of the area of 53 acres 6 kanals and 3 marlas acquired by notification of 2nd of September, 1960, was transferred to Northern India Iron and Steel Co., Limited, New Delhi and Messrs. Manco Bevel Gear of India Limited, Faridabad for Installation of Steel Foundry Forge and C.I. casting unit and establishment of a factory to manufacture automobile gear etc. respectively. In the notification it was mentioned that the orders regarding the remaining area of 33 acres 4 kanals and 4 marlas would follow in due course. According to the written statement of the Punjab State, the land acquired by the notification of 2nd of September, 1960, was not actually taken possession of till November, 1962 and the Petitioners had been permitted to remain in possession of it. The contention of the Petitioner is that the notification of 2nd of September, 1960 had lapsed and the acquisition should now be deemed to be subsisting only under the notification of 3rd of October, 1962. The object of the Petitioner is to get advantage of the rise in land prices during this interregnum. The cast of the Respondent -State is that the original notification is still operative and the appropriate Government is competent to divert the purpose of acquisition so long as it remained in the nature of a "public purpose". There is no direct authority on the point and the learned Advocate -General relies on some observations made by a Division Bench of B.B. Ghose and Roy JJ. of the Calcutta High, Court in Secy. of State v. Amulya Charan Banerjee : AIR 1927 Cal 874, in which land had been acquired at the instance of the Calcutta Corporation. It had been urged on behalf of the claimants in that case that: the corporation having acquired land on the south, for widening the Kalighat 1st lane, are not entitled to use any portion for some other purpose. This contention is set out at page 877 and after examining the validity of the contention it was observed that: a municipality is justified in using the land for any purpose for which the statute authorised it to use land although not for which it was professedly taken. What happened in that case was that the land which, was acquired for a public ghat by the municipality was used only partially for this purpose and was used partly for a market. In the opinion of the Court, After acquisition the new owners have the ordinary rights of proprietors and may use their lands as they think fit for any purpose which does not infringe the rights of others and is not inconsistent with the purposes sanctioned by the statute under which lands have been taken. The Bench relied also on the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Luchmeswar Singh v. Chairman Darbhanga Municipality, ILR 18 Cal 99 (PC), to justify the conclusion reached by it. Mr. Sikri relying on this authority further contends that no limitation has been placed on the power of the appropriate Government to acquire land for a public purpose and there is nothing la the provisions of the Land Acquisition. Act to prohibit the appropriate Government to divert the land acquired for one public purpose far utilisation of another.
(3.) REFERENCE may also be made to a Bench decision of three Judges of the Calcutta High Court (Chief Justice Sir Francis Maclean, Banerjee and Harington JJ.) in Guru Das Kundu v. Secy of State,, 18 Cal 1 J 244. In this case the land was originally acquired for the purpose of a sewage depot but as a result of a claim for compensation on account of injurious affection it was suggested on behalf of the municipality that: It would not use the land which they had thus ac squired for a sewage discharge depot, that they have abandoned this intention, and that they are willing to have this expression of that present intention inserted in the decree. it was observed by Chief Justice Maclean at p. 249 that: It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether a public body which has acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act in this country, for one specific purpose, can subsequently abandon that purpose, and use the land so acquired for some other purpose for which they have not acquired it. For my own part I should have thought it very questionable. Apart from doubting the proposition that diversion was possible no definite opinion was given by the learned Chief Justice and the other two Judges constituting the Bench did not specifically give their views on this question. This authority therefore, cannot be pressed into service for the proposition which is stated in its head -note that: A public body which has acquired land in this country for one specific purpose, may not subsequently abandon that purpose and use the land so acquired for some other purpose for which they have not acquired it. it is also to be observed that the primary question before the Bench in Guru Das Kundu's case,, 18 Cal LJ 244 was concerned with the quantum of compensation and the question of the intended user of the land so acquired assumed importance in this context.;