D.S. Tewatia, J. - (1.) The petitioner, the Municipal Committee, Patiala, is the employer of sweepers impleaded in this writ petition through the secretary of their Union, respondent No. 2. Certain dispute arose between the petitioner and its sweeper employees and respondent No. 2, treating the same as an industrial dispute, represented to the Punjab Government, respondent No. 1, to refer the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, for adjudication. Respondent No. 1, vide notification, dated 14th October, 1968 (annexure 2 to the return of the State), referred the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab for adjudication. The decision of the Tribunal was sought on the following points: 1. Whether Jhota allowance should be increased? If so, from which date and with what details?
(2.) Whether part -time sweepers and sweepresses should be given increase in wages?
(3.) Whether part -time sweepresses and sweepers who have joined service after 1st April, 1956, should be given an ad hoc increase of Rs. 3/ - per month in wages as granted to other part -time sweepers and sweepresses who were in service on 1st April, 1956? If so, with what details? 4 Whether the following categories of workmen should be provided with free summer and winter uniforms and whether washing allowance should also be given? If so, with what details? (i) Whole as well as part -time sweepers and sweepresses. (ii) Sanitary Jamadars. (iii) Beldars. (iv) Night -soil Beldars. 5. Whether sweepers and sweepresses should be given Jharu and Basket allowance? If so, with what details? 6. Whether Night -soil Beldars' allowance, the payment of which has been stopped by the management, should be restored? If so, from which date and with what details? The aforesaid Tribunal gave its award, which was published in the Punjab Government Gazette, dated 13th March, 1970 (copy Annexure 'A' to the writ petition). The petitioner Municipal Committee has impugned both, the notification, dated 14th October, 1968, of the Punjab State, and the award given by the Tribunal, through the present writ petition, inter -alia, on the grounds - (a) That the petitioner Municipal Committee does not fall within the ambit and scope of the word 'industry' as defined in Sec. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act; (b) that the order of reference has not been properly authenticated and as such does not constitute a legal and a valid reference in the eye of law; (c) that the award has been given without notice and without giving hearing to the petitioner; and (d) that the finding of the learned Tribunal is not based on any evidence. Respondents 1 and 2 both placed their returns and controverted the allegation that the order of reference or the award suffers from any kind of illegality or lack of jurisdiction. Respondent No. 2, in addition, asserted that as a result of the services of the sweepers the petitioner Municipal Committee earns an yearly revenue of about two to three lakhs of rupees. A preliminary objection was also raised that the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction before the Tribunal and asserted that the same cannot be agitated for the first time before this Court in writ jurisdiction. 2. Mr. S.K. Sharma, Learned Counsel for the petitioner Municipal Committee, only pressed before me the attack against the award contained in the first ground and specifically stated that he does not press the other grounds of attack against the said award. So the soundness of his contention that the Municipal Committee does not fall within the ambit and scope of the definition of the word 'industry' as given in Sec. 2(j) of the Act has only to be considered in this case. 3. Whether the activity of the petitioner Municipal Committee relating to its scavenging and sanitary functions will bring it within the definition of the word 'industry' as defined in the Act pointedly came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in two cases: first time in D.N. Banerji v/s. P.R. Mukherjee : AIR 1953 SC 58 and second time in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur v/s. its employees : AIR 1960 SC 675. In both the cases, the municipal committee qua its employees, deployed in the sanitation department, was held to answer the definition of the word 'industry' as given in the Act. So far as the question before this Court is concerned, in my opinion, stands clearly answered by the above -quoted decisions of the Supreme Court, but the Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that as to whether a particular activity carried on by an employer with the help of the employees engaged in connection therewith can be termed as 'industry' depends on the construction put on the words 'employers', 'trade' 'business', 'undertaking', 'manufacture', and 'calling' used in Sec. 2(j) of the Act while defining the word 'industry' The Learned Counsel goes on to assert that since their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their latest decisions especially in the Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v/s. The Management of the Gymkhana Club : AIR 1968 SC 554 and in the Management of Sefdarjung Hospital v/s. Kuldip Singh Sethi (1970) I SCC 735, have given a restricted meaning to the aforesaid words, so earlier decisions in D.N. Banerji and the Corporation, of the City of Nagpur's cases (Supra) stand overruled by implication and, in any case, contends the Learned Counsel, can no longer be considered to be laying down a good law on the point.;