Dua, J. - (1.) CHAMAN Lal petitioner in this Court applied to the Rent Controller under section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act No. III of 1949 for fixing fair rent. According to his allegations Rakha Ram respondent was charging him Rs. 130/ - per month whereas the fair rent of the shop in question could not, according to law, exceed Rs. 10/ - or Rs. 15/ - per month. The application was contested by the landlord and on the pleadings of the parties the folio wing issue was settled : What is the fair rent of the premises in dispute - Chaman Lal examined four witnesses in addition to himself. After the evidence of five witnesses had been recorded on 7th March, 1961 the case was adjourned to 27th March, 19(31. On 27th March, 1961 only one witness appeared but he was bound down as he could not be examined in the absence of certain rent -deed which had been summoned. The case was then adjourned to 15th April, 1961. On 15th April, 1961 it appears that the witnesses were not summoned. Chaman Lal, however, made his own statement on oath stating that considering the area of his shop and the rent of shops in the neighbourhood in 1938 -39 Rs. 90/ - per month was proper rent and the same may be fixed in the case. The learned Rent Controller gave his findings in the following words : Finding himself unable to substantiate his allegation, the applicant made his own statement deposing that considering the rate of rent of the neighbouring shops in the year 1938 -39, the rent of his shop in his occupation comes to Rs. 90/ - only (instead of Rs. 130/ - he is paying at present). He stated that Rs. 90/ - was the fair rent of the premises in question. He did not tell me the basic rent, but I need not find out the same since the appellant's counsel before me concedes and admits that the fair rent of the shop in question comes to Rs. 90/ -. To work out a basic rent from an admitted and proved fair rent, and then re -calculate the fair rent from the basic rent would be an idle formality. I am, therefore, convinced that Rs. 90/ - is the fair rent of the premises in question and reply this issue accordingly. Against the order fixing Rs. 90/ - as fair rent Chaman Lal took the appeal to the appellate authority and the first challenge to the Rent Controller's order was that he had not fixed the rent on merits but merely on the basis of a statement made by the tenant that the fair rent of the shop was Rs. 90/ - only. Reliance before the appellate authority was placed on Dharam Pal v. Yog Raj, A.I.R. 1953 Pun. 287 =, (1953) 55 P.L.R. 385, a decision by Bhandari C.J., for the proposition that an application for fair rent when parties omit to produce necessary evidence the Controller is required by law to make an enquiry and it is his duty to call additional evidence to assess fair rent and to pronounce judgment; failure to perform this duty must entail remand of the case by the District Judge for further enquiry or for an enquiry to be held by the District Judge himself. Niranjan Singh v. Murti Shri Bhagwan Ram, I.L.R. 1955 P&H. 211 =, (1955) 57 P.L.R. 530, another decision by the same learned Chief Justice, was also cited for the proposition that the protection afforded by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, cannot be waived by agreement. The appellate authority distinguished these two decisions on the ground that the order of the Controller in the case in hand was not solely based on a compromise or agreement but on the statement of the tenant as well as the other circumstances of the case. After quoting a passage from Popatlal Ratansey v. Kali Das Bhagwan : I.L.R. 1957 Bom. 688, according to which the decision or judgment of a Court embodied in a consent decree estops the tenant from going back in a subquent application under the Act from the previously agreed rent on the ground that it was not the fair rent, it observed that there was nothing in the Rent Act which would prevent a tenant from abandoning the dispute or his objection for a fair rent at any stage of the proceedings and from agreeing that the rent proposed by the landlord should be considered to be the proper standard rent. The authority then proceeded to observe that in the case before it the tenant had produced all available evidence on the issue and had examined four witnesses but finding their evidence to be unfavourable made a statement on solemn affirmation that the legitimate amount of rent of the shop would be Rs. 90/ - per month and that the fair rent should be fixed at that figure. The Controller's order was thus not based on any compromise or agreement between the parties but on an enquiry conducted by him. It also expressed the view that there was no presumption under the Punjab Rent Act that the rent fixed by agreement between the parties must be considered to be "unfair rent". Indeed, the appellate authority also opined that where the parties failed to lead evidence because of non -existence or non -availability of evidence it would be an impossible task for the Controller to search evidence in support of his order. With these observations, the appellate, authority dismissed the appeal.
