- (1.) The Punjab State by a notification dated 14th December, 1949 requisitioned 10 biswas and 16 biswansis of land comprising Khasras Nos. 1365/581 and 1366/581 situate on G.T. Road Ludhiana, belonging to Mela Ram, under Section 2 of the East Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947, (Punjab Act No. XVII of 1947). Subsequently, the Punjab State acquired the aforesaid property under Section 3 of the East Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948). The owner's efforts to persuade the State Government to appoint an arbitrator under Section 5 of the said Act proved futile which led him to file writ petition No. 1070 of 1957 (Mela Ram V/s. The State of Punjab). This petition was accepted and a direction issued to the State of Punjab to proceed to arbitrate according to East Punjab Act No. XLVII of 1948 as amended by the President's Act No. 2 of 1951 in the matter of compensation in regard to the petitioner's acquired land. The Punjab Government in compliance with the directions so issued by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953 by their notification No. 265 J 60/1349, dated 18th January, 1960, appointed the District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana as an arbitrator, "for the purposes of making an award, determining the amount of compensation payable under the said Act and specifying the person or persons to whom it is payable in relation to the requisitioning of the property specified in the schedule below which was requisitioned vide order of the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, dated 14th December, 1949, under Section 2 of the Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Power) Act, 1947 (Punjab Act No. XVII of 1947)." Schedule Description of the Immovable Property Bighas Biswas Biswansis Acres. 1. Village Dhoewal 260 14 13 162.95. * * * * * * *" Mela Ram owner of the land comprised in survey No. 1365/581 and 1866/581 which formed a part of the above 162.95 acres claimed compensation as follows :- "[1] Market price of the acquired land on the date of acquisition i.e. 12th June, 1951, at the rate of Rs . 20/- per sq yard under Section 5 of Act No. XLVIII of 1948 read with Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Rs . 32, 400/- [ii] Loss incurred by him on account of his not setting up a factory on the land as it had been acquired by the State. Rs . 50,000/- [iii] Additional amount at 15 per cent on the Market value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Rs . 9860/- Total Rs . 87, 260/-" The Punjab State on the other hand maintained that Mela Ram was entitled to a plot of land in lieu of his acquired land or compensation at the rate of Rs. 11,000/- per acre. The District and Sessions Judge framed the following issues :- [1a] Has Mela Ram been provided with alternative land ? [1b] If not, is Mela Ram entitled to claim land in lieu of compensation ? [2] What is the fair amount to compensation of the acquired land ? Mela Ram gave up his claim of Rs. 50,000/- and also his right to get an other plot of land in lieu of his land acquired by the State Government. The arbitrator decided issue No. 1-A against the Punjab State. As regards issue No. 2 he observed the area of the acquired land was 1633 square yards and the Market price thereof at the time of its acquisition calculated at the rate of Rs. 12/- per square yard came to Rs. 19,596/-. In addition he awarded a sum of fifteen per cent on Rs. 19,596/- [Rs. 2,939/-] in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition as provided in sub-section [2] of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Act No. 1 to 1894]. The total compensation payable to the owner was thus assessed at Rs. 22,535/- The Punjab State felt aggrieved from the above award and preferred the present appeal. Mela Ram also has filed cross objections. The learned counsel for the Punjab State appellant impugned correctness of the award on the grounds that the arbitrator should have assessed market price of the land prevailing on the date it was requisitioned and not acquired that the rate at which market price had been ascertained by him was excessive and that in no case the owner was entitled to get fifteen per cent, on Rs. 19,596/-. The other points although entered in the grounds of appeal were not pressed and could be deemed to have been waived. The parties agree that as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Satinder Singh and others V/s. Umrao Singh and other, 1961 AIR(SC) 908 "compensation for property acquired under the Punjab Act 48 of 1948 must be paid in accordance with the principles set out in that Act and not in accordance with the prinicples set out in the later Punjab Act, 11 of 1953. Thus for determining the amount of compensation and its apportionment amongst the rival claimants the provisions of the relevant Act of 1948 are applicable though the proceedings are held under the relevant provisions of the later Act of 1953" Section 5 of the East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948 amongst other things also provides that the arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to the provisions of sub-section [1] of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable. Sub-section [1] of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act while giving the matter to be considered in determining compensation mentions that the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 sub-section [1] shall be taken into consideration. The appropriate Government under Section 4 notifies that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. The land in question was requisitioned by the District Magistrate's order dated 14th December, 1949, but no indication was given therein that it would be acquired at some later date. Therefore, to urge that the compensation should have been assessed at the rate prevailing on 14th December, 1949, would not be justifiable. The proper date would be the date (12th June, 1951), on which the State Government acquired the land under Section 3 of the East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948. The arbitrator, therefore, was correct in ascertaining the market price with reference to this date. In doing so he relied on three instances, firstly, the sale of 1 biswas 6 biswansis (about 193 square yards) of land for Rs. 1,960/8/- on 16th May, 1949, by Bachan Singh to Shrimati Krishna Vati, secondly the sale of 247 square yards of land on 10th May, 1954, for Rs. 3645/- and, thirdly, the sale of 700 square yards of land on 19th November, 1957, for Rs. 14,000/-. The land forming subject- matter of these transactions as found