Shamsher Bahadur, J. - (1.) THIS rule is directed against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, who declined to interfere in revision with the order passed by the Magistrate, Mrs. S.K. Gill, under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2.) THE petitioners Nikka Singh and his brothers are in possession of the disputed land situate in the abadi of village Batta measuring 69 feet in length and 27 feet in width. The respondent Aka applied on 3rd of August, 1961, that the petitioners Ram Singh, Hazara Singh, Sadhu, Sunder and Nikka had obtained possession of the disputed land "11/4 month back" and as the land was claimed by him as his own there was an apprehension of breach of peace. The preliminary order was passed by the Magistrate on 31st of August, 1961, wherein it was stated that he was satisfied that the dispute between the parties was likely to cause a breach of peace and called upon the parties to file written statements or affidavits in respect of their claims on 15th September, 1961. The final order was passed by Mrs. Gill on 1st of March, 1962. and Akka was ordered to be put in possession. Nikka Singh and others filed a petition before the Sessions Judge, Patiala, which having been rejected on 5th of April, 1963, they have again come to this Court in revision. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the application under section 145 had been entertained beyond the statutory period of two months, Under the proviso to sub -section (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, "if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date of such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession at such date". It is urged that Akka on his own showing moved the petition 11/4 months after his dispossession and another period of 28 days elapsed before the preliminary order was made on 31st August, 1961. The preliminary order, in the submission of the counsel, was made more than two months after the dispossession. It is submitted on basis of the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin : A.I.R. 1959 All. 141, that a Magistrate "is not justified in treating or empowered to treat the party who had been dispossessed more than two months before the actual date of his preliminary order under section 145(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, as being in possession on the date of his order under proviso (1) to sub -section (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure". Section 145 of the Code is intended to prevent immediate breach of peace on account of forcible and sudden dispossession of parties and this is not its purpose to settle disputes about the title. The imminence of the breach is an essential prerequisite for action which has been taken by the Magistrate under section 145. On behalf of the respondent, it is urged that the petition merely mentioned that 11/4 months had elapsed before the dispossession took place and the time specified was only an approximation and there was no exact date given of dispossession. It was the duty of the person who moved the application to have mentioned when the dispossession took place because the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under section 145 can only be invoked if the dispossession had taken place two months before the preliminary order is passed. No protection can be sought by Aka on the vague description of the time of dispossession as "11/4 months back". This time should be taken at its face value and considering that the preliminary order was passed on 3rd of August, 1961, I must hold on basis of the Full Bench authority of the Allahabad High Court that the order has been passed without jurisdiction. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey : A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165, "the fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide". Reference may also be made to a Bench decision of the Andhra High Court of Chief Justice Subba Rao and Satyanarayana Raju J, in Padmaraju Subba Raju v. Padmaraju Koneti Raju, A.I.R. 1955 And. 99, where it was held that: The first proviso to sub -section (4) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, must be confined only to forcible and wrongful dispossession within two months next before the date of the preliminary order. Where a party is dispossessed beyond two months from the date of the preliminary order, it is not entitled to have a declaration under section 145(6), Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the Courts below have given no finding with regard to any apprehension of the breach of peace. It cannot be disputed that the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under sub -section (1) of section 145 can be invoked only when there is a dispute "likely to cause a breach of the peace". Not every forcible dispossession can give rise to such apprehension or danger. Apart from a bald assertion made in the petition, there was no material on which the Magistrate could reach the conclusion that a breach of peace was apprehended. The affidavits which have been filed by the respondent only disclose that the petitioners had no right to the piece of land which was in their possession. The words used are that "they are committing excesses" (sarasar ziadti kar rahe hain). These words cannot be construed to mean that any apprehension of the breach of peace existed. In any event, there is not a word about this matter in the orders of the trial Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge.
(3.) IT seems to me that the satisfaction of the Magistrate before he passed the preliminary Order has to be based either on a police report or other information under sub -section (1) of section 145. There was no report of the police and the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents do not disclose the existence of a dispute which might have caused a breach of peace. As I have said, even forcible dispossession cannot always give rise to a breach of peace. It appears to me that there was no justification for the Magistrate to have passed the order which is sought to be impugned.;