R.S. Narula, J. - (1.) THIS is an application for review of our order, dated July 19, 1971, dismissing the writ petition of the applicants in limine. The ground on which review is (sic) is that the impugned orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the Central Government were wholly without jurisdiction as the above mentioned two authorities lacked inherent jurisdiction to hear the matter.
(2.) MR . Y.P. Gandhi, Advocate, who appears for respondent No. 5, has raised two preliminary objections against the maintainability of this application. He has firstly contended that under article 5 of the first Schedule to the Court Fees Act, 1970, one half of the fee leviable on the writ petition should have been paid on the application for review. Article 5 reads as below: - The Court Fees Act being a fiscal statute has to be construed strictly. Originally there was no specific provision either in Schedule I or in Schedule II of the Court Fees Act prescribing any special amount of court -fee payable on a writ petition. Therefore, an application under Article 226 of the Constitution used to be stamped with the same court -fee which is payable on a miscellaneous application. By the Court Fees (Punjab Amendment) Act (20 of 1960), the second Schedule to the Court Fees Act was, however, amended by the addition of item (iiA) under clause (d) of article 1 of that Schedule so as to provide that a court -fee of fifty rupees is payable on an application or a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India other than petitions for habeas corpus and petitions arising out of criminal proceedings. No specific provision has, however, been made even after the abovementioned amendment about the court fee payable on an application for review of a judgment or an order is a writ petition. Article 5 of the first Schedule would not be applicable to such a case as a writ petition is neither a plaint nor a memorandum of appeal within the meaning of that provision. It is significant to note that whereas the same amount of court -fee is payable on the memorandum of an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as was paid on the memorandum of a second appeal or other proceedings from which the Letters Patent Appeal arises, court -fee payable on a Letters Patent Appeal against the decision in a writ petition is still Rs. 5.25 P. in spite of the court -fee payable on the writ petition itself having been raised to Rs. 50/ -. No particular court -fee having been prescribed for petitions for review of orders or judgments passed in writ petitions, the court fee payable on such an application must be governed by clause (d)(iii) of article 1 of Schedule II that is court -fee payable on such an application is only two rupees sixty -five naye paise. The office has, therefore, correctly treated the review application as a miscellaneous application for purposes of court -fee. The sum of Rs. 2.65 P. paid in court -fee on the application is, accordingly found to be correct and the first preliminary objection is repelled. It was next submitted that the application has been filed beyond time as the limitation for filing an application for review has been reduced to thirty days under article 124 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The order sought to be reviewed was made by us on July 19, 1971. The present application was filed on August 17, 1971. The application has, therefore, been filed within time and the second preliminary objection is wholly without force.
(3.) IT is then contended by Mr. Gandhi that no notice of the review application was necessary to him as his client was neither present nor represented at the time when the writ petition was originally dismissed. Mr. Gandhi may possibly be correct, but it is not necessary to finally pronounce on this matter. So far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, the applicants are, in our opinion, entitled to succeed. No appeal is allowed against the order passed by us on July 19, 1971. The fact that the ground on which the impugned orders are intended to be attached goes to the root of the matter, and raises questions of inherent jurisdiction, is in our opinion sufficient reason for reviewing the order whereby the writ petition was dismissed in limine.;