RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK - (1.) THE petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for quashing of FIR No.133 dated 26.08.2011, under Sections 420/120-B of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Mandi Gobindgarh (Annexure P-1), on the basis of compromise dated 31.10.2011 (Annexure P-2), arrived at between the parties. Notice of motion was issued. THE respondents have appeared and admitted the factum of compromise.
(2.) IN compliance of the order dated 22.03.2012 passed by this Court, the parties appeared before the Illaqa Magistrate and got their statements recorded. Consequently, report dated 04.04.2012 from the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Amloh has been received through the learned District and Sessions Judge, Fatehgarh Sahib. The Magistrate has reported that the parties have arrived at an out of Court settlement by way of compromise without any pressure. Learned counsel for the litigating parties are ad idem that since the parties have arrived at an out of Court settlement by way of compromise (Annexure P-2), which has been found to be genuine by the learned Magistrate also, the impugned FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom are liable to be quashed. Having heard the learned counsel for parties and after going through the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that since the parties have arrived at an out of Court settlement by way of compromise, which has been found to be genuine and without any pressure, the continuation of criminal proceedings would be nothing but sheer wastage of valuable time of the Court and would result in abuse of process of law. The view taken by this Court finds support from the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Shiji @ Pappu and others versus Radhika and another, 2012 (1) RCR (criminal) 9 and also the larger Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another reported as 2007 (3) RCR (criminal) 1052 . The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment in Shiji's case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under: "It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of Crl.Misc. No.M-39198 of 2011 3 recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."
(3.) COMING to the facts of the present case, this Court has satisfied itself that the parties have arrived at an out of Court settlement by way of compromise without any pressure. The compromise has been found to be genuine. The parties have decided to bury the hatchet. Thus, the continuation of the impugned FIR and the criminal proceedings arising therefrom would be serving no purpose and it would result in abuse of process of law.;