- (1.) This appeal has been filed by the dealer under section 36 of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (in short, "the Act") against the order dated November 28, 2011 (annexure A9) passed by the Haryana Tax Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") claiming the following substantial questions of law : (i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honourable Tribunal was justified in dismissing the application for restoration of appeal ? (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honourable Tribunal was justified in not condoning the delay caused by mistake of the counsel for the appellant ? Briefly stated, the facts for adjudication of the present appeal are that the appellant is a registered dealer and engaged in the business of manufacturing non-stick plastic coating and magnesium oxide and magnesium carbonated and allied products. It had applied for exemption from paying sales tax which was taken by the Higher Level Screening Committee in its meetings held on June 29, 2004 and June 30, 2004. The claim for exemption of the dealer was rejected vide letter dated November 3, 2004 (annexure A1) against which an appeal was filed before the Commissioner and Secretary to State of Haryana under the unamended rule. On July 4, 2005, the dealer received a letter dated June 23, 2005 (annexure A2) from the Commissioner and Secretary to the State of Haryana stating therein that the appeal against the order of the Higher Level Screening Committee shall lie before the Tribunal. Accordingly, an appeal was filed before the Tribunal on July 13, 2005, along with an application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal vide order dated August 1, 2008 (annexure A5) dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation after noticing that fourteen opportunities had been provided to the appellant and the appeal was never pursued seriously. Thereafter, on March 5, 2010, the dealer received summon for the recovery of sales tax arrears and approached the counsel as according to it, the case was still pending before the Tribunal. On enquiries, it was found that the counsel for the dealer had received a letter on September 10, 2008, from the Tribunal who misplaced the same. It was only after the appellant received summons and approached its counsel, it came to know about the order of the Tribunal on March 5, 2010. An application for restoration of the appeal (annexure A6) was filed before the Tribunal on April 7, 2010 accompanied by an application for condonation of delay of 549 days. The Tribunal vide order dated November 28, 2011 (annexing A9) dismissed the application for restoration of appeal. Hence, the present appeal.
(2.) The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the application for condonation of delay of 549 days for restoration of the appeal was decided against the appellant by the Tribunal. He has placed reliance upon the judgments in Rafiq v. Munshilal, 1981 AIR(SC) 1400 Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, 1987 66 STC 228 N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 AIR(SC) 3222 Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu v. Gobardhan Sao, 2002 3 SCC 195 Mahaveerprasad Jain v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1988 172 ITR 331, and Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi, 1979 118 ITR 507 to contend that the appellant should not suffer for the lapses of its counsel. It was further submitted that for condoning the delay in filing the application for restoration of appeal, no prejudice was caused to the respondent. Moreover, the appellant did not derive any benefit by delaying the proceedings. It was a]so submitted that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay as there was no intimation from the counsel and, therefore, the appellant could not file the application earlier.
(3.) Examining the legal position relating to condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, "the 1963 Act"), it may be observed that the honourable Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, 2010 5 SCC 459 laying down the broad principles for adjudicating the issue of condonation of delay, in paras 14 and 15 observed as under : 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the Legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed of for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing of the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate--Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, 1987 66 STC 228 N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, 2001 9 SCC 106 ;