Teja Singh, C.J. - (1.) THIS is the Defendants' second appeal directed against the appellate decree of the District Judge, Kapurthala. The Respondents have put in cross -objections. Both the appeal and the cross -objections will be disposed of by one order.
(2.) THE Plaintiffs' allegations were that the Defendants firm had rented a shop from them for a period of one year from 1 -1 -1998 Samvat, that they agreed to pay yearly rent of Rs. 75/ -, that it was further agreed that if the shop was not vacated after the expiry of the year i.e. 30 -12 -1998 Samvat, the rent charged would be Rs. 150/ - per annum and that the Defendants had neither paid any rent nor had acated the shop. On these allegations the plain -tiffs prayed, first for the ejectment of the Defendants from the shop and secondly for Rs. 44/ - on account of rent. It may here be mentioned that the rate at which the Plaintiffs claimed the arrears of rent was Rs. 150/ - per annum for 1999 and Rs. 300/ - per annum from 1 -1 -2000 to 23 -4 -2002, on the ground that there was a general rise of rent in the locality in 'which the Plaintiffs' shop was situate. The suit was instituted on 30 -4 -2002 Samvat. The Defendants resisted the suit on several grounds. The following issues were framed by the trial court. i. Whether the suit was barred by time. ii. Whether the lease entry could not be admitted in evidence without payment of penalty. iii. Whether the Plaintiffs deliberately refused to receive the rent offered to. them by the Defendants and if not could they recover enhanced rent as damages? iv. Whether there was any agreement between the landlords and the tenant and if so what is the effect of it upon the suit? As regards the second issue the trial court ordered the Plaintiffs to pay certain amount by way of stamp duty and penalty and after the amount had been paid the entry in question was admitted in evidence. On the first issue it held that the suit was within time in so far as it related to ejectment and the recovery of rent for three years before the date of the suit. Other issues were found against the Defendants and the Plaintiffs were granted a decree for ejectment of the Defendants and for Rs. 497/ -. Against this decree both sides preferred appeals to the District Judge. The Plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed but that of the Defendants was partly allowed and the decree for ejectment was set side. It is admitted by the Appellants learned Counsel that the terms of the agreement between the parties were that the Defendants lyre to vacate the shop on 30 -12 -1998 and in case they failed in this they would pay rent at the rate of Rs. 150/ - per annum for the subsequent period. Counsel also admitted that if this agreement be held binding upon his clients the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover the rent for the three years preceding the date of the suit at the rate of Rs. 150/ - per annum. He, however, contended that because of the provisions of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance No. 8 of 2006 no decree could be passed or more than the rent that was originally settled, i.e. Rs. 75/ - per annum. He urged the same point before my learned brother when the appeal came up before him for the first time and as the learned Judge considered that the point was important and was not covered by any authority, he referred it to a Division each.
(3.) COUNSEL was constrained to concede that his plea was not borne out by any specific provision of the Ordinance, but he argued that the intention of the frames of the Ordinance as gathered from the different sections thereof was that if rent was once fixed it could neither be decreased or increased except Plaintiff Section 4 which empowers the Controller to fix fair rent. He also referred us to Section 6 which in his opinion barfed a suit for enhanced rent. In my opinion, important as the question raised by counsel is, it is not necessary to express an opinion thereon in this case, because it is not hit by the Ordinance, I have already observed that the tenancy in this case began on 1 -1 -1998 and the term relating to the enhanced rate was to take effect from 1 -1 -1999. The suit was instituted on 30 -4 -2002. The period for which the rent could be recovered, i.e., three years immediately preceding the suit extended from 30 -4 -1999.. to 29 -4 -2002. The Ordinance came into force on 12 -5 -1949 which corresponds to 31 -1 -2006 i.e., more than three years and a half after the suit. It is correct that the suit was Still pending in the trial court, but it is well recognised principle of interpretation that a statute cannot have retrospective effect unless it contains an express provision to this effect and it cannot even apply to pending suits, unless it relates to procedure, which is not the case with this Ordinance. Counsel refers us to the decision of the Madras High Court in - 'A. Mosses Pillai v. M.K. Govindan', : AIR 1948 Mad 346 (A), in which it was laid down that Clause 7(a), Madras House Rent Control Order, affected the rights created by contracts even though they were entered into before the Order. Now the facts of that case were quite different from those of the present one and even the language of Section 7 which came up for consideration was different. The section said. After the commencement of this Order, an increase in rent shall be permissible only where some addition, improvement or alteration, not included in necessary repairs or repairs which are usually made to houses in the local area, has been carried out at the landlord's expense since the rent was fixed. The observations that the learned Judge made with regard to the effect of the Section are as follows: The language of Clause 7(a) is peremptory and permits an increase in rent only where some addition, improvement or alteration such as is described in that clause has been carried out at the landlord's expense after the fixation o £ rent. It does not permit an increase in any other case. The stipulation as to the payment of rent of Rs. 45/ - per month could, Plaintiff the rent chit, come into operation only after 3 -2 -1943, by which time the Madras House Rent Control Order was in operation in Coimbatore. The relevant section of our Ordinance is Section 5 which reads as follows: (1) When the fair rent of a building or rented land has been fixed Plaintiff Section 4 no further increase in such fair rent shall be permissible except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration has been carried out at the expense of the landlord and if the building or rented land is then in the occupation of a tenant at his request: Provided that ... ... ... ... ... (2) Any dispute between the landlord and tenant in regard to any -increase in rent claimed Plaintiff Sub -section (1) shall be decided by the Controller. The words of the Section make it clear that it comes into operation only after fair rent has been fixed by the Controller. Counsel also refers us to Section 6, but as the opening words of Sub -section (1) lay down that also applies after the Controller has fixed a fair rent. The words of the Section are: (1) Save as provided in Section 5, when the controller has fixed the fair rent of a building or rented land Plaintiff Section 4. (a) the landlord shall not claim or receive any premium or other like sum in addition to fair rent, or any rent in excess of such fair rent, but the landlord may stipulate for and receive in advance an amount not exceeding one month's rent; (b) any agreement for the payment of any sum in addition to rent or of rent in excess .. of such fair rent shall be null and void. In addition, Sub -section (2) of Section 6 shows that it does not affect the landlord's right to recover the rent due to him before the first day of Besakh, 2004. The Sub -section says: Nothing in this section shall apply to the recovery of any rent which becomes due before the first day of Besakh, 2004. Since the rent for three years preceding the date of the suit became due before the date mentioned in Sub -section (2) of Section 6 and the enhanced rate became elective long before the Ordinance of 200G was even promulgated, by virtue of Section 6 Sub -section (2) and also on the autho rity of the case cited by the Appellants' coun sel there was nothing to prevent the Plaintiff's from suing and the Court from decreeing their claim for the said rent.;