D.K. Mahajan, J. - (1.) THIS petition for revision is directed against the order of the lower appellate Court reversing on appeal the decision of the trial Court restoring possession of the premises in dispute to the tenant under section 15 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
(2.) ON the ground that the landlady bona fide required the suit premises for reconstruction an order was passed by the trial Court on the 30th August, 1957, directing the tenant to vacate the same. It was provided in that order that after reconstruction the tenant was to be put in possession of the same within the time specified in the order. The possession was actually delivered to the landlady on the 9th April, 1959. On the 1st October, 1959, the landlady rented out the premises after reconstruction to one Chhadami Lal and not to the petitioner in disregard of the order of eviction passed on the 30th August, 1967. This led to the present application by the petitioner under section 15(3) of the Act on the 6th August, 1960. This application was allowed on the 7th October, 1961. Against this decision an appeal was taken by Chhadami Lal. No appeal was preferred by the landlady. The lower appellate Court allowed Chhadami Lal's appeal and has directed that the possession be not delivered to the petitioner, but he should be allowed compensation in lieu of the same. It is against this order that the present petition for revision has been preferred. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as no appeal was filed by the landlady the order of the trial Court dated the 7th October, 1961 became final and Chhadami Lal could not get the order set aside in appeal because he derives his title from the landlady and in support of this contention he relies on the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Shankarrao Govindarao Naik v. Kisanlal Nagarmal, A.I.R. 1950 M . B 19. This decision no doubt supports him, but in the present case we are not concerned with a case under the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal section, so far as the Rent Control Act is concerned, is section 34, and is in these terms: - 34. (1) Any person aggrieved by any decree or order of a Court passed under this Act may, in such manner as may be prescribed, prefer an appeal - (a) to the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, if any, where the value of the case does not exceed two thousand rupees: Provided that where there is no Senior Subordinate Judge, the appeal shall lie to the District Judge. (b) to the Court of the District Judge, where the value of the case exceeds two thousand rupees but does not exceed ten thousand rupees; and (c) to the High Court, where the value of the case exceeds ten thousand rupees. (2) No second appeal shall he from any decree or order passed in any case under this Act. It will be apparent from the opening part of the section that an appeal can be preferred against any order or decree of a Court passed under this Act by any person aggrieved with the same. Therefore, the short question is whether Chhadami Lal was an aggrieved party. He was a party to the petition under section 15(3) of the Act and as the order of eviction would adversely affect him he would certainly be a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 34. It must be held that Chhadami Lal could appeal against an order under section 15(3) of the Act. Therefore, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail.
(3.) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was a fit case where the order of the trial Court should have been allowed to stand and the alternative order for compensation should not have been passed. It cannot be disputed that under section 15(3), two alternatives are provided and once the Court of fact decides to adopt one alternative, it can hardly be said to be a ground for interference in revision, unless the choice for one or the other alternative has been made on extraneous considerations. This is not the case here.;