H.R. Sodhi, J. - (1.) JOGINDER Singh respondent was employed as a Conductor in the service of the petitioner company which operates passenger bus services on various routes with its registered office at Hoshiarpur. On 11th August, 1967, a passenger bus was to leave Ludhiana but Waryam Singh who was to drive that bus did not turn up at the scheduled time. Joginder Singh without informing the management about the non -arrival of Waryam Singh to enable it to make some alternative arrangement took upon himself to drive the bus. This was undoubtedly a very improper and culpable conduct on It is part as it could have resulted in any serious consequences since Joginder Singh was not used to drive buses. A domestic inquiry was instituted against him after serving a charge -sheet, He was afforded several opportunities but in spite of service and for reasons best known to him he did not choose to appear and defend himself. The inquiry officer held him guilty of misconduct and his services were consequently terminated An industrial dispute having been raised, a reference was made to the Labour, Court Jullundur, under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter ended the Act. The only issue that required determination was whether the termination of services of Joginder Singh, Conductor (respondent), was justified or not. Before the Labour Court, the necessary partes appeared and the defence of Joginder Singn was that no proper inquiry was held and his services were wrongfully terminated. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Domestic inquiry was fair and proper and that Joginder Singh could not complain of having not been afforded proper opportunity. The findings of the inquiry officer were, therefore, affirmed. It, however, did not agree with the management on the quantum of punishment and relating on a judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court repotted as Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen,, (1966) I L.L.J. 462 was of the opinion that fine and warning would have met the ends of justice. The extenuating circumstances taken into consideration in the matter of punishment were that Waryam Singh driver absented himself suddenly and that since Joginder Singh had a driving license which entitled him to drive a bus, he could not be challaned on the road and that possibility of meeting an accident in his case could not be more than what would have been If Waryam Singh had driven the vehicle. According to the Labour Court, Joginder Singh is a young man who perhaps acted under a mistaken sense of duty. From the alleged seventy of punishment, the Court found it legitimate to infer that it must be for other reasons that the management wanted to get rid of the services of Joginder Singh and the incident in question furnished a handle to it to do so. The punishment of dismissal was, therefore, set as de and Joginder Singh ordered to be reinstated with full back wages and continuity of service. The award of the Labour Court was published in the Punjab Government Gazette dated July 25, 1969, and its validity is now being challenged in the present writ petition.
(2.) MR . Bhagirath Dass, learned counsel for the petitioner, has advanced the following contentions: (1) that it was not open to the Labour Court to sit as a Court of appeal over the decision of the management in regard to punishment imposed by it upon its employee who was proved to be guilty of misconduct, and that it is only in exceptional cases that interference with the quantum of punishment could be justified. The submission is that in the circumstances of the instant case the punishment could not be said to be shockingly excessive so as to warrant an interference by the Labour Court. Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd.'s case (supra) relied upon by the Labour Court modifying the punishment has been pressed into service by the learned counsel as well in support of his contention; (2) The reference (Annexure 'A') was had in law in as much as the same had not been authenticated by any person authorised in tins behalf under Rule 9 of the Rules of Business of the Punjab Government, 1966, read with Article 166 (2) of the Constitution. It is urged that Shri N.N. Vohra, Labour Commissioner, respondent could exercise the powers or the State Government for making a reference under Section 10 (I) of the Act in relation to a dispute which fell under Section 2 -A, but had no power to authenticate the order in the name of the Governor. A judgment of Tuli J. reported as Municipal Committee, Patiala, v. The State of Punjab and Ors., 1969 Cur. L.J. 1000, has been cited in this behalf; (3) That the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court which made the impugned award had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute as the Labour Court to which reference was originally nude had ceased to function The argument in order words is that with the appointment of Shri E F. Barlow as Presiding Officer a new Labour Court came into being necessitating a fresh order of reference. I have given my careful thought to the aforesaid contentions but find substance only in the first one and the last was not in fact seriously pressed by Mr. Bhagirath Dass. A Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal does not have an unfettered power of interference and cannot, as observed by the Supreme Court in Tilaghur Paper Mills Company, Ltd. v. Ham Naresh Kumar, (1961) I L.L.J. 611, substitute its own judgment for that of the management. The scope of the power of an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court to interfere in the dismissal of a workman by the management was considered by their Lordships in Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. and Anr. v. Their workmen : (1958) I L.L.J. 260, and the following four guidelines were laid down: (i) there is want of good faith; (ii) there is victimization or unfair labour practice; (iii) the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice; or (vi) on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse. In the instant case, the Labour Court accepted the finding of the management that the workman was guilty of misconduct and that the inquiry conducted against him was in order. From the quantum of punishment which the Court considered to be severe, it observed that "the whole action of the management does not inspire confidence and the case appears to be of victimisation". It was alive to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Doom Dooma Tea Company, Ltd. v. Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, (1960) II L.L.J. 56 and reiterated in Hind Construction and Engineering Company. Ltd.'s case. The mere fact that an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court would have given lesser or more punishment if the matter had come for its decision is not normally a relevant consideration for justifying interference with the order of the management. The awarding of the proper punishment is indeed the function of the management alone and interference will be only in exceptional circumstances where the punishment meted out is unconscionable, shockingly too severe and out of proportion to the default committed by the workman so as to warrant in inference that no reasonable employer would have, in similar circumstances, imposed such a punishment, The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has rightly treated the mistake of the Conductor, respondent 3. in driving the passenger bus which act of the latter exposed the lives of the passengers to the risk of an accident when there is nothing on the record to show that he had ever been en -rusted before with the driving of a passenger bus. It is not necessary that a person possessed of driving license must also be a good and efficient driver as experience in this line is equally essential. These are all matters which the management could know better and punishment of dismissal was deemed by it to be called for in the present circumstances As to whether a punishment is so shockingly severe that no reasonable employer would have imposed it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court must not be readily led by its own notions of what would be a just punishment and interfere with the decision of the management in this behalf. To my mind, the misconduct of the workman, respondent was sufficiently serious and the punishment awarded by the management could not be said to be shockingly severe. When the driver did not arrive in time, it was the duty of the respondent who was just a Conductor to have brought this fact to the notice of the management which would have arranged another driver. He acted desperado and unmindful of the consequences by indulging in the rash act of driving the vehicle himself. In transport concerns many of the conductors may be knowing some what driving and even possessing driving licenses but they cannot be permitted to ply the buses unless the management is satisfied that a particular person is really an efficient driver. It was a different matter that no accident actually took place but respondent 3 had committed a rash act which needed to be visited by such punishment as would serve a warning to others. The finding of victimisation is not based on any evidence and no inference to the effect was warranted from the quantum of punishment in this case. The Labour Court seems to be of the opinion that fine and warning would have met the ends of justice. It however tailed to appreciate that it assumed the functions of an appellate Court against the award of punishment and this is just what it had no jurisdiction to do. The award must, therefore, be quashed of this short ground alone.
(3.) TO assess merit of the second contention, namely, that the reference had not been properly authenticated in the manner required by the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution and intended to regulate the conduct of business of the State Government, it is necessary to look into the reference itself. The dispute between the petitioner and respondent 3 was basically an individual one covered by Section 2 -A of the Act unless it had become a collective dispute because of the other workers or a union having espoused his cause. No objection about the invalidity of the reference on account of the same having not been authenticated in accordance with law was taken before the Labour Court. No doubt, a copy of the reference head as Annexure 'A', refers to the dispute as existing between the workmen and management of M/s Doaba Roadways Ltd., Hoshiarpur but in the award the title of the case discloses a dispute between an individual workman and the management of the petitioner company. The award indeed opens with the following words: An industrial dispute, regarding the muter, as set oat below having come into existence between the workman and the management of M/s Doaba Koadwavs Ltd. Hoshiarpur, the Punjab Government referred the same to the Labour Court Jullundur, for adjudication. No appearance on behalf of any union was recorded though respondent 3 was represented by one Shri Brij Lal. The learned counsel has not invited any attention to any material on the record which could show that the dispute was not one covered by Section 2 -A. It was therefore, a fit case where objection about the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on the ground of invalidity of the reference should have, in the first instance been taken before the Court itself. The Labour Commissioner in his return has stated in unequivocal terms that the dispute fell under Section 2 A and this averment has not been controverted by the petitioner by tiling a rejoinder. I must, therefore, hold that the dispute was covered by Section 2 -A of the Act. Notification No. 13397 -I&E -III/67/ 28l16, dated August 11, 1967, as published in the Government. Gazette dated August 25, 1967, empowers the Labour Commissioner to exercise the powers exercisable by the State Government under Sections 10 and 12(sic)) of the Act in relation to an industrial dispute falling under Section 2 -A. The Labour Commissioner was beyond doubt competent to make a reference at his own without the necessity of the same purporting to be in the name of the Governor. In Municipal Committee. Patiala's case, decided by Tuli, J., the dispute was admittedly a collective one for which reference could be made: by the State Government alone and not by the Labour Commissioner who has been delegated a limited power extending only to a dispute falling under Section 2 -A. It was in such a situation that the learned Judge took the view that the award of the Labour Court based on a notification signed by the Labour Commissioner though it purported to be in the name of the President was without jurisdiction for want of proper authentication. The facts of that case are indisputably distinguishable from the one before us. In the instant case, the Labour Commissioner was competent to refer the dispute to the Court since the same fell under Section 2 A, and, to my mind, it makes no difference if the notification under Section 10(l)(c) though signed by him purports to be in the name of the Governor. The Labour Commissioner seems to have thought that as a delegate of the powers of the State Government, he could issue a notification in the name of the Governor but no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction arises in such a case nor can reference be held to be invalid on this ground. At the most, it was merely a technical or a formal defect not affecting the competence of the Labour Commissioner or jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The contention advanced by the learned counsel is thus, devoid of force and must be repelled.;