Passey, J. - (1.) SHRI Jai Kishan, who is an Advocate of this Court, represented Dalip Singh and Ors. Respondents in Regular First Appeal No. 295 of 2005, which was decided by this Bench on 26 -3 -1951. The Pepsu State had also been arrayed as a Respondent and the Advocate General had appeared for it, whereas Shri Anent Ram was the counsel of the other Respondents. One of the points involved in the appeal was whether a decree for possession of the suit property could be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs -Respondents without their having got the order of Raja Sahib Nalagarh. dated 20 -10 -1994 set aside within the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. The suit for avoiding that order of the Raja Sahib had not been brought within a year, as required by Article 14 of that Act. The question was decided by us in favour of the Appellants, as Shri Jai Kishan had conceded that in those circumstances the suit was not maintainable. We accepted the appeal on 26 -3 -1951 and it was mentioned in our judgment that it had been conceded by Mr. Jai Kishan, counsel of the Respondents, that no decree for possession could be passed in their favour till the order of Raja Sahib Nalagarh dated 2 -10 -1994 stood; but limitation for avoiding that order had expired long ago. On 23 -4 -1951 Shri Jai Kishan on behalf of Dalip Singh and Ors. Respondents filed an application under Article 133 of the Constitution of India praying for a certificate that the amount or value of the subject matter of dispute in the trial Court and in dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs. 20000/ - and that the case in view of the points involved in it was otherwise also a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In ground No. 8 of that application it was stated "that the counsel of the Petitioners did not concede that no decree for possession can be passed in their favour till the order of Raja Sahib Nalagarh dated 20 -10 -1994 is set aside". The application came up for preliminary hearing on 3 -5 -1951 when notice was directed to issue to the opposite side and as what was alleged in ground No. 8 was contrary to what was stated in the' judgment of this Court. Shri Jai Kishan was required to support that ground b/an affidavit. Shri Jai Kishan submitted his affidavit on 1 -1 -1952 and repeated what had specified in ground No. 8. On the next date viz. 2 -6 -1952 S. Narindar Singh, Advocate General and Shri Anant Ram stated in Court that they definitely remembered that Shri Jai Kishan had conceded the point and that what was stated in the judgment of the Court in that behalf was perfectly correct. On that very day both of them put in counter affidavits to the effect that Shri Jai Kishan had in their presence conceded that no decree for possession could be passed in favour of his clients till the order of Raja Sahib Nalagarh was set aside. On 3 -6 -1952 Shri Jai Kishan filed an application stating that his affidavit was the result of some misunderstanding on his part for which he expressed deep regret and tendered unqualified apology. Since the affidavit given by him was false, proceedings for unprofessional conduct were started against him and on 30 -6 -1952 a copy of the charge was delivered to him to show cause by 31 -12 -1952 as to why his license be not cancelled and his name removed from the roll of the Advocates of this Court. On 31 -12 -1952 he submitted his reply re -producing what was contained in his application of 3 -6 -1952. On 2 -2 -1952 he was examined to make clear the nature of the misunderstanding under which the affidavit had been given by him. He was unable to give any satisfactory answer, and stated that he had conceded the point in dispute; but had done so half -heartedly and that there was misunderstanding that he had not conceded the point. The alleged misunderstanding was, in our view, only a manufactured excuse for wriggling out of the position once taken steadfastly. He did not set out in his reply to the notice issued to him the basis of the misunderstanding. Even during the course of arguments he could not disclose any cause' for the 'misunderstanding' except that he stated that he thought that if he did not give the affidavit, the Court would look at his conduct with dis favour. This was no misconception but Anr. innovated excuse opposed to the one advanced by him during his examination. We have no doubt that he gave the affidavit so that ground No, a taken by him in his application for a certificate might: pass as true. Shri Jai Kishan had conceded the point mentioned in our judgment and his affidavit is a false one. The application for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution was a judicial proceeding and by giving a false affidavit, Shri Jai Kishan tried to lead the Court to suppose that what was stated in, ground No. 8 was true. No mistake or carelessness or lack of willfulness was responsible for the false affidavit. It was a considered one and had been designedly made. Shri Jai Kishan attacked the judgment of this Court as containing an incorrect record about his concession of the disputed point and then to boot, he put in a false affidavit which amounted to perjury. It is because of his high eduescdonal attainments, culture and good moral character that a person is permitted to practice law and he is expected to maintain and, if possible, to enhance the dignity of the honorable profession by adhering to its standards of integrity, truth and morality. The Respondent is not an inexperienced lawyer but has been in the profession for a number of years. His studied departure from rectitude and upright conduct amounting to an offence must not only be viewed with strong disapprobation but condemned severely' as grossly irresponsible and improper. Shri Jai Krishna's act in supporting a false ground of his application with a false affidavit proves his deplorable misconduct for which a severe punishment' would ordinarily be called for. A lenient view in this case would, however, be warranted as he has apologized unreservedly. We, therefore, order that his license to practice as an Advocate be suspended for two months. Teja Singh, C.J.
(2.) I agree.;