Khanna, J. - (1.) THIS petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution filed by Joginder Singh Petitioner, raises the important question as to whether a District Magistrate in an application under Section 51 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can convict a person who has been acquitted by the Gram Panchayat. It arises in the following circumstances: Amar Singh made a complaint to the Gram Panchayat of village Kakarwal against Joginder Singh Petitioner and his wife, Gnrnam Kaur on the allegation that on the day of Dussehra in 1961, corresponding to 18th October 1961, the aforesaid husband and wife assaulted the complainant after dragging him inside their house and also pulled his beard. Amar Singh examined himself and produced one witness Bachan Singh in support of that allegation. The allegation was denied by Joginder Singh and his wife. The Gram Panchayat found the evidence, produced on behalf of the complainant, to be discrepant and not convincing. It also observed that according to its enquiry the case of the complainant was false. Joginder Singh and Gurnam Kaur were, accordingly, acquitted.
(2.) AMAR Singh filed an application under Section 51 of the Act to the Court of Executive Magistrate, Malerkotla, who was exercising the powers of a District Magistrate. The learned Magistrate was of the view that the version of the complainant was straight forward and that the discrepancies referred to by the Gram Panchayat were not material. He accordingly, set aside the order of the Panchayat and convicted Joginder Singh under Section 323, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 20/ -. Gurnam Kaur was given the benefit of the doubt and was held to have been rightly acquitted by the Panchayat. In this Court, Mr. Vinayak, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has made two submissions, It is urged in the first instance that in an application under Section 51 the Magistrate could not convict the Petitioner who had been acquitted by the Gram Panchayat. in the alternative , it is argued that assuming that the Magistrate was vested with that power, the circumstances of the present case did not justify interference with the order of acquittal made by the Panchayat, Section 51 of the Act reads as under: - 51(1) The District Magistrate, if satisfied, that a failure of justice has occurred, may, of his own motion or on an application of the party aggrieved, by order in writing after notice to the accused, or the complainant as the case may be, cancel or modify any order in a judicial proceeding made by a Panchayat or direct the retrial of any criminal case by the same or any other panchayat of competent jurisdiction or by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to him. (2) * * * * Perusal of the above provision of law goes to show that the District Magistrate is empowered, in case he is satisfied after due notice to the parties that failure of justice has occurred, to cancel or modify an order or to direct the retrial of any criminal case. The question, which arises for determination, is as to whether the words "cancel or modify any order" include the power of converting a finding of acquittal into that of conviction. The word "cancel" conveys the idea of making inoperative, and the dictionary meaning of this word is "to annul or suppress: to abolish or wipe out". According to Aiyer's Law Lexicon of British India, the word "cancel" means "to blot out on obliterate ". Mr. Vinayak urges that though a Magistrate can under Section 51 of the Act set aside or wipe out an order of the Gram Panchayat, he cannot, at the same time, convict the Petitioner and the only power, which the Magistrate can exercise is to direct the retrial of the criminal case it the circumstances warrant such a course. The power of a Magistrate under Section 51 of the Act in this respect, it is stated, is analogous to that of a revisional court under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3.) SO far as the word "modify" used in Section 51 of the Act is concerned, it is contended that modification implies an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject matter intact. Reference in this connection has been made to Aiyer's Law Lexicon of British India which supports the contention of the learned Counsel. Reference lias also been made to case Imperatrix v. Rama Prema, I.L.R. 4 Bom. 239 wherein it was held that the word "modify" cannot be deemed to include the power of enouncing the sentence. The contentions of Mr. Vinayak prime facie appear to be well -founded. In view, however, of the importance of the question and to ensure an authoritative pronouncement on the subject, I am of the view that the matter should be decided by a larger Bench. I, accordingly, direct that the papers may be laid before my Lord the Chief Justice for retiring the matter to a larger Bench. ORDER OF THE DIVISION BENCH Mehar Singh and Jindra Lal, JJ.;