Ajay Tewari, J. - (1.) THIS judgment shall dispose of RSA No. 4106 of 2004, RSA No. 20 of 2005, RSA No. 21 of 2005, RSA No. 2048 of 2005, RSA No. 2241 of 2005, RSA No. 3024 of 2005, RSA No. 3344 of 2005, RSA No. 3345 of 2005, RSA No. 3405 of 2005, RSA No. 3406 of 2005, RSA No. 3407 of 2005, RSA No. 3408 of 2005, RSA No. 4382 of 2005, RSA No. 2954 of 2006, RSA No. 2957 of 2006, RSA No. 3829 of 2008 and C.R No. 2087 of 2006, as common questions of law and facts are involved therein.
(2.) IT is relevant to notice here that in RSA Nos.3344 and 3345 of 2005, there are applications for condonation of delay of 1341 and 2400 days respectively in filing the said appeals. Before embarking upon the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to decide these applications first. Counsel for the respondents has argued that in the said cases, there is delay not of days and months but years.
(3.) COUNSEL for the appellants has relied upon State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (SC),, 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 119 and has argued that in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had condoned delay of five years in filing the revision petition. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads thus : - 7. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy ( : AIR 1998 SC 3222) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 8. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra ( : 1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari ( : AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 11. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh ( : 1984 (4) SCC 66), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji ( : 1987 (2) SCC 107), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice -oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even -handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.;