Teja Singh, J. - (1.) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has arisen out of proceedings started by the Respondents against the present Petitioners for their ejectment from a shop situate in Malerkotla. The Respondents who are three in number are landlords of the shop. The Petitioners have been occupying that shop as the Respondents' tenants for a large number of years. In the application that the Respondents made before the Rent Controller Malerkotla they urged two grounds for the Petitioners' ejectment, one that the rent of the shop was in arrears and second that Tone of the landlords namely Maya Mal required the shop for his own use. Since the Petitioners paid the entire rent that was in arrears on the first hearing of the application before the Rent Controller, the first ground could not be availed of by the Respondents. As regards the second ground the present Petitioners contended that the application was not bona fide, inasmuch as Maya Mai was carrying on business at Ahmed Garh and Bahaaurgarh and the object of making the application merely was to get the snoop vacated because the landlords intended to sell it and no one would come forward to buy it or at least they would not get the proper price for the shop unless the landlords were able to deliver the vacant possession. The Rent Controller on consideration of the evidence produced before him by both sides upheld the contention of the present Petitioners and dismissed the Respondents' application holding that the application was not bona fide. On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner who is the appellate authority in proceedings under the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, set aside the Rent Controller's decision and ordered the present Petitioners to vacate the shop within one month.
(2.) THE point stressed before me by Mr. Jagan Nath, learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that while disposing of the appeal the appellate authority did not take into consideration the facts and the evidence on the basis of which the Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that the application for the Petitioners' ejectment was not bona fide. He also argues that the judgment of the appellate authority shows that he did not even apply his mind to the question whether or not the application was bona fide, and this being the case his order is liable to be set aside by this Court under Article 227 which gives the High Court power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. As regards the power of the High Court to interfere with the decisions of subordinate Courts and Tribunals in proper cases under Article 227, there are now, no two opinions. I had the occasion to refer to this question in - 'Kartar Singh v. the Custodian Muslim Evacuee Property',, AIR 1952 Pepsu 82 (A), but as I pointed out in that case the power of the Court under the said Article is limited, and it cannot be used to correct errors of subordinate Courts and tribunals. I have also held in other cases that this power is quite different from the power that a Court of appeal or a Court of revision possesses and in the words of Harries C.J. of the Calcutta High Court which I quoted in 'Kartar Singh's case (A)' it is a power to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. In the present case, it is not denied that the Deputy Commissioner was properly seized of the appeal as the appellate authority under the Ordinance. This is also not denied that his jurisdiction extended to deciding whether the view taken by the Rent Controller that the application for Petitioners' ejectment was not bona fide was correct and was supported by evidence. Mr. Jagan Nath, however, contends that while the Rent Controller has discussed' the whole question elaborately and given reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by him, the appellate authority not only did not support his finding by any argument but merely dismissed it with the laconic remark that he was satisfied that the Respondents required shop for their own use. I cannot help saying that if the objection was that the appellate authority did not write a very elaborate judgment and did not dispose of all the arguments given by the Rent Controller in support of his finding, I must say that it is well founded, but as I read the provisions of the Ordinance, I cannot hold that this fact by itself can be a, ground for holding that the appellate authority did not act within the bounds of law. All that can be said is that his order was defective, i.e., he committed an error but the error neither affected his jurisdiction nor invalidated the order made by him. As I pointed out in Anr. case, all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to the proceedings before the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. What the appellate authority is to do is given in Section 16 Clause 3 which merely lays down that the said authority, shall send for the records of the case and "after perusing the record and after giving the . parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as it thinks fit either 'himself or through the Collector, he shall dispose of the appeal. Unlike the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which relate to judgments and orders of civil Courts, the Ordinance does not even lay down that it is necessary for the appellate authority to mention the points of difference between the parties and to give reasons in support of the view that he takes. I may not be taken to mean that either the Rent Controller or the appellate authority need not write any judgment at all and he can merely dispose of a case by an observation of the kind that he does not find any merit in the petition or the appeal. After all the law requires that they should decide each case that comes before them and if the order by which a case is decided is so defective or incomplete that one cannot be sure whether the authority concerned realised what he had to decide and what the position of the parties -was, it may be treated as no order in law but so far as the order of the present appellate authority is concerned no such criticism can apply to it. The contention that the authority . did not apply his mind to the Petitioners allegation that the application for ejectment was not bona fide is without force for the reason that even though he did not hold in so many words that the application was bona fide, if we read the whole order, it will be clear that this is exactly what he meant to say when he held that the landlord required the shop for his own use.
(3.) THESE being the only points urged before 'me the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 100/ -.;