by the arbitrator was situate in the vicinity of Mela Ram's land and was also similar to it in all other respects. The average price per square yard came to Rs. 10.19 nP., Rs. 15/- and Rs. 20/- respectively. In his opinion these three well ascertained instances indicated that price of the land in the locality where the land in dispute was situate was rising at the rate of Rs. 1/- per square yard every year from 1949. He, therefore, concluded from the above that correct market price of the land in question on the date of its acquisition (12th June, 1951) would be Rs. 12/- per square yard. The method adopted by him in coming to this conclusion was most logical and could not legitimately be assailed particularly when the material produced by the appellant on the point was vague and indefinite. The learned counsel for the appellant frankly conceded and rightly too that the same offered no assistance in determining market price of the land. Therefore, the arbitrator was correct in fixing market price of the land at the rate of Rs. 12/- per square yard. He erroneously allowed fifteen per cent over and above the price so ascertained. According to Section 5 of the East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948 in marking the award sub-section (2) of Section 23 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 could not be availed of by him. The amount of compensation awarded in the matter should have been Rs. 19,596/-. The respondent in his cross-objections claimed interest at the rate of Rs. 4/- per cent per annum on the Exhibit $.$958 S.C. 947, which lays down : "There is a sharp distinction between a decision which is pronounced by a Court in a cause which it hears on the merits, and one which is given by it in a proceeding for the filing of an award. The former is a judgment, decree or order rendered in the exercise of its normal jurisdiction as a Civil Court, and that is appealable under the general law as for example, under Sections 96, 100, 104, 199 and 110 of Civil Procedure Code. The letter is an adjudicaion of a private tribunal with the imprimatur of the Court stamped on it, and to the extent that the award is within terms of the reference, it is final and not appealable. The position in law is the same when the reference to arbitration is made not under agreement of parties but under provisions of a statute. The result of those provisions again is to withdraw the dispute from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and to refer it for the decision of a private tribunal. That decision is an award and stands on the same footing as an award made on reference under agreement of parties. Nor does it make any difference in the legal position that reference under the statute is to a Court as arbitrator. In that case, the Court hears the matter not as a Civil Court but as a person designata, and its decision will be an award not open to appeal under the ordinary law applicable to decision of Courts. A statute, however, might provide for the decision of a dispute by a Court as Court and not as arbitrator, in which case its decision will be a decree order of Court in its ordinary Civil jurisdiction, and that will attract the normal procedure governing the decision of that Court, and a right to appeal will be comprehended therein. It may be a question whether the reference to a Court under a particular statute is to it as a Court or as persoa designate but when once it is determined that it is to as persona designata, there can be no question that its decision is not open to appeal under the ordinary law. Under Section 19(1)(b), of the Defence of India Act, the reference is admittedly to an arbitrator. He need not even be a Judge of a Court. It is sufficient that he is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court. And under the law no appeal would have lain to the High Court against the decision of such an arbitrator. Thus, the provision for appeal to the High Court under Section 19(1)(f) can be construed as a reference to it as an authority designated and not as a Court. The fact that in a particular case the reference was to a District Judge would not affect the position. Then again, the decision of the arbitrator appointed under Section 19(1)(b) is expressly referred to in Section 19(1)(f) as an award. Now an appeal is essentially a continuation of the original proceedings, and if the proceedings under Section 19(1)(b) are arbitration proceeding, their character cannot suffer a change, when they are brought up before an appellate tribunal. A proceeding which is at the inception an arbitration proceeding must retain its character as arbitration even when it is taken up in appeal, where that is provided by the statute. The decision of the High Court in the appeal under Section 19(1)(f) is not a judgment, a decree or order either within Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code or CI 29 of the Letters Patent of the Nagpur High Court". Applying the rests enunciated therein the award given by the District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana in the case is not a judgment, decree or order and as such, no appeal was competent against it under the general law as for example under Sections 96, 100, 104, 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appeal has been preferred under Section 5(f) of the East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948. The cross-objections have been lodged under Order 41, rule 22, Civil Procedure Code, relevant part thereof runs as :- "22(1) Any respondent, though he may have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below but take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or with in such further time as the appellate Court may see fit to allow". The present appeal as already pointed out was not against any decree as defined in the Civil Procedure Code, hence the cross objections were not competent. The respondent if he was not satisfied with any part of the award he should have applied for modification thereof by preferring an appeal under Section 5(f) of the East Punjab Act No. XLVIII of 1948 as was done by the other party. For the above reasons, the appeal is accepted to the extent that the amount of compensation payable to Mela Ram respondent as awarded by the District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, is reduced from Rs. 22,535/- to Rs. 19,596/-. In case the compensation is not paid within a month, the respondent will be entitled to future interest at the rate of Rs. 4/- per cent per annum till the date of its payment. The cross-objections are dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.;