G.D. Khosla, J. - (1.) THIS petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India aims at quashing the order of the Election Tribunal, Delhi, dated the 21st January, 1953, in Election Petition No. 8 of 1952, See, 3 E.L.R. 347. The petitioner is Sucheta Kripalani who was declared an elected member of the House of the People from the Parliamentary Constituency of New Delhi in a notification, dated 24th January, 1952. She was opposed in this election by respondent No. 4, Manmohini Sahgal. The petitioner, Sucheta Kripalani, filed a return of her election expenses on 6th March, 1952, but, as this return was not in accordance with law, she filed another return on 30th April, 1952. This return was accepted by the Election Commission and the disqualification attaching to the previous return was removed. Manmohini Sahgal presented an election petition under sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in which she alleged inter alia that the petitioner, successful candidate, had been guilty of corrupt practices and that the return of election expenses filed by her was invalid. She, therefore, prayed that the election of the petitioner be declared void and she herself be declared duly elected. This relief was claimed under the provisions of section 84 of the Act. The petitioner opposed this petition and contended that the petition was not maintainable. Two preliminary issues were considered by the Election Tribunal - -(1) whether it is relevant for the purpose of the present petition to enquire into the allegations that the return of election expenses filed by the respondent, Sucheta Kripalani, was false in material particulars, or the return was not in accordance with the rules, and (2) what is the effect, if any, of the order made by the Election Commission, dated 7th May, 1952, removing certain disqualifications incurred by respondent No. 1, Sucheta Kripalani, in connection with the return of election expenses. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was entitled to go into the question whether the return was false in material particulars. It also held that "It was no longer open to the petitioner, Manmohini Sahgal, to urge that the return of expenses was not in accordance with the rules." As a consequence of this decision the Tribunal could proceed to enquire into the truth of the allegations contained in the return of expenses. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee who appeared on behalf of Sucheta Kripalani is that this decision of the Tribunal was (a) without jurisdiction and (b) wholly against law. He has drawn our attention to the various provisions of the Representation of the People Act and has argued that according to the provisions of section 81 an election petition can only be based on the grounds specified in sub -sections (1) and (2) of section 100 and section 101. The only reliefs which can be claimed in an election petition are the reliefs set out in section 84. Therefore, if the election petition is based upon a ground which is not a valid ground for setting aside an election, the petition cannot be entertained and must be dismissed. Mr. Chatterjee went on to say that the main ground upon which the present petition was based was making a false return of election expenses. This amounted to a minor corrupt practice as defined in section 124 and since a minor corrupt practice cannot be made a ground for setting aside an election the election petition should never have been entertained. It was, however, conceded that apart from this ground the petitioner, Manmohini Sahgal, also contended that the election was liable to be set aside on other grounds.
(2.) THE filing of a false return is no doubt a minor corrupt practice and cannot be made the ground for setting aside an election, but if it is proved that the statements made in the return are false, then it may be argued that the candidate was guilty of major corrupt practices, for the deed which has been falsely reported in the return may have affected the result of the election and may amount to a major corrupt practice as defined in section 123. The Tribunal will therefore have to decide (1) was the return false, and (2) what were the deeds or misdeeds committed by the candidate. As far as (1) is concerned it is no more than a minor corrupt practice, but the result of (2) will no doubt affect the validity of the election. Therefore it is clear that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion on the first issue. It is the duty of the Tribunal to enquire whether the return was false in material particulars and what was the truth behind the cloak of falsehood. Therefore it is clear that the Tribunal acted with jurisdiction. The Tribunal has referred to section 143 of the Act. We have also seen section 142. A reading of these sections shows that the Tribunal is entitled to enquire into the question of minor corrupt practices and give a decision thereon. A minor corrupt practice may not be sufficient for setting aside an election but it may involve the disqualification of a candidate for voting for a certain period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Election Tribunal cannot enquire into the question of a minor corrupt practice. Finally, it is clear from section 170 of the Act that no civil court can question the legality of any decision given by a person appointed under the Act and a civil court cannot therefore question the legality of an order passed by the Tribunal. In a petition under article 226 or 227 this court would certainly interfere in a case where the Tribunal had acted wholly without jurisdiction. In the present case we find that the petition of Manmohini Sahgal was covered by the provisions of sections 80 and 81 of the Act. The Tribunal was therefore competent to entertain it and to give its decision upon the various questions raised in it. Both issues 1 and 2 deal with matters which the Tribunal is competent to adjudicate upon and this court therefore cannot consider the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in election matters and this court cannot act as if it were a court of appeal. We have no reason for holding that the order of the Tribunal was against law or in any way incorrect. But even if it were so, we shall not be justified in interfering as long as the order was passed with jurisdiction. The Tribunal certainly had jurisdiction to pass this order and the present petition therefore must be dismissed. I would accordingly dismiss it with costs. D. Falshaw, J. I agree.;