- (1.) The only ground on which the landlord sought for eviction was that the tenant's act of raising flooring constituted material impairment of utility of the building, a ground that was urged under the Rent Restriction Act to secure eviction. A Commissioner, who had inspected the property, had also noticed that the flooring looked new and there had been an increase in the level of the floor. The landlord himself had a reason to suspect as to why a tenant did increase the level of floor that he was attempting to raise the level of the floor above the level of the road when the road level had also increased.
(2.) The Rent Controller and the appellate Court agreed with the landlord's perception and relied on a judgment of this Court in a decision rendered in Bhupinder Singh and another Versus J.L. Kapoor and another-1992(2) PLR 218 to hold that raising the floor would constitute an impairment in value and utility of the demised premises. The learned counsel for the tenant before me contends that there is also another view expressed contrarily in Gurmit Singh Versus Smt. Kirpal Kaur-1992(2) RCR (Rent) 380, that held that a tenant lowering the flooring of shop by one foot but still above the road level, could not be considered to be such an act which could bring the act of tenant within mischief of impairing the value and utility of the premises. An earlier judgment of this Court in Kewal Chand Jain and another Versus Jiwan Kumar Kaushal-1989(2) PLR 410 held that construction of a wall by a tenant must still be shown by the landlord by leading appropriate evidence that addition led to impairment of value and utility of the premises finding of such proof was not available. The Court had held that the tenant's act was not actionable for eviction.
(3.) The learned counsel for the landlord contends in response to the contentions raised by the tenant and the reliance on the judgment made by the tenant, by a further reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh and another Versus Shivalak Rubber Industries and others-(1996) 2 SCC 626. The Supreme Court was considering an issue relating to the material impairment as found expressed in East Punjab Rent Restriction Act of 1949. The Court held that the term impair materially was used to mean, considerable decrease in quality which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as it existed earlier in point of time as compared to a later stage after the alleged change is made or effected suggesting impairment. The value itself has something to do with the needs or desires of a person and, therefore, the meaning of expression to 'impair materially' cannot be said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different meaning in different context and situations.;