- (1.) By this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner impugns two orders, one dated June 10, 1969 of the Collector by which he raised a demand of Rs. 4651.37 as the arrears of rent against the petitioner, and another dated April 22, 1970, of the Commissioner, Ambala, by which he dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the aforesaid order of the Collector. The petitioner alleges that in accordance with its announced policy, respondent No. 1 (State of Haryana) allotted to the petitioner some sheds in the Industrial Estate of Ambala. The assurance held out by the respondent was that they would arrange for the supply of electricity to the allottees. The monthly rent of the plots was fixed at Rs. 350/- commencing from April 3, 1967, for the purpose of milling tools industry subject to final fixation of rent at a later date. The rent so fixed finally was payable from the date of taking possession of the premises by the allottees. The petitioner-lessee paid Rs. 1000/- as earnest money and asked respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to arrange installation of electric connection. They, however, failed to do so, nor did they deliver actual physical possession of the allotted plots to the petitioner. The sheds remained idle for a few months as they could not be used in the absence of electricity. No industry could be started there. Petitioner through his counsel, served a notice on the respondents informing them that he was not interested in the premises. The respondents, however, succeeded only partially in getting electric connection for night hours. The petitioner did not accept this partial and conditional possibility of getting electric connection. He, therefore, wrote to the respondent in November, 1967 to cancel the lease. In March 1968, the respondent cancelled the lease but started demanding the rent which, in fact, had never become due. The Collector then issued a notice under Section 7(1) of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This notice, according to the allegations in the return, was served on the petitioner by registered post on May 13, 1969. The petitioner did not attend the Court of the Collector, despite this service. Consequently, the impugned order was passed ex parte on June 10, 1969, wherein it was stated that a sum of Rs. 4561.37 was due from the present petitioner (then respondent) which should be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
(2.) Mr. Lakhanpal learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order dated April 22, 1970, of the learned Commissioner, dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred, suffers from apparent error of law inasmuch as it was held therein that the limitation for the appeal had started from May 13, 1969, that is, the date on which the notice under Section 7(1) of the Act, was served on the petitioner. The counsel maintains that the ex parte order dated June 10, 1969, of the Collector, which had been appealed against, was never communicated to the respondent, and as had been sworn to in the affidavit, the petitioner came to know of that order near-about February 17, 1970, when the Tehsildar, Patiala, in recovery proceedings informed the petitioner about the same. It is urged that the starting point of limitation for the appeal was February 17, 1970, and the appeal before the Commissioner having been filed on March 5, 1970, that is, within 30 days of the communication of the Collector's order, dated June 10, 1969, was within time.
(3.) There appears to be a good deal of force in these contentions. At the outset it will be appropriate to notice the law on the point. The limitation for an appeal from every order made under Section 7 of the Act, is prescribed by Section 9 of the same Act, the material portion of which reads as follows : "9. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Collector made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or Section 7 to the Commissioner. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred - (a) xx xx xx xx xx (b) In the case of an appeal from an order under Section 7, within thirty days from the date on which the order is communicated to the appellant :- Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time." What is to be noted is that every order whatever made under Section 7, has been made appealable by Section 9(1). The first thing, therefore, to be seen is, whether the impugned order dated June 10, 1969, of the Collector, was one under Section 7. This question will turn on a construction of the order. This order not only specifies the sum of Rs. 4561.37 including interest, as the amount due from the respondent, but also directs that it be recovered as arrears of land revenue. It is thus a sort of composite order falling mainly under sub-section (3) of Section 7. The terminus a quo for limitation under clause (b) of Section 9(2), therefore, would be the date on which the order was communicated to the appellant. Learned State counsel has not been able to show that this order dated June 10, 1969, was ever communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner has sworn in para 9 of his petition, that he was first informed of this order in recovery proceedings by the Tehsildar, Patiala, after February 17, 1970. He had admittedly filed the appeal before the Commissioner on March 5, 1970, i.e., within 15 days of the communication of that order. Thus considered, the appeal before the Commissioner was manifestly within time. The learned Commissioner was thus in error in taking May 13, 1969, (that is the date on which the notice under Section 7(1) was served on the petitioner), as the starting point of limitation. The impugned order dated June 10, 1969, of the Collector in fact, on that date had not been passed. Perhaps, there could be a point in accepting that date as the start of limitation if the order to be appealed against, had been passed under Section 7(1) simpliciter. In the present case, however, the impugned order of June 10, 1969, was one, as already noticed, substantially under sub-section (3) of Section 7. There is thus an error of law patent on the face of the record in the impugned order, dated April 22, 1970, of the Commissioner.;