Mehar Singh, J. - (1.) THE reference order of August, 29, 1962, will be read as part of this judgment. In view of that order before this Bench the question for consideration is this: - Whether protection of section 11 of Punjab Act I of 1913 is or is not available against a deposit made by the pre -emptor in a pre -emption suit after the dismissal of the pre emption suit when the amount is sought to be attached by the decree -holder of the pre -emptor, in execution of the decree against the pre -emptor, and whether it makes any difference that the parties agreed in the money suit by the decree -holder against the pre -emptor that the amount of the deposit be attachable in execution of the decree ? The facts are given in sufficient detail in the reference order and there is no need to recapitulate the same here. The question has been clearly framed. It is in substance in two parts.
(2.) IN the Punjab Pre -emption Act, 1913 (Act I of 1913), section 11 reads: No sum deposited in or paid into Court by a pre -emptor under the provisions of this Act or of the Code of Civil Procedure shall while it is in the custody of the Court, be liable to attachment in execution of a decree or order of a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court or of a Revenue Officer. The language of the section is as clear as can be leaving no possible ambiguity in its meaning. It refers (a) to deposit or payment of a sum into Court, and (b) its immunity from attachment whilst it is in the custody of the Court. Once the deposit has been made or the sum paid in the terms of this section, the sum goes into the custody of the Court, and as long as it is in that custody, it is immune from attachment. This section does not refer even in the remotest manner to the result of any suit in connection with which the deposit might have been made or the sum paid into Court. It says plainly that the deposit once made or the sum once paid into Court shall be immune from attachment whilst it is in the custody of the Court. This is without reference to any other circumstance. The only condition is that the deposit be made or the sum paid into Court in accordance with section 11 and once that is done there can never be any attachment of the same whilst it is in the custody of the Court. The indirect object or effect of the deposit or the payment of the sum may be protection of the interest either of the vendee or the pre -emptor or say to a point of both; but in the prohibition enacted by this section there is not the least reference to any such object or the limitation of the protection only while that object remains in existence. The plain language of the section conveying straight meaning is not effected by looking away from the section and asking why the deposit has been made or the sum paid into Court by the pre -emptor. This question does not arise from reading the plain language of the section, which can be given effect to without more than what it says. Two cases decided by the Lahore High Court have already been referred to in the order of reference which support this view. The first case is Sulakhan Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1934) 36 P.L.R. 250=A.I.R. 1934 Lah. 850. In that case, like the present case, the pre -emptor's suit had been dismissed. Attachment of the amount deposited in the Court was sought by a decree -holder of the pre -emptor in execution of his decree against him. The learned Judge negatived this claim in view of section 11. The other case is Ishar Singh v. Allah Rakha, (1936) 38 P.L.R. 906 in which the pre -emption suit had been decreed and the amount deposited by the pre -emptor had become available to the vendee. In execution of his decree against the vendee, the decree -holder sought to attach the amount while still deposited in Court. Again another learned Single Judge negatived this claim upon the language of section 11. In both these cases during the arguments reliance for the contrary approach was placed on Mohna Mal v. Tulsi Ram, I.L.R. 3 Lah. 141=A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 290. That case concerned section 15 of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, 1913 (Punjab Act II of 1913), which section is in these terms: - No sum deposited with the Collector by a petitioner under the provisions of this Act shall be attached by any Court or Revenue Officer." The learned Judges in Mohna Mal v. Tulsi Ram I.L.R. 3 Lah. 141=A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 290 were of the opinion that this section is primarily for the protection of the person depositing the money, and the intention of the legislature was that the money deposited under the provisions of this Act should be exempted from attachment in execution of a decree against the depositor. This consideration, however, does not apply to section 11 of Punjab Act I of 1913 because in that section prohibition from attachment of the deposit or the sum paid into Court is 'while it is in the custody of the Court'. No such words appear in section 15 of Punjab Act II of 1913 and so Mohna Mal v. Tutsi Ram is no help in regard to the meaning and scope of section 11 of Punjab Act I of 1913. The Legislature, in so far as section 11 is concerned, by the very language of the section has left no possible doubt about its intention which is clearly stated that whilst the deposit made or the sum paid in Court remains in the Court, there is prohibition against its attachment. The prohibition is mandatory and it is obvious that there is no manner of getting away from it or around it. The learned counsel for the decree -holder has made reference to this observation of the learned Judges in Abdus Salam v. Wilayat Ali Khan, I.L.R. 19 All.256: Money paid into Court by a plaintiff in pre -emption to be paid over in a certain event to the defendant in the suit is in custody of the Court until the result of the litigation is known. The learned counsel