Shamsher Bahadur, J. - (1.) THE single point for determination in this appeal concerns the competence of the State Government to acquire the suit property, and in order to examine the validity of this objection which was raised and accepted at a very late stage by the learned District Judge of Ambala, it is necessary to set out the history of this acquisition right from the beginning.
(2.) AN area of land measuring 161 bighas and 7 biswas, that is, about 33.61 acres belonging to the Respondents in village Chuharpur of Kharar Tehsil in Ambala district, was included in the notification for its requisition under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953 (Punjab Act No. XI of 1953). The essential requirement of this provision is that where the competent authority is of opinion that any property is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, being a purpose of the State, and that the property should be requisitioned, the owner may be called upon to show cause within 15 days why the property should not be requisitioned. The notification was issued by the Estate Officer, who is the competent authority, on 8th of September. 1954, and it was stated that the land was needed for the public purpose of "Government Aerodrome Chandigarh," which was described as a purpose of the State. In course of time this notification was followed by a notice issued to the owners under Sub -section (2) of Section 3 on 29th of October, 1954. The land requisitioned was taken possession of under Section 4. Section 7 authorises the State Government to acquire the requisitioned property for a purpose at any lime by publication in the official Gazette a notice to the effect that the said Government has decided to acquire the property. It is not disputed that a notice was issued under Section 7 to acquire this property on 7th of March, 1955. After the property is acquired the question arises about the settlement of compensation and this matter is dealt with under Section 8 of the Act. It is provided that where any property is requisitioned or acquired the compensation shall in the first place be fixed in accordance with agreement and where no such agreement is possible an arbitrator is appointed by the State Government to fix the amount of compensation. It is the duty of the arbitrator under Clause (e) of Sub -section (I) of Section 8, after hearing the dispute, to "make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just and specify he person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid and in making the award he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of Sub -sections (2) and (3), so far as they are applicable Sub -sections (2) and (3) lay down the principles on which compensation is to be determined. The District and Sessions Judge of Ambala was appointed an arbitrator in pursuance of the notification of the Punjab Government of 6th of October, 1956. Mr. Hans Raj Khanna (now Khanna J. as arbitrator) made an award on 30th of July, 1957, to -the effect that the Respondent -claimants were entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 175/ - per bigha for barani land, Rs. 202/ - per bigha for abi land and Rs. 40/ - per bigha for gair mumkin land, and also to compensation at the rate of Rs. 100/ - per bigha for the sugar cane crop standing over 24 bighas and 11 biswas out of the land acquired. The appeal preferred to this Court from the award came for hearing before Grover J. in F. A. O. No. 148 of 1957, and by his order of 20th of May, 1959, the award of the arbitrator was set aside and remitted to him for fresh determination of compensation in accordance with law. The arbitrator was to decide whether on any particular point he required fresh evidence to be adduced. The arbitrator this time, Shri Sant Ram Garg who is now the District and Sessions Judge, Ambala, instead of re -determining the amount of compensation has held, on an objection raised on behalf of the claimants that the entire proceedings suffered from lack of jurisdiction in as much as under Sub -section (1) of Section 3 the land for the purpose of construction of an aerodrome could not be requisitioned or acquired by the State Government, the object not being a purpose "of the State". The learned arbitrator has taken note of certain correspondence which passed between the Punjab Government and the Government of India and has reached the conclusion that the acquisition was made as the instance of the Central Government for a purpose which is that of the Union.
(3.) IN the appeal preferred by the State Government it has been urged by Mr. Lachhman Dass Kaushal, that the arbitrator had no warrant to enter into the question regarding the validity of the notification at the stage which the case had reached when it was only required of him to re -assess the amount of compensation and to take any fresh evidence for the purpose if considered necessary. It is further urged that in any event the satisfaction of the State of Punjab that the object of requisitioning was a purpose of the State was conclusive and could not form the subject -matter of further investigation by the arbitrator whose functions are confined within the scope of Section 8 of the Act. It is admitted by the parties that the object of acquisition has long since been fulfilled, an aerodrome having been constructed on the various lands including those of the Respondent -claimants which had been requisitioned and acquired under the Act. None of the Respondents, and indeed no other claimant ever raised the objection or showed cause against the original notice issued under Sub -section (1) of Section 3. The land was requisitioned and then acquired by successive notifications and notices, and no objection was ever raised about the competence of the power of the Punjab Government to take over the property under the Act. When a reference was made before the District and Sessions Judge as arbitrator, there was no challenge offered to the validity of the reference and there can be no manner of doubt that if the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was in question the matter should have been raised at that time. In the appeal before Grover J. the case was argued on the merits of the award and the remission was directed only on the question of assessment. When the case came back before the District and Sessions Judge for re -determination as arbitrator under the Act, this objection was taken for the first time and it can acceptably be contended, as has been done by Mr. Kaushal, that the time for raising the objection even on the question of jurisdiction has long since passed. Support for this submission is sought on basis of the authority of the Bombay High Court of West and Nanabhai Haridas JJ. in Dattu v. Kasai, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 535, holding that the objection with regard to limitation having been taken too late could not be considered after the appeal had been remanded for determination of the Plaintiff's right of perpetual cultivation of land. The question of jurisdiction is no doubt fundamental and goes to the root of the matter and so does the question of limitation in a certain way. There is another decision of the Allahabad High Court in Chunnilal and Ors. v. Habib Ali and others : A. I. R. 1916 All. 213, where the Judges declined to entertain a technical plea of want of due attestation after the case had been remanded in second appeal for consideration of certain matters. In my opinion, the principle of the Bombay and Allahabad authorities lend some aid to Mr. Kaushal's argument that the question of jurisdiction could not have been raised before the Arbitrator by the claimants after the proceedings had been remitted to him for the limited purpose of re -assessing the award. There is a further circumstance which can be taken into consideration in this case. If the objection had been taken at the proper time the State Government might have been able to establish that the purpose of the acquisition was in fact a purpose of the State and some evidence may have been called. It would be seen that two essentials are necessary before a notification can be made under Section 3 ; in the first place the acquisition should be for a public purpose, and secondly, the purpose should be one of the State. It has never been disputed that the requisitioning and acquisition had been made for a public purpose. The objection which has been greatly delayed relates only to a determination of the question whether it is a purpose of the State or of the Union.;