Dua, J. - (1.) THIS revision under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (Act No. 38 of 1952) is directed against the order of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge allowing the appeal of the Plaintiff -landlady Smt. Ram Piari and approving the order of ejectment against Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as well in addition to the order of ejectment granted by the Court of first instance against Defendant No. 1.
(2.) AT the bar on behalf of the Respondent, Smt. Ram Piari a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri Gurbachan Singh urging that the revision in this Court is barred by time. In order to appreciate this argument it is necessary to state some of the relevant dates in this connection. The revision in this Court was filed on 12th February, 1962. The order of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge is dated 18th September, 1961. An application for a copy of that order was made on 22nd September, 1961 and it was ready on 18th November, 1961. The office raised an objection that certified copy of the first Court's order had not been attached to the revision and it was directed to be returned to the Petitioner to be refiled within a week. The Petitioner, however, applied for a certified copy of the first Court's order on 19th April, 1962. That copy was apparently ready on 2nd June, 1962 and its delivery was obtained on 21st June, 1962. The revision was in the circumstances represented in this Court on 26th September, 1962. On the basis of these dates it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the revision is barred by time because it is the practice of this Court to insist on revisions being filed within a period of ninety days. I am not aware of any well -recognised or universal practice prevailing in this Court that every revision filed after the expiry of ninety days (e. g. on 91st day) must be dismissed as barred by time. As a matter of fact no period has been provided either by the Limitation Act or by any rules framed by this Court or by any statutory rule under the statute in question. Period of limitation which restricts an aggrieved suitor coming to this Court to seek justice must be well -known and certain. My attention has been drawn to only one case in support of this objection and that is an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Amar Nath v. C.R. Motihar C.R. 486 -D of 1956, decided on 8th February, 1962. While dealing with a similar objection in that case the learned Single Judge observed that there was clearly no period of limitation provided for the exercise of the power of revision under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control, 1952 and a Judge of this Court can apparently call for the record on its own irrespective of any period of limitation. He, however, proceeded further to observe that in case a party moves this Court in revision the ordinary and normal practice is that such an application should be made within ninety days of the judgment or order which is sought to be revised. This is, so proceeds the observations, a rule of practice placing limitation on the discretionary powers of this Court and a rule which is followed in this Court not as a rule of law but as a rule of practice placing a limitation on the discretionary powers of this Court so that those powers do not run it to the sphere of whim. This observation is followed by another important sentence according to which it is clarified that if there is a case of gross injustice the practice will obviously not be strictly enforced. It is quite clear that this decision does not refer to any earlier precedent and by itself also it does not seem to lay down any strict precedent to be followed invariably and universally; the discretionary power of this Court is judicial to be exercised in each case on its own facts and circumstances. This reserve of power which is conferred on this Court by Section 35 seems to be analogous to those revisional powers which every superior Court has been given by the Parliament to promote the cause of justice with the result that no artificial or arbitrary line can be drawn to give rise to the plea of limitation for depriving a citizen from approaching this Court to have his controversy considered and adjudicated. It must be borne in mind that the revisional power in question vests in the Court and it does not entitle the person as of right to move this Court and claim to be heard and this irrespective of his diligence and promptitude. In each case the Court is full master to consider the question whether or not to interfere, of course keeping in view the factor of delay, for unexplained delay which is undue, would normally deprive a party of the discretionary and extraordinary relief. Coming now to the facts of this case it appears that the premises in question were originally let on 23 -3 -1953 in favour of Messrs D. W. Bawa Singh and Co. for a period of three years by means of a registered lease -deed. In the lease -deed I am told there was a term according to which the lease could be transferred to any one of the partners. It is not disputed that Attar Chand, Defendant No. 1, who was one of the partners of that firm, actually got leasehold rights assigned to him on 1 -11 -1955. Prior to that it appears sometime about 13 -4 -1955 Defendant No. 3 who is Petitioner in this Court came on the premises. It may be stated here that the Respondent does not admit this plea to be correct, but assuming it to be so I do not think this would really make any difference in the determination of this controversy. Defendant No. 3 claims to have been granted a lease of this property by one Gurdial Singh and it is on this basis that he claims to have a direct relationship with the landlord and insists that in the present proceedings no decree for his ejectment can be passed because he is not the Plaintiff's tenant.
(3.) NOW the finding of the Court below is that Gurdial Singh had no power to grant a lease to Defendant No. 3. If this be the correct position then obviously, an ejectment decree granted against Defendant No. 1 can clearly be executed against all those who happen to be in occupation of the premises in question: see Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Act, 1952. The argument that Attar Chand came on the scene about seven months after the claim of Defendant No. 3 of having been given possession is wholly immaterial, because if up to that time Defendant No. 3 had not acquired any status of tenant or otherwise secured right to be on the premises which is binding on the Plaintiff, it cannot effect the present controversy prejudicially to the Plaintiff.;