Nawab Singh, J. - (1.) THIS claimant's appeal is directed against the judgment dated May 31st, 2010 passed by Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Mewat (for short 'the Commissioner'), whereby, he allowed compensation to the tune of Rs. 81,497/ - to be paid within thirty days of passing of the judgment, against respondents Nasrudin Kureshi and the Oriental Insurance Company, owner and insurer, respectively, of offending Canter No. RJ -14/GA - 3024 (for short 'the offending vehicle'). It was also ordered that in case the amount is not so deposited, rate of interest at the rate of Rs. 12% per annum from the date of judgment shall also be paid on the amount awarded. The judgment passed by the Commissioner has been assailed only on the short point of grant of interest. It is contended by counsel for the appellant that interest should have been paid with effect from 'thirty days after the suffering of injuries' and not with effect 'from the date of adjudication'. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo versus Srinivas Sabata and Another, (1976) 2 SCC 289 and judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited versus Manphool Singh and others : 2009 ACJ 458.
(2.) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has urged that the Commissioner awarded the interest correctly as it was to be paid from the date of adjudication of the claim. Reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamla Chaturvedi versus National Insurance Company and others, 2009 (1) ACC 60 (SC). When it comes to the question as to from which date the interest is to be awarded, the provisions of Section 4(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') are crystal clear. Firstly, it has to be understood that the compensation becomes due to the employee and the employer becomes liable to pay it from the date on which injury is sustained by the employee or the death takes place, as the case may be. However, sub -section (3) of Section 4 of the Act provides a period of thirty days to the employer to make the payment of compensation. It will be wrong to argue that the compensation becomes due on the passing of the judgment by the Commissioner. A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamla Chaturvedi's case (supra) after relying upon the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Mubasir Ahmed & another : 2007 (2) SCC 349, held that compensation becomes due only when Commissioner passes order or an award. That view is in direct conflict with the ruling of the Four -Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case (supra). In fact, Hon'ble Supreme Court completely negated the argument that compensation becomes due only when adjudication is done by the Commissioner and clearly held as under: - 7. Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub -section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if "personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment". It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under subsection (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under Section 19. What the section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under Section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by Section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary.
(3.) IN Kerala State Electricity Board and another versus Valsala K. and another etc. etc. : AIR 1999 SC 3502, a Three -Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court after relying upon the judgment of Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case (supra) held as under: -;