- (1.) The revision petition is against the order of ejectment passed by the Appellate Authority reversing the decision rendered by the Rent Controller. The issue that is brought before the Court in revision is purely on law and I would not detain the case by setting out elaborately on facts. The tenant, who is the revision petitioner, took the property or rent from one Ram Sarup, who was his landlord. His landlord himself had taken the property on lease originally for a period of 20 years on 15.07.1965. In an action for eviction brought at the instance of his landlord, the contention in defence by the tenant was that his (landlord's) own lease was only for a period of 20 years and after the expiry of said period, he had lost his status as landlord. His further contention was in relation to an event of purchase of half share from the original land owner. It was brought in evidence that his own landlord had purchased the remaining 50% from the original land owner. The contention consequently was that there was a change in his character of possession being a co-owner in possession of the property and therefore, he cannot be evicted.
(2.) The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would contend that after the termination of lease period on completion of 20 years at the time of commencement on 15.07.1965, his own landlord was liable for eviction in terms of the rent deed and therefore, the tenant has no compulsion to recognize him as his landlord. According to him, the tenancy in his (landlord's) favour stood extinguished by efflux of time and consequently, the operation of the bar of denial of landlord-tenant relationship as provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not arise. Learned Senior Counsel refers me to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Rajiv Srivastava v. Sanjiv Tuli and another, 2005 AIR(Del) 319 to contend that where a tenant (defendant in that case) continued to be in possession even after expiry of lease and when he had admitted rate of rent of premises, his own status as tenant would stand extinguished by efflux of time and when a suit had been filed after the termination of tenancy by notice, the decree passed by the Court would be taken as proper. This decision, in my view, has absolutely no application. Where a suit is been filed by his landlord for recovery of possession after service of notice when the period of lease had expired, the tenant could not plead his right to continue in possession. We are now confronted with the situation where the lease was in respect of an urban land with building to which the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 are applicable. The provisions of the Act are not notwithstanding any law to the contrary and Section 13 protects a tenant in possession of a building or a rented land against eviction, except in accordance with provisions of that Act. The determination of lease that could took place by efflux of time under Section 111 has no applicability at all to cases which are governed by the respective State legislation and the landlord, who was himself a tenant of the premises, could not have been evicted by his landlord otherwise than in accordance with provisions of Section 13 of the Act. On efflux of time, the tenant will become a statutory tenant and the landlord, who was a statutory tenant cannot lose his status as such by the mere fact that the period of lease has expired. The tenant in this case, who was a sub lessee cannot, therefore, contend that his landlord's right can be denied since the landlord's own lease had expired by efflux of time. The subtenant's right to possession owes its origin only to the right of his landlord and if his landlord were to lose his right to possession, a fortiorari, the sub-tenant's right could no longer subsist. Such an argument is untenable and without any substance.
(3.) Learned Senior Counsel also contends that he had purchased half the share from the original landlord directly and therefore, his own status has also changed and he could not be ordered to be evicted. Learned counsel relies on a decision of this Court in Thakar Dass v. Surjit Singh and others, 2010 158 PunLR 364 to contend that a tenancy in respect of which the sub-tenant had become a co-owner of the property by a purchase would result in extinguishment of his status as a tenant. The above case was in the context of a tenant who purchased 1/3rd share of the land from the owners to which the provisions of Rent Restriction Act were applicable and having purchased the property, he had sought for partition of the land between co-owners and on such partition, the status of tenant as a co-owner was found to have been extinguished. The issue, therefore, is not that the tenant buying the property of fractional share of the property could obtain a higher status as a landlord himself. If the decision were ever to make a meaning that a tenant on acquiring a fractional share of the property could defy the jural relationship itself then I am afraid it is not stating a correct proposition. The principle is governed squarely by Section 116 of the Evident Act, which is reproduced as under:- 116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.- No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.;