Bhopinder Singh Dhillon, J. - (1.) A complaint under Sections 193, 196, 199, 209, 420, 427 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, was filed against the Petitioner Mohinder Kaur and two others before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala. The Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the complaint on 19th June, 1970 on the ground that the Settlement Officer before whom the false documents are alleged have been used by the accused persons had not filed the complaint under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, the complaint was maintainable. The complainant went in revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, vide his order dated 16th January, 1971 accepted the revision petition and directed the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to proceed with the complaint and decide the same on merits. Smt. Mohinder Kaur Petitioner approached this Court through this revision petition against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala; dated 16th January 1971.
(2.) I have heard Mr. P.S. Mann, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. H.S. Awasthy, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, and Mr. Naubat Singh, the learned District Attorney for the State of Haryana, at considerable length, and am of the opinion that there is no merit in this petition. Mr. Mann, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently contended the following two points before me: (1) That the Settlement Officer under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmention) Act, 1948, is a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, therefore, the learned Settlement Officer in whose Court the offence is alleged to have been committed, having not filed the complaint, the private parties are not entitled to file the complaint and the same has been rightly dismissed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. (2) That the learned Additional Sessions Judge had no power to quash the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and at the most the learned Additional Sessions Judge should have made a reference to this Court and it was this Court which could set aside the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. As regards the point No. 1, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Settlement Officer is an authority created by the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, who is to decide the claim of the contending parties regarding the dispute in consolidation proceedings. The further contention is that according to the provisions of Section 40 of the Act, the Settlement Officer is empowered to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary for the purpose of any business before him as the Settlement Officer and the said person is enjoined by law to speak truth and is bound to appear before him. He, therefore, contends that the Settlement Officer, whose orders are also determinative and are subject to appeal before the higher hierarchy as envisaged under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act is certainly a Court and the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable.
(3.) THE learned Counsel has relied on the Observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a case reported in Virendar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab : A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 153, which are to the following effect: It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi -judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi -judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act is possesses all the attributes of a Court.;