I.D.Dua, J. - (1.) THE short question which this appeal raises is whether a candidate who withdraws his candidature and against whom allegations of corrupt practice have been made is a necessary party to an election petition under Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Shri Abhai Singh Appellant filed an election petition calling in question the election of Nihal Singh Respondent to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in the general elections held in February, 1962. The Respondent's election was challenged on a number of grounds which do not concern us at this stage. After practically the whole evidence in the case had been recorded, the Respondent filed an application under Section 90(3) of the aforesaid Act praying for dismissal of the petition on the ground that allegations of corrupt practice were made in the petition against Ram Narain Singh and Yudhvir Singh, Pleader who were also candidates and, therefore, who should have been impleaded but were not made parties. The petition on (sic) of this detect was, according to the prayer, (sic) to be dismissed. The learned Tribunal in a very well -reasoned order came to the conclusion that the allegations against Yudhvir Singh and Ram Narain Singh in the petition did amount to allegations of corrupt practice and that these allegations need not be confined to acts done by a candidate in his capacity as such. On these findings the petition was dismissed.
(2.) ON appeal, the Appellant's learned Counsel has drawn our attention to the definition of the word "candidate" as contained in Section 79 -A (Section 79(b)) but I do not think this definition in any manner advances the Appellant's case. On the other hand it clearly suggests that a "candidate" means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election. Applying this definition to the provisions of Section 82(b) a candidate who has withdrawn his candidature would certainly fall within the purview of this provision. The matter is really concluded by a Bench decision of this Court in Mool Chand Jain v. Rulia Ram : F.A.F.O. 1 -E Or 1963 : AIR 1963 P&H 516, to which our attention has been drawn on behalf of the Respondent. Another argument urged on behalf of the Appellant is that the allegations in the petition do not show that the corrupt practices were alleged to have been committee by the two candidates mentioned above in their capacity as candidates. The Appellant's learned Counsel has tried to find support from the provisions of Sections 79, 81, 82, 99 and 140 of the Act but I must confess my inability to appreciate how these sections suggest that the allegations, must be confined to the commission of acts by the candidates in their capacity as such, The definition of corrupt practice does not postulate any such distinction nor is there any other provision in the Act which supports the distinction sought. If a corrupt practice vitiates an election it matters little whether it has been committed by a candidate for the purpose of advancing his own election, and this is what is meant by the Appellant's counsel when he speaks of a corrupt practice by a candidate in his capacity as such, or for the purpose of advancing the election of another candidate, It is the purity of the election as such which is to be maintained. The language of Section 82(b) also does not, on the face of it, support the Appellant's contention. The language is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. The counsel has singularly failed to point out any cogent, convincing, or even plausible reason why any limitation should be placed on the statutory language. If the Parliament, had intended to confine, Section 82(b) only to cases of allegations of corrupt practice by candidates in their capacity as candidates the could have said so clearly. It is contended that it must be necessarily but for this submission except the bald assertion learned Counsel no other basis has been shown either in the statute or otherwise. Reference has of course been made to Section 99(a)(ii) of Act 43 of 1951 but in has not been possible for me to appreciate how this provision can be understood to suggest, on any reasonable and rational hypothesis, that under Section 82(b) only SUCH candidates are to be impleaded against whom allegation OR corrupt practice has been made in their capacity as candidate?. Section 99 is a general provision covering all cases of proved corrupt practice and by virtue of the proviso a person who is not a party to the petition has to be afforded an opportunity of showing cause against being named under Section 99(1)(a)(ii). This proviso would obviously exclude a candidate Impleaded under Section 82(b) I find no logical reason for concluding from Section 99 that section' 82(b) only contemplates impleading of those candidates against whom corrupt practice is alleged in their capacity as such The Appellant's contention is thus unsustainable and must be negatived.
(3.) WE have in another case also come to the same conclusion: See Amin Lal v. Hunne Mal F.A.F.O. 4 -E or 1963 :, AIR 1964 P&H 213.;