- (1.) THE facts from which the present reference to a Bench of three Judges has arisen are briefly these. One Ram Rachhpal who was employed as a Sub-Treasurer in a Government Treasury was accused of criminal misappropriation punishable under Section 409, Indian Penal Code, During the investigation of the case, Ram Rachhpal made a statement to the police which is contained in a memorandum. Exh. P. H. After making this statement Ram Rachhpal led the police party to a place mentioned in the memorandum and from this place several pieces of torn paper were recovered. These when joined showed that the document which had been destroyed was a "currency chest slip". These pieces were taken into possession and were later produced as evidence against the accused at the trial. The prosecution also produced the memorandum, P. H. in which the statement made by the accused had been recorded, and proved it under the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian evidence Act as information given by the accused leading to the discovery of a fact. Ram rachhpal was convicted and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/ -. He filed an. appeal against his conviction and sentence to this Court and the appeal in the first instance came up before my brother, Harnam Singh, J. Mr. Sethi who appeared on behalf of the convict contended that the statement made by the accused person could not be proved's it was not this statement which had led to the recovery of the pieces of the currency chest slip, for the recovery of these pieces was made by the accused pointing out the spot where they were lying. Two judgments of Weston, C. J. , were cited by Mr. Sethi and although, there was a Division Bench decision of this Court in - State v. Lehna Singh manu/ph/0035/1953,, AIR1953 Pandh 101 , in which a contrary view had been taken, Harnam singh, J. thought that a more authoritative decision of this question was necessary. He therefore referred the following question for the consideration of a Bench of three Judges: whether the statement of the accused contained in the memo, Exhibit P. H. , may be proved under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in view of the fact that the accused led the police to the place from where the torn pieces of the currency chest slip were recovered?
(2.) THE matter has been argued at considerable length before us and we have had the advantage of examining a large number of cases in which a similar point arose. Before coming to these cases, however, I should like to make a few observations on the wording of Section 27, Indian evidence Act. This section reads: provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such in-formation, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The words requiring special attention are: (1) "in consequence of" (2) "so much. . . as relates distinctly" (3) "thereby discovered". In the case before us we are concerned more particularly with words "in consequence of". This section contemplates that an accused person has in his possession some knowledge. He communicates this knowledge to the police, and in consequence of such communication a new fact is discovered, and when this happens the information communicated by the accused person may be proved even though his statement or the information given by him amounts to a confession, but only so much of the information can be proved as relates distinctly to the fact which 3s discovered. In other words, the giving of information and the discovery of the fact must be connected by a causal relationship; one must follow as the logical consequence of the other, that is, the discovery must be made as the result of the information given. On this point there can hardly be any dispute, and the words of the section are quite clear. The difficulty which has arisen in the present case is due to the fact that after giving information the accused pointed out the spot where the pieces of paper lay, and therefore the pointing out intervened between the giving of Information and the discovery of the 'fact'. The question which we have to consider is whether this intervention is sufficient to destroy the causal relationship between the giving of information and the discovery of the 'fact'. If I may use a metaphor in order to clarify the position there is a gap between the giving of information by the accused and the discovery of the fact. This gap is bridged over by causal relationship and the relationship must be direct and immediate. If some extraneous circumstance intervenes the bridge will not be continuous and so the discovery will not be in consequence of the information, and, that being so, the information cannot be proved under Section 27.
(3.) THE argument of Mr. Sethi may, therefore, be briefly put in this way. The discovery of the pieces of paper was made in consequence of the pointing out by the accused and not in consequence of any information given by him. Had the accused kept quiet and merely taken the police to the place from where the pieces of paper were recovered, the discovery would have been made notwithstanding the fact that the accused had remained silent. Therefore the discovery was not made on any information given by the accused, Mr. Sethi has stressed the point that the consequence must be direct and immediate and not Indirect and remote. Mr. Sethi has also drawn our attention to Section 8 of the Evidence Act, and has contended that the pointing out by the accused and anything he may say at that time, are relevant as conduct under section 8 and if a statement made by him at the time of pointing out is relevant under Section 8 a statement made by him before pointing out cannot be relevant under Section 27.;