- (1.) The Divisional Forest Officer (Social Forestry), Bhiwani and another have filed the instant Letters Patent Appeal for setting aside the order dated 19.5.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby Civil Writ Petition No. 13368 of 2009 filed by the appellants for quashing the award dated 15.1.2008 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, ordering re-instatement of respondent No.1 workman in service with continuity of service and 50% back wages from the date of demand of notice, has been dismissed.
(2.) Though there is a delay of 19 days in filing the appeal and the appellants have filed application (CM No. 3239-LPA of 2012) for condoning the delay, yet we have heard learned counsel for the appellants on merits, and gone through the award as well as the impugned order.
(3.) Before the learned Single Judge, a contention was raised by the appellants that services of the respondent workman were terminated on 1.7.2003, therefore, in order to calculate that he had worked for 240 days during 12 months preceding from the date of his termination, 12 calendar months are to be taken into account, by including the total month of July, 2003. The learned Single Judge has rejected this contention of the appellants, while observing that it is contrary to the basic provision of Section 25-B (2) (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 itself. In this regard, the following observations have been made : "In view of the above, contention of counsel for the petitioner that it is the 12 calendar months, which have to be taken into consideration for counting the days for which the Workman had worked with the Management, cannot be accepted. Merely, because the Workman has worked for one or two days in a particular month would not mean that the said month would be counted as a whole to be taken into consideration for calculating the period for which the Workman has worked with the Management. What has to be counted is 12 preceding months from the date of termination and not 12 preceding calendar months including the whole month in which the termination has taken place irrespective of the date of termination, as has been asserted by counsel for the petitioner. This contention of counsel for the petitioner is against the provisions of Section 25-B(2)(a) of the Act itself, thus, unsustainable. As per Section 25-B (2) (a) of the Act, the period of one year is to be taken with reference to the date of termination and, therefore, it would mean 12 months preceding the date of his termination. In the present case, the services of the respondent/ Workman as per his own statement and claim, were terminated on 01.07.2003 and, therefore, 12 preceding months would be from 30.06.2003 backwards to 01.07.2002. It is, thus, apparent from the language of Section 25B(2)(a) itself that the date with reference to which calculation is to be made is the benchmark, but period of 12 calendar months prior to that has to be taken into consideration, which is from 01.07.2002, to 30.06.2003, in the case in hand as the date of termination is 01.07.2003. In view of this and in view of the admission made by counsel for the petitioner/Management on the basis of the records that the respondent/Workman would complete more than 240 days, if period is taken into consideration from July, 2002, to June, 2003, no fault can be found with the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, which would call for any interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.";