(2.) ON revision before me the learned counsel for the tenant -petitioner has drawn my attention to Ladha Ram etc. v. Khushi Ram, (1955) 57 P.L.R. 188, where Bishan Narain J. observed that the object of Rent Control Acts, generally speaking, is inter alia to restrict increase in rents and also to restrict the landlords' rights to eject tenants, thereby preventing the landlords from charging excessive rents and forcing tenants to pay increased rents by threat of ejectment. On the grounds of general public policy and expediency, therefore, the Courts must give full effect to these statutory provisions and a party cannot be allowed to circumvent them by private arrangements. The rent in excess of standard rent is, according to this authority, declared by the statute irrecoverable from the tenants notwithstanding any contract to the contrary between the landlord and the tenant. The scheme of the East Punjab Rent Act was, according to this decision, considered to prevent the landlord or the tenant from coming to any agreement or doing anything which would increase the fair rent of the premises, for, the statute declares such an increase not only illegal but also renders the landlord liable to imprisonment if he tries to enforce such an agreement. In the course of the judgment, another decision by D. Falshaw J. (as he then was) in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Shri Badri Parshad, (1954) 66 P.L.R. 549, was noticed as an authority in support of the view mentioned above. In the ultimate conclusion the learned Single Judge then observed that "fair and standard rent of premises cannot possibly be fixed by agreement between the particular parties before the Controller nor can a dismissal of an application in default or its disposal without enquiry fix fair or standard rent for the premises for all times." As against this the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to a decision by the ex -Chief Justice G.D. Khosla in Sat Parkash v. Parkash Chand C.R. No. 648 of 1960 (Civil Revision 648 of 1960) given on 6th April, 1961. The facts there were that a shop was let out on a rent of Rs. 55/ - per mensem and the tenant made an application for the fixation of the fair rent. The parties compromised the dispute and it was agreed that Rs. 48/ - per mensem would be the fair rent. The Rent Controller thereupon dismissed the tenant's application. The landlord thereafter applied for ejectment on the ground that the tenant was; misusing the premises; another application was also filed by the landlord for the same relief on the ground of non -payment of rent. The tenant then also made an application for the fixation of fair rent urging that Rs. 10/ -per mensem was the basic rent for these premises. This prayer was resisted on the ground that the tenant was debarred from agitating this point again in view of the previous compromise arrived at between the parties. This plea was repelled by the Rent Controller on the basis of Naranjan Singh's (supra) and Ladha Ram's (supra) cases. On appeal before the Appellate Authority the landlord did not press this point and conceded that in view of the rulings just mentioned the tenant could re -agitate the question of the fixation of the fair rent. The landlord's appeal was accordingly dismissed. On revision in this Court relaying on Popatlal's (supra) case of the Bombay High Court the learned Chief Justice distinguished the cases of Ladha Ram (supra) and Niranjan Singh (supra) on the ground that in those cases the application for fixation of fair rent second time had been made by different tenants from those who had compromised earlier. In Ladha Ram's case though the tenants were two partners and the first petition was by one partner and the second by another the learned Chief Justice felt that these two petitions were virtually by different tenants and therefore the rule of law laid down in that case was held not to apply to a case where both the petitions were by the same tenants. He emphasised that in the earlier proceedings the other partner filing the second petition, was not a party. The learned Chief Justice also proceeded to observe that in the two earlier cases of this Court the argument that had prevailed was that the fixing of the rent is a duty cast upon the Rent Controller and once he exercises the duty after making the enquiry into the matter, the rent is fixed once and for all and that the figure arrived at by the Rent Controller will bind all subsequent tenants unless circumstances change. In the case before the learned Chief Justice the question was considered to be whether the tenant could re -agitate the matter after having agreed to withdraw that matter from the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller on the basis of an agreement. arrived at with the landlord in the presence of the Rent Controller. The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to consider the object of the Rent Registration Act and observed that there would be no undue advantage exercised by the landlord over a tenant in need of accommodation where the Rent Controller accepts the agreement and passes an order on the basis of the compromise with the result that such a. compromise would stand on a wholly different footing from a compromise arrived at outside the Court where the landlord would be in a position to exercise pressure on him. The tenant in that case was held to be precluded from re -agitating the matter both by the principle of res judicata and by the principle of estoppel. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Popatlal's case (supra) was considered to be more in point. In following the ratio of that decision the landlord's revision was allowed. Another unreported decision by Gurnam singh J. (C.R. No. 796 of 1956) was also noticed but that too was distinguished on the same ground on which the two earlier decisions were distinguished, though an additional factor taken into account was that the Bombay ruling had not been brought to the Court's notice. More recently sitting singley D.K. Mahajan J. in Ram Singh v. Panna Lal C.R. No. 733 of 1960 (C.R. No. 733 of 1960) purporting to follow the Single Bench decision in Sat Parkash's case (supra) and also approving the decision of the Bombay High Court in Popatlal's case (supra) allowed the landlord's revision. From the judgment in Rant Singh's case (supra), however, it appears that Panna Lal tenant, a party to the revision in this Court, had taken a lease in 1952 and apparently he himself as tenant had filed both the applications for the fixation of fair rent. The plea of res judicata had not been agitated in that case before the appellate authority but was allowed in this Court on the ground that being a pure question of law it could be taken up for the first time particularly when the earlier consent order operated as res judicata and barred the jurisdiction of the appellate authority to fix fair rent afresh.