says that section 11 be read subject to this limitation as in the observation of the learned Judges, but this observation was made by the learned Judges in 1897, long time before Act I of 1913 was enacted, and the language of section 11 does not admit of any such limitation unless something more is read into it which is not admissible by reason of the clarity of the language of this section. In either of the two cases, Sulakhan Singh v. Sundar Singh (supra) and Ishar Singh v. Allah Rakha (supra) the learned Judge concerned distinguished Mohna Mal v. Tulsi Ram from the case he was considering and did not rely upon it. So far the matter seems to be clear beyond any possible argument. The learned counsel for the decree -holder contends that though this may be the correct approach to the meaning and effect of section 11, the deposit or the sum paid, particularly after the dismissal of the preemption suit, is in the hands of the Court for the benefit of the pre -emptor or the person depositing or paying the amount in Court, and as such a person can always waive even a statutory protection of this type, so the judgment -debtors having waived protection under section 11 in the present case, the amount is attachable by the decree -holder in execution of his decree against them. The leaned counsel further points out that the only case in which a person, for whose benefit such a protection is, cannot waive is where the protection is on the ground of public policy. In this respect he relies upon Dupagunta Subramaniam v. Govinda Petar Satyanadham, I.L.R. 1942 Mad 640=A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 391, a case under section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which the learned Judge has held that the provisions of that section are imperative and are intended to give protection to persons, being the employees referred to in that section, on grounds of public policy and not merely to confer a personal benefit upon them; and so the employee cannot waive the privilege given to him by this section. Now it is well settled that where a personal benefit is conferred by a statutory provision, unless it proceeds on grounds of public policy, in which case it cannot be waived; it may be waived by the person for whose benefit it has been enacted. On its plain language section 11 does not show that it has been enacted for the benefit of any particular party . It is a section which enacts a prohibitory provision against the attachment of depositor sum paid into Court in certain circumstances, without reference to its benefit to any party that may be concerned with it. It may be true that indirectly the effect of the deposit or the sum paid into Court may in certain circumstances benefit one of the other party to a pre -emption suit, but the prohibition enacted in this section is not connected in any manner with any such benefit to any party to such a suit. The prohibition, as pointed out, is directed against an attachment of sum deposited in or paid into Court whilst it is in the custody of the Court. The prohibition is operative as long as the sum remains in the custody of the Court, whether ultimately somebody else benefits by it does not ease the prohibition. The prohibition being imperative and it being directed as against what is in the custody of the Court, an act or omission of a party to a pre -emption suit, or who was a party to a pre -emption suit before its final decision cannot sanction what is directly prohibited in clear language by the statutory provision. The prohibition being imperative and directed in regard to what is in the custody of the Court and not having direct reference to the benefit or advantage of the sum deposited or paid into Court in relation to any particular party, the question of it having been enacted or not on the ground of public policy does not in the circumstances really arise. If power could be assumed in a party to a pre -emption suit, after the decision of the suit, to sanction attachment of the sum deposited in or paid into Court whilst in the custody of the Court, the question of waiver or personal benefit or advantage could come in for consideration, but there is no justification for any assumption of such power in a party to a pre -emption suit. The language of section 11 does not admit of its reading otherwise than it plainly reads on the basis that ultimately somebody might benefit from the deposit made in or the sum paid into Court. The legislature may have its own reas,ns for enacting such an imperative prohibition and it is not the function of the Court to delve into such reasons, find them not satisfactory, and to import the doctrine of want of grounds of public policy in the statutory provision, and then proceed to allow a party to a pre -emption suit the power to sanction attachment of the sum deposited in or paid into Court contrary to the express words of section 11. The doctrine of waiver does not apply to section 11.
(3.) THERE has been some argument that section 11 refers to a sum deposited in or paid into Court by 'a pre -emptor', and that as soon as a pre -emption suit is decided, the pre -emptor ceases to be 'a pre -emptor' within the meaning of section 11. This apparently is not correct, for the words 'a pre -emptor' in section 11 are descriptive of the person making the deposit in or paying the sum into Court at the time the deposit is made or the sum is paid. Nothing in the language of section 11 justifies that any such status has to be maintained by the pre -emptor even after the decision of the pre -emption suit for section 11 to remain operative. The reason is obvious. The prohibition is against the attachment of the sum deposited in or paid into Court whilst in the custody of the Court and the emphasis in the section is upon the custody of the Court and not upon the person who initially made the deposit or paid the sum into Court. So that this approach is not correct.;