I.D. Dua, J. - (1.) THE short question which falls for determination in this second appeal from order is whether the ejectment order is a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction and is, therefore, not executable In order to appreciate the position it is necessary to state the facts so far as they are relevant for the present purpose.
(2.) AN ejectment order was passed on 24 -9 -1960 in favour of Topan Ram against his tenant Manohar Lal when the tenant was allowed time up to 24 -9 -62 for vacating the premises. Since the tenant did not vacate the premises in accordance with the order, the decree -holder landlord applied for execution of the order dated 24 -9 -1960. The tenant resisted the execution on the ground that the order of ejectment had been passed on the basis of a compromise and was, therefore, unenforceable in execution proceedings, being an order passed by the Rent Controller without jurisdiction. The First Additional Rent Controller, who was executing the order, found, that his predecessor, who had passed the order of ejectment, had, after recording the statement of one witness produced by the Petitioner on 26 -8 -60, adjourned the case for the landlord's remaining evidence to 13 -9 -1960 and then again to 24 -9 -60. On the last mentioned date, the learned Counsel for the tenant made a statement that his client admitted the bona fide personal requirements of the landlord and that therefore, an ejectment order may be passed. He further stated that the tenant may be allowed two years' time to vacate the premises. The counsel for the landlord agreed to give two years' time to the tenant for vacating the premises in question. The Rent Controller thereupon passed the order mentioned above. Reliance before the executing Rent Controller was placed on K.L. Bansal v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Civil Revn. No. 140 -D of 1961 (since, reported as 64 Pun LR 1091) where it had been observed that mere consent of the tenant is not enough for passing an ejectment decree against him on the ground of personal requirement under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (Act No. 38 of 1952). This decision was distinguished by the executing Rent Controller on the ground that the present Rent Control Act (Act No. 59 of 1958) is differently worded and, therefore, the decision on the basis of Section 13 of the 1952 Act is not a helpful precedent for construing Section 14 of the 1958 Act which governs the case in hand. In the alternative it was also observed that even if it is considered that the Controller has to be satisfied regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord it was clear in the present case that the Rent Controller passing the ejectment order had actually satisfied himself of the necessary requisites before passing the impugned order. The executing Controller also observed in this connection that Bedi J., one of the members of the Bench deciding Kaushalya Devi's case, 64 Pun LR 1091 did not disagree with an earlier decision of Grover J. in Vas Dev Sharma v. Milkhi Ram Bhatia, 62 Pun LR 888 : : AIR 1960 P&H 514, which according to him, was a case similar to the one in hand. On this view the objections were disallowed.
(3.) ON the matter having been taken on appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal the same arguments were repeated on behalf of the tenant but without success. According to the Appellate Tribunal, the counsel for the tenant had stated on 24 -9 -60 that it was admitted that the landlord required the premises for his residence and that an order of ejectment on this ground may be passed giving the tenant two years period for vacating the premises. This statement was admitted to be correct by the counsel for the landlord. It thus appeared clear to the Appellate Tribunal that the tenant had admitted the correctness of the grounds of ejectment and it was on this basis that the order for eviction was passed, the Controller having been fully satisfied on the admission of the tenant regarding the existence of the grounds of ejectment. On this premise, the impugned order of eviction was held to be valid. The Bench decision in Kaushalya Devi's case,, 64 Pun LR 1091 was distinguished on the same grounds on which the executing Controller had done so. It was observed by the Tribunal as well, as it was done by the executing Controller, that there was sufficient material on the file for the satisfaction of the Controller to pass the impugned eviction order.;