(3.) IT is hardly open to serious doubt, and there is ample support available in binding precedents for the view, that a decree or an order passed by a Court in consequence of a compromise is a mere record of the will of the parties and it cannot be regarded to acquire any greater sanctity than a compromise itself on the mere ground that it is adopted by the Judge or that the command of the Judge is added to it. In such cases the Judge is not called upon to consider the fairness of the compromise with the result that in the absence of judicial determination of: the propriety, validity or legality of the decree or order, they are liable to the same attack and suffer from the same infirmities which the compromise is open or subject to. It is undoubtedly true that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment in which the Court exercises its judicial mind on the merits of the contested case. The question, however is; Can an order of a Rent Controller accepting the compromise not by judicially determining its legality and propriety operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings, when the matter relates to fixation of fair rent under the E.P. Rent Restriction Act ? At this stage I should like to mention one more Singl Bench decision of this Court, which has come to my notice, in Hindu Rao v. Shori Lal, I.L.R. (1962) 2 P&H. 108, a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The tenant in the reported case had taken the premises on 1st July, 1958 on an agreed rent of Rs. 45/ - per mensem. On 27th August, 1959 he applied to the Rent Controller for fixation of fair rent. On 1st October, 1960 the parties made statements before the Controller, the landlord agreeing to charge Rs. 31/4/ - per mensem as rent from 1st September, 1959 and the tenant expressing his willingness to pay it. The Rent Controller in accordance with the parties' statement ordered : The respondent having agreed to charge the applicant Rs. 31/4/ - per mensem with effect from 1st September, 1959, the petition is dismissed as anfractuous. On appeal by the tenant the Rent Control Tribunal remanded the case back for decision in accordance with law for independent determination of fair rent. On second appeal Shamsher Bahadur J. purporting to follow the decision in Sat Parkash's case (supra) and agreeing with the reasons for distinguishing the earlier reported decisions of this Court observed as follows : It is true that the Act enjoins the Rent Controller to settle a dispute with regard to standard rent between a landlord and a tenant but it cannot be inferred therefrom that a tenant is prevented from abandoning the dispute at any stage of a proceeding and agreeing that the rent proposed by the landlord should be determined as the proper standard rent. The various decisions of this Court (both reported and unreported) noticed above may not be easy to reconcile and the matter may perhaps have to be settled by a larger Bench on a more suitable occasion., because, in my humble opinion, the above decisions do seem to make the law uncertain, thereby introducing in the state of law an element of confusion to the embarrassment of the citizens, their legal advisers and the Courts for which those decisions may be held to constitute binding precedents. One cannot over emphasise the importance of certainty and easy ascertain ability of law in all legal systems; more so in our system of administration of justice where judicial precedents play a vital role in interpreting the existing law : conflicting judicial precedents must not, so far as possible, be allowed to remain in the field and it is eminently desirable in the interest of rule of law to strive to sustain uniformity in this domain, so that law may be both certain and predictable. In this context it would not be out of place to observe that proper functioning of the rule of law demand d liberal and not restricted reporting of decisions laying down law for the guidance of the citizens, the bar and the Courts. It is unnecessary to say anything more on this subject on the present occasion.;