- (1.) The judgment dated 11.02.2011 passed by the District Judge, Hoshiarpur, dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff appellant (hereinafter referred as 'the plaintiff') against the judgment and decree dated 13.05.2010 passed by the trial Court, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for declaration, is under challenge. The factual position in the case is that two enquiries were held against the plaintiff, who has been working as a conductor in Punjab Roadways, Hoshiarpur. In the first enquiry, the Punishing Authority had awarded a penalty of stoppage of 8 annual increments with cumulative effect vide order dated 21.07.2005 and in the second enquiry, the Punishing Authority, vide order dated 04.08.2005, had compulsorily retired the plaintiff from service. On appeal, the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Transport Department, Chandigarh, vide order dated 18.10.2006 while deliberating over the issues, though held the plaintiff guilty, yet while examining the gravity of the charges, had reduced the penalty in both the cases to the extent of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect in each case. The plaintiff had challenged the aforesaid order by way of filing a civil suit.
(2.) The trial Court, vide judgment dated 13.05.2010, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The appeal filed by him also met the same fate on 11.02.2011.
(3.) The allegations against the plaintiff relate to the years 1999 and 2002. He also remained under suspension for some time. The plaintiff was charge sheeted on the allegations that he did not issue tickets to the passengers, though he had charged money from them. Be that it may, the Court should not interfere in the quantum of punishment, but it is not an abstract proposition of law and principles of natural justice could be put into operation in fit and suitable cases. This principle is popularly known as "Wednesbury Principles", to which reference has been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Om Kumar v. Union of India, 2001 1 SCT 214. The views of Lord Greene in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1947 2 AllER 680, have been relied upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para No. 26 and the conclusion has been recorded in para No. 71, which are reproduced as under:- 26. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the Wednesbury case, 1947 (2) All.E.R. 680 (CA) that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the U.K. and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service, 1983 1 AC 768, (called the GCHO case) summarised the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that "proportionality" was a "future possibility." xxx xxx xxx 71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary" under